Cary T. Grayson Diary
Title
Cary T. Grayson Diary
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP16992
Date
1918 December
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
President Wilson’s great part in the shaping of the peace following the world war was one of the most remarkable tests of human endurance probably ever known. It was my privilege to be at the President’s side through the entire time that America was in the war, to accompany him to Europe, and to return with him after the peace was signed. The task which the President was forced to initiate, practically single-handed, brought great satisfaction to me as an American when it was successfully concluded. The whole proceedings were epoch-making and precedent-shattering. In the first place, no President of the United States ever had actually left American soil, although theoretically they had done so when former President Taft went to Panama. However, he made the trip on an American battleship.
When the Armistice came the American people were divided in their views as to how peace should be secured. Germany had clinched America’s absolute participation in all of the peace negotiations by making it plain that she sought peace on the Fourteen Points, as outlined by President Wilson in his addresses before Congress. From the outset there was discussion of a most serious nature as to who would constitute the American Peace Commission. The President in possession of facts known only to himself and gathered by trained observers designated for that purpose in Europe was probably the first American to realize the magnitude of what confronted the United States. He early saw that only a complete bringing into action of every bit of American prestige could prevent a peace “of force.” Realizing this the President decided that it would be advisable for him personally to head the American delegation. So far as I was concerned personally at the outset I counselled the President against the trip, feeling that the risks that must be run and the pressure that would be put upon him individually would be so enormous as to overtax his physical strength. However, I myself soon realized that there was nothing for the President to do but to assume the task.
When the first intimation was given the American people that the President was to go abroad there was a wide difference of opinion. Leaders of the Republican Party in Congress bitterly denounced the suggestion. It was very plain that they feared the President would endeavor to create political advantage for the Democratic Party. How foolish these utterances actually were developed when the weary grind commenced in Paris. Originally, the President had planned to make the trip and to hurry through the peace negotiations so that he would be back in the United States some time early in February. He could have accomplished that if there had been any sympathy with his views entertained by any of the other leaders of the belligerent powers allied together.
When the President sailed from New York for Brest, France, he had anticipated a very early gathering of the British, French, Italian and Japanese statesmen, who had been commissioned by their governments to arrange the peace terms. In fact, the President had been hopeful that before Christmas it would have been found possible to outline the general terms of the proposed treaty of peace, and to have started all of the experts on their tasks in order that the result would not be delayed long after the first of the year. This was found to be absolutely impossible within forty-eight hours after we landed in Paris.
As a matter of fact, Lloyd George, the British Premier, had appealed to the people and was holding general election. He made it very plain in the word that he sent the President that until he knew exactly where he stood, he did not propose to have any part in any treaty negotiations. Clemenceau, the French Premier, endeavored to get the President interested in the French peace proposals which were without doubt probably the most selfish ever entertained at the conclusion of any war. Revenge was the watchword. The French terms were designed entirely to wipe out Germany as a factor in world affairs and to exact from her everything that she possessed. Singularly enough, when the actual peace terms eventually were revealed by the various nations it was found that they closely resembled those of France. As a matter of fact, the United States was the only altruistic nation which was not desirous of robbing the crushed foe. The result was that President Wilson’s task was heart-breaking at all times. That he succeeded eventually in securing just, although stern terms for Germany was due simply to his absolute refusal at all times to compromise with the questions that were questions of national conscience.
I kept a day to day record of the President’s work. It carries through the hard times and shows plainly what a great American he was, and how he overcame difficulties that must have disheartened any man less fixed in his purpose. This record shows that at any time the President could have compromised and saved himself from material discomfitures but that at no time did he do so, his motto of securing “the greatest good for the greatest number” having been carried through from start to finish.
When the Armistice came the American people were divided in their views as to how peace should be secured. Germany had clinched America’s absolute participation in all of the peace negotiations by making it plain that she sought peace on the Fourteen Points, as outlined by President Wilson in his addresses before Congress. From the outset there was discussion of a most serious nature as to who would constitute the American Peace Commission. The President in possession of facts known only to himself and gathered by trained observers designated for that purpose in Europe was probably the first American to realize the magnitude of what confronted the United States. He early saw that only a complete bringing into action of every bit of American prestige could prevent a peace “of force.” Realizing this the President decided that it would be advisable for him personally to head the American delegation. So far as I was concerned personally at the outset I counselled the President against the trip, feeling that the risks that must be run and the pressure that would be put upon him individually would be so enormous as to overtax his physical strength. However, I myself soon realized that there was nothing for the President to do but to assume the task.
When the first intimation was given the American people that the President was to go abroad there was a wide difference of opinion. Leaders of the Republican Party in Congress bitterly denounced the suggestion. It was very plain that they feared the President would endeavor to create political advantage for the Democratic Party. How foolish these utterances actually were developed when the weary grind commenced in Paris. Originally, the President had planned to make the trip and to hurry through the peace negotiations so that he would be back in the United States some time early in February. He could have accomplished that if there had been any sympathy with his views entertained by any of the other leaders of the belligerent powers allied together.
When the President sailed from New York for Brest, France, he had anticipated a very early gathering of the British, French, Italian and Japanese statesmen, who had been commissioned by their governments to arrange the peace terms. In fact, the President had been hopeful that before Christmas it would have been found possible to outline the general terms of the proposed treaty of peace, and to have started all of the experts on their tasks in order that the result would not be delayed long after the first of the year. This was found to be absolutely impossible within forty-eight hours after we landed in Paris.
As a matter of fact, Lloyd George, the British Premier, had appealed to the people and was holding general election. He made it very plain in the word that he sent the President that until he knew exactly where he stood, he did not propose to have any part in any treaty negotiations. Clemenceau, the French Premier, endeavored to get the President interested in the French peace proposals which were without doubt probably the most selfish ever entertained at the conclusion of any war. Revenge was the watchword. The French terms were designed entirely to wipe out Germany as a factor in world affairs and to exact from her everything that she possessed. Singularly enough, when the actual peace terms eventually were revealed by the various nations it was found that they closely resembled those of France. As a matter of fact, the United States was the only altruistic nation which was not desirous of robbing the crushed foe. The result was that President Wilson’s task was heart-breaking at all times. That he succeeded eventually in securing just, although stern terms for Germany was due simply to his absolute refusal at all times to compromise with the questions that were questions of national conscience.
I kept a day to day record of the President’s work. It carries through the hard times and shows plainly what a great American he was, and how he overcame difficulties that must have disheartened any man less fixed in his purpose. This record shows that at any time the President could have compromised and saved himself from material discomfitures but that at no time did he do so, his motto of securing “the greatest good for the greatest number” having been carried through from start to finish.
Original Format
Diary
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Cary T. Grayson Diary,” 1918 December, WWP16992, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.