Notes
Title
Notes
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP15743
Date
1919 January 1
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
Notes on the Japanese-Chinese Question.
The public opinion of the world, especially in America and in the British colonies sympathises with China.
Germany entered Shantung, and Japan is now there, by virtue of pursuing the “mailed fist” policy.
The Japanese,-Chinese agreements of 1915 were extorted under pressure and with attempt at concealment and deceit. China, at the moment of signing, issued an official protest.
The United States is not only ot committed to the support of Japan but, on the comontrary, the American government specifically declared in May, 1915, that it woiuld not recognise agreements impairing the principles of the open door, the integrity of China, and the rights of other nations. The Lansing-Ishii Notes can in no way correctly be cited as bearing on the question now in controversy.
The Unitesd States is under special moral obligation to stand for the utmost measure of justice for China, as it was at the invitation of the American government, and through the persuasion of Americans that China entered the war.
The Allied and Assoiociated powers are all under moral obligation to refuse to sanction the doing of a wrong to China, inasmuch as they are bound by the professions which they made as to war aims and by the principles which they adopted as the nbasis for making peace, the Fourteen points proposed by President Wilson.
For the Conference to accept the contention that the question can be disposed of between Japan and China alone would be to evade responsibility.
To approve the Japanese contention that the settlement must conform to the terms of the agreements of 1915 and 1917 would be to set the seal of legality upon agreements decured by duress.
If the Conference renders a decision adverse to the Japanese claims it will, of course, occasion great annoyance in Japan. The effect, however, would be not that of an injury to the Japanese people; it would constitute a rebuke to a bureauocratic group which, pursuinga a policy of militaristic imperialism, has created an almost intolerable ineternational political situation, has forced an unjust issue, and is apprehensive for its own political future.
As contrasted with its this, a decision adverse to China, leaving Japan in an established political and strategic position in Shantung province, would cause a nation of 400,000,0000 people to despair of obtaining justice or security except tby embracing the very militarism which they fear and hate; it would destroy their confidence in the combined ideialism and strength of the United States; it would embitter them against the Occident; it would make for war rather than for peace in the Far East. Left to the mercies of Japan at this critical moment, Japan China would be forced to accept either subjugation to or an allience with Japan, with the probability in either case that the Orient would soon be arrayed in arms against the Occident.
A decision in fvavor of Japan’s claims would sanction the principle of conquest for profiyt.
A decision against Japan’s Shantung claims will do Japan no injury, and will constitute a reaffirmation of the principle that the world must be made safe for those who wish to govern themselves within their own territories.
Japan, like Italy, cites her treaties, urges her particular interests, pleads consideration of domestic p0litics and international prestige. Here too, an individual state places its own ambitions and self-adjudged interests above the principles accodrding to which it has agreed that the peace shall be made. And Japan, like Itialy, has alrwady gained or been conceded great advantages. Has she not been relieved of the “menace” of the presence of JGermant in the Pacific--in the worss of her own statesman. Has she not profited enormously in ,material ways through the elimination of this rival from the markets in which she competes? Has she not won great political prestifge? With a contribution infinaitley small in comparison with that made by the others, has she not been accoreded recogniytion before the world as the equal in diplomatic authority of the greatest occidental powers? SureltyJapan has been richly repaid for all that she has contributed toward the defeat of Germany.
The Japanese profession of willingness to restore the “lease of Kiaochow” and certain otherthingsat toKChina must be carefully considered for its exact import. The lease itself is a thing of comparative unimportance. The Japanese plan contemplates the retention of KJapan of the railroads (or joint Japanese, Chinese control, which would speedily become Japanese control), the retention of the right to build additional railroads, retention of mines, the establishment of an exclusive port on Kiaochow bay, and continsuation of the German right of first refusal in connection with assisting in economic enterprises throughout Shantung.
As in Manchuria, control of the railways and of a prort as a terminus would enable Japan to control Shantung, and added to the control of Manchuria, would make Japan strategetically the master of North China.
The Japanese proposals amount to “offering China the shell and securing for Japan the oyster.
