Cary T. Grayson Diary
Title
Cary T. Grayson Diary
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP17116
Date
1919 March 26
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
This was probably the hardest day the President has had since he has been in France. In the morning he had a long session of the Big Four at his house; in the afternoon the meeting was continued at the residence of Lloyd-George; while in the evening the President conferred with and presided over the meeting of the committee on the League of Nations - not returning home until half past eleven o’clock.
The morning session of the Big Four was devoted again to the question of reparations. The President was endeavoring to bring about an agreement on the amount of indemnity that is to be exacted from Germany, and it developed today that he has the support along this line of both Lloyd-George and Orlando.
Today Lloyd-George told the President he believed that when they considered the time that had been lost he was convinced something must shortly be done to speed everything up. He called the President’s attention to the fact that he (the President) had been responsible for the unity of military command, and wondered whether it would not be a good idea to have a unity of diplomatic command. There has been a growing disposition on the part of both the British and the Italians lately to propose that the President himself formulate the complete program and put it across in his own way. They argue that inasmuch as the President will be held more or less responsible for the results, it is only fair that he should frame the program himself.
The Big Four at both morning and afternoon sessions made what was described as “substantial” progress in their work to establish the foundations for a peace that would be founded on the sound principles of justice, and which would be acceptable to HGermany herself. Inasmuch as there has been some talk that Germany might not sign when the peace treaty was finally submitted to her, there has been discussion in peace conference circles over what could be done should that refusal come. The general opinion, however, was that if the President’s plans were followed out the treaty, while stern, would not be so harsh that it would not finally receive approval from the Central Powers. It had been about decided that the treaty when completed will be a blanket treaty dealing with all of the Central Powers, instead of following out the original program, which was to make separate treaties with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.
I asked the President what would be the outcome if the Germans refused to sign the peace treaty. He heaved a sigh and said: “God knows.” “Of course,” he said, “it would mean that it would be necessary for the Allies to intervene by arms and this would be an awful thing to contemplate, but something of this kind would have to be done. What we must do, however, is what I have been contending for all along, and that is to prepare a peace that will be founded on justice. We must bear in mind all of the time that the peace must be one which Germany can sign. If we do that and our terms are based entirely on justice, should Germany refuse to sign, then the entire opinion of the world will be against her and it will simplify the task of dealing with her.”
At the night session of the League of Nations committee the entire constitution of the League was definitely approved and referred to a committee to be passed upon as to legal phrasealogy. This committee was made up of Lord Robert Cecil, Colonel House, Venizelos and Larnaude, the French Jurist. It was stated that the committee would probably have the complete re-drafted treaty ready for consideration by the full committee within a day or two. All of the amendments which had been approved and the original draft of the treaty were turned over to the committee, whose duty it was to clarify all ambiguous language and to reduce the textual size of the document as much as possible.
The biggest concession made to public opinion at home was to set forth in unmistakeable language the right of a nation to withdraw from the League should a contingency arise which would make such action desirable. In discussing this point before the committee the President said that he was prepared to say that so far as the United States was concerned it never would withdraw from the League unless a situation arose which would imperil its national honor. Should the time ever come when it did withdraw, the President said the world an would unanimously approve its action, and he could not see a situation arising which would compel such action.
Afterward the League of Nations committee assured the President and Colonel House at a ten-minute conference, at which Colonel House reported to him the result of his (House) conference with Premier Orlandoand earlier in the day.
Lloyd-George called the President’s attention to the fact that more than a majority of the members of the British Parliament had signed a memorial setting forth that he (the Premier) must stand for the infliction upon Germany of an assessment for war claims that would compel the payment of Germany’s last cent. He said that he had been warned if he did not stand out for such a program the opposition would move a vote of lack of confidence, and as they had the votes would remove him as Premier and force the downfall of the present Cabinet. The President did not seem to consider this in the nature of a catastrophe if it should come and told Lloyd-George that nothing would be finer than to be put out of office during a crisis of this kind for doing what was right. Should some one succeed him and discover that he had assumed a task which could not be accomplished, the roof of the temple would fall about his head, swallowing him, and history would give him (Lloyd-George) the fine distinction of standing for what was right and for not being awed by the opinion of the majority who were in the wrong. The President added: “I could not wish a more magnificent place in history.”
