The Chief Danger of Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements in Eastern Europe

THE CHIEF DANGER OF REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLUTIONARYMOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE: REVOLUTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

Revolutions can succeed or cause serious trouble more easily in free countries than in military autocarcies. Hence, free countries have more to fear than military autocracies from international revolutionary movements like that of the Bolsheviki or the German Minority Socialists.

The Governments of America and Great Britain are doing everything possible to encourage the German Minority Socialists and are apparently inclined to recognize the Bolsheviki as the de facto Government of Russia, which they undoubtedly are. But such recognition, or any friendly steps, would be taken by the Bolsheviki in Russia and all other countries as an acknowledgement of partial defeat by the "imperialist" governments of Great Britain, France and America, against which they have declared a world wide class war (with violence and a reign of terror, according to Lenine's last speech to the Soviet).

The German and Austrian pseudo-revolutionary strikes in reality proved the helplessness of the German and Austrian workers unless aided by widespread military revolt. But, occurring as they did at the same time with the Bolshevik conquest at Kiev, Odessa and Orenburg, they have immeasurably strengthened Bolshevik confidence -, until the slightest concession, or anything but a continuation of complete outward indifference, would be taken by them as showing that they are conquering the Entente countries also, and that we are becoming afraid of pacifist strikes similar to the Austrian and German ones.

The direct objective of our government in "establishing a better understanding" with the Bolsheviki is not to encourage them either in their home or their foreign policy but solely to delay and restrict their approach to Germany and above all to encourage their efforts to revolutionize the peoples of Central Europe. We are also endeavoring to appeal directly to these peoples to revolt. Both policies have the over-whelming approval of the Entente peoples. But we forget that the continuing success of Bolshevism in Russia and the growing strength of pacifist strikes in Germany and Austria immensely aid the already dangerous pacifist movements among the working-men of France, England, and Italy movements united in the demand for a Stockholm conference to bring about "an immediate democratic peace." As we have seen with the Bolsheviki, the emphasis is on the "immediacy" which involves a recognition of the war map and of the military situation at the time the conference is held. This is proved nearly every time a Stockholm advocate gets up to speak or write. "This awful war must end at once." That is the avowed purpose of the Conference, which proposes to deal with "realities."Entirely independently of German victories, brutal German peace terms, Bolshevik surrenders, or other events, the Stockholm movement grows without the slightest check or interruption. I have watched carefully for the influence of events. It is nil. No German victory or ultimatum can affect the underlying cause, war weariness accompanied by Utopian dreams fanned into new life by the Russian revolution.

The Stockholm movement grows apace. Sooner or later delegations may steal from the Entente countries (or be chosen from persons residing abroad) and the conference will occur or an agreement will be reached without it. The conference will contain one minority demanding German peace terms and another standing for the equal rights of all peoples, but the overwhelming majority will be for those terms upon which an immediate peace can be obtained. And if the conference is not held a Labor and Socialist entente, including all the parties of Europe will probably soon be formed and will reach the same conclusion.

The current in this direction is steady and rapid, and is accelerating. The French Socialists are unanimous and the labor unionists nearly unanimous for Stockholm, while a clear majority have already subordinated the question of peace terms to the proposition that an immediate peace can and should be attained. In Italy the situation was similar until the great defeat. After that there was a short revival of the fighting spirit; all later reports indicate a rapid tendency for Socialists and unionists to resume their previous revolutionary pacifist activities. The situation in England is not very much better. For the first time a full third of the labor unions have adopted the whole pacifist program, while Henderson, a leading spokesman of British Labor repeats almost daily that an international Socialist and Labor conference can bring an early end to the war. There is no danger that an international revolutionary strike to end the war will begin in England, but there is a very grave danger that such a movement may spread to England from Italy or France. The danger is not immediate. But if Bolshevism continues to succeed, and the German Socialists' strikes become more prolonged and menacing, a few months more may produce movements far more threatening to the French and Italian armies than are Bolshevism and German Socialism the armies of Germany and Austria. Such a general European movement would almost certainly spread to England. Nor could it fail to have an effect on Chicago, New York, San Francisco and our other foreign industrial centers in this country.

Even if in the midst of such a crisis the German government were overthrown and the war brought to an end, Germany would keep a very large part of the advantages she has won.

For the danger is that these widespread strikes will begin before the power of America has been fully developed, that is before Germany has lost anything whatever of her conquests. The German Socialists might voluntarily and magnanimously surrender surrender a certain part of the German gains. But even the Haase and Liebknecht programs do not offer to relinquish German domination over Germany's present allies, nor her economic domination over Russia and all surrounding small nations. Nor does the Haase program offer any solution of the questions of German and Austrian Poland and Alsace-Lorraine or propose any compensation for the vast destruction done by the Kaiser except very vaguely and insufficiently in the case of Belgium.

But it is far more probably that any revolutionary movement in Germany, before her military defeat would prove either partial or abortive. The result would then be that Germany would have been less weakened by her own upheaval than Italy, and France and, perhaps, less weakened than England.

The peace then offered would be even worse than that of Haase, namely, Erzberger's and Czernin's Teutonic and adaptation of the status quo ante and "no annexations, no indemnities" formula, with neighboring nations bound by coerced economic treaties and "readjustments of the frontiers."To aid the German Socialists (positively) and the Bolsheviki (negatively) is not only playing with fire, it is almost certain to end the war before German defeat or American victory with all the consequences that must inevitably follow such an indecisive outcome.