Memorandum on Conversation with Wellington Koo

Confidential

Memorandum.

Converstation with Dr. VKW Koo, Chinese Minister and Delegate, regarding Japanese Declaration.
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1. Dr. Koo stated that the Chinseese Delaegation haws a cable from the Chinese Government stating that that Government is not negotiating with the Japanese regarding Shantung and that it leaves to the Delegation in Paris all negotiations on that subject.

2. Dr. Koo says that the French Government has let the senators and deputies know that negotiatiohns are being conducted looking toward securing a declaration from the Japnanese, has intimated that the suggestions which have been made include eight points, and is fostering the impression that it expects the negotiations to succeed.The Committees which were appointed by the Deputies to study various parts of the treaty are to report on Monday, July 28. M. Maurice Long will report on Far East. M. Sarraut has spoken to M. Long. The Government naturally seeks to avoid criticism or interrogation on the Shantung matter.

3. Dr. Koo had a conversation with M. Clemenceau on July 17. M. Clemenceau said he might be counted on for support in getting a declaration from thte Japanese (not specifying what sort of declaration). He said that Mr. Lansing had given him a “paper” and that he had turned it over to M. Pichon and had asked M. Pichon to see Mr. Matsui. Dr. KooWellington Koo thinks M. Pichon may by now have seen M.rr. Matsui.

4. Dr. KooWellington Koo is of the opinion that the present would be a particularly opportune moment to see M. Clemenceau.------------------Comment.

I concur with Dr. Koo in the opinion recorded in 4 above.

An argument that would probably carry much weight with the French would be the following:The U?.S. Senate is raising more objection to the Shantung settlement than to any other point in the treaty (with the ecxception with of the provisions for the Leageue of Nations.). If it should chance that the Senate make a reservation in reference to Shantung, it would probably follow that tit would be strengthened in its opposition to other things to which the Administration has committed itself. This might endanger the treaty pledging the US to come to the aid of France. Therefore, measures which tend to weaken the opposition on the question of Shantung tend by just so much to lessen the likelihood of effective opposition to other agreements in which France is much more directly int interested.