The public opinion of the world, especially in America and in the British colonies sympathises with China.
Germany entered Shantung, and Japan is now there, by virtue of pursuing the “mailed fist” policy.
The Japanese,-Chinese agreements of 1915 were extorted under pressure and with attempt at concealment and deceit. China, at the moment of signing, issued an official protest.
The United States is not only ot committed to the support of Japan but, on the comontrary, the American government specifically declared in May, 1915, that it woiuld not recognise agreements impairing the principles of the open door, the integrity of China, and the rights of other nations. The Lansing-Ishii Notes can in no way correctly be cited as bearing on the question now in controversy.
The Unitesd States is under special moral obligation to stand for the utmost measure of justice for China, as it was at the invitation of the American government, and through the persuasion of Americans that China entered the war.
The Allied and Assoiociated powers are all under moral obligation to refuse to sanction the doing of a wrong to China, inasmuch as they are bound by the professions which they made as to war aims and by the principles which they adopted as the nbasis for making peace, the Fourteen points proposed by President Wilson.
For the Conference to accept the contention that the question can be disposed of between Japan and China alone would be to evade responsibility.
To approve the Japanese contention that the settlement must conform to the terms of the agreements of 1915 and 1917 would be to set the seal of legality upon agreements decured by duress.
If the Conference renders a decision adverse to the Japanese claims it will, of course, occasion great annoyance in Japan. The effect, however, would be not that of an injury to the Japanese people; it would constitute a rebuke to a bureauocratic group which, pursuinga a policy of militaristic imperialism, has created an almost intolerable ineternational political situation, has forced an unjust issue, and is apprehensive for its own political future.
As contrasted with its this, a decision adverse to China, leaving Japan in an established political and strategic position in Shantung province, would cause a nation of 400,000,0000 people to despair of obtaining justice or security except tby embracing the very militarism which they fear and hate; it would destroy their confidence in the combined ideialism and strength of the United States; it would embitter them against the Occident; it would make for war rather than for peace in the Far East. Left to the mercies of Japan at this critical moment, Japan China would be forced to accept either subjugation to or an allience with Japan, with the probability in either case that the Orient would soon be arrayed in arms against the Occident.
A decision in fvavor of Japan’s claims would sanction the principle of conquest for profiyt.
A decision against Japan’s Shantung claims will do Japan no injury, and will constitute a reaffirmation of the principle that the world must be made safe for those who wish to govern themselves within their own territories.
Japan, like Italy, cites her treaties, urges her particular interests, pleads consideration of domestic p0litics and international prestige. Here too, an individual state places its own ambitions and self-adjudged interests above the principles accodrding to which it has agreed that the peace shall be made. And Japan, like Itialy, has alrwady gained or been conceded great advantages. Has she not been relieved of the “menace” of the presence of JGermant in the Pacific--in the worss of her own statesman. Has she not profited enormously in ,material ways through the elimination of this rival from the markets in which she competes? Has she not won great political prestifge? With a contribution infinaitley small in comparison with that made by the others, has she not been accoreded recogniytion before the world as the equal in diplomatic authority of the greatest occidental powers? SureltyJapan has been richly repaid for all that she has contributed toward the defeat of Germany.
The Japanese profession of willingness to restore the “lease of Kiaochow” and certain otherthingsat toKChina must be carefully considered for its exact import. The lease itself is a thing of comparative unimportance. The Japanese plan contemplates the retention of KJapan of the railroads (or joint Japanese, Chinese control, which would speedily become Japanese control), the retention of the right to build additional railroads, retention of mines, the establishment of an exclusive port on Kiaochow bay, and continsuation of the German right of first refusal in connection with assisting in economic enterprises throughout Shantung.
As in Manchuria, control of the railways and of a prort as a terminus would enable Japan to control Shantung, and added to the control of Manchuria, would make Japan strategetically the master of North China.
The Japanese proposals amount to “offering China the shell and securing for Japan the oyster.
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Notes,” 1919 January 1, WWP15743, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.