Another very interesting development which tended to show the British and American viewpoint regarding the question of excessive indemnity came today when Lord Sumner called at the temporary White House to present to Lloyd-George figures arrived at by the British experts, and which covered the British indemnity claims. These figures were very excessive and a sharp colloquy between the President and Lord Sumner developed. The President said that if the demands which Lord Sumner had presented were to be enforced they would inevitably lead to Bolshevism throughout all Germany. In reply the British representative said that they (Germany) would be cutting its own throat. To which the President responded that it would be inhuman for any normal being to contribute to anything that would lead to the murder of a nation; in other words, the President said: “You would be willing to have Germany murder itself rather than give up the indemnity. Any man who would express an opinion like this should not be permitted to participate in a peace settlement.”
The morning session of the Big Four was devoted again to the question of reparations. The President was endeavoring to bring about an agreement on the amount of indemnity that is to be exacted from Germany, and it developed today that he has the support along this line of both Lloyd-George and Orlando.
Today Lloyd-George told the President he believed that when they considered the time that had been lost he was convinced something must shortly be done to speed everything up. He called the President’s attention to the fact that he (the President) had been responsible for the unity of military command, and wondered whether it would not be a good idea to have a unity of diplomatic command. There has been a growing disposition on the part of both the British and the Italians lately to propose that the President himself formulate the complete program and put it across in his own way. They argue that inasmuch as the President will be held more or less responsible for the results, it is only fair that he should frame the program himself.
The Big Four at both morning and afternoon sessions made what was described as “substantial” progress in their work to establish the foundations for a peace that would be founded on the sound principles of justice, and which would be acceptable to HGermany herself. Inasmuch as there has been some talk that Germany might not sign when the peace treaty was finally submitted to her, there has been discussion in peace conference circles over what could be done should that refusal come. The general opinion, however, was that if the President’s plans were followed out the treaty, while stern, would not be so harsh that it would not finally receive approval from the Central Powers. It had been about decided that the treaty when completed will be a blanket treaty dealing with all of the Central Powers, instead of following out the original program, which was to make separate treaties with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.
I asked the President what would be the outcome if the Germans refused to sign the peace treaty. He heaved a sigh and said: “God knows.” “Of course,” he said, “it would mean that it would be necessary for the Allies to intervene by arms and this would be an awful thing to contemplate, but something of this kind would have to be done. What we must do, however, is what I have been contending for all along, and that is to prepare a peace that will be founded on justice. We must bear in mind all of the time that the peace must be one which Germany can sign. If we do that and our terms are based entirely on justice, should Germany refuse to sign, then the entire opinion of the world will be against her and it will simplify the task of dealing with her.”
At the night session of the League of Nations committee the entire constitution of the League was definitely approved and referred to a committee to be passed upon as to legal phrasealogy. This committee was made up of Lord Robert Cecil, Colonel House, Venizelos and Larnaude, the French Jurist. It was stated that the committee would probably have the complete re-drafted treaty ready for consideration by the full committee within a day or two. All of the amendments which had been approved and the original draft of the treaty were turned over to the committee, whose duty it was to clarify all ambiguous language and to reduce the textual size of the document as much as possible.
The biggest concession made to public opinion at home was to set forth in unmistakeable language the right of a nation to withdraw from the League should a contingency arise which would make such action desirable. In discussing this point before the committee the President said that he was prepared to say that so far as the United States was concerned it never would withdraw from the League unless a situation arose which would imperil its national honor. Should the time ever come when it did withdraw, the President said the world an would unanimously approve its action, and he could not see a situation arising which would compel such action.
Afterward the League of Nations committee assured the President and Colonel House at a ten-minute conference, at which Colonel House reported to him the result of his (House) conference with Premier Orlandoand earlier in the day.
Lloyd-George called the President’s attention to the fact that more than a majority of the members of the British Parliament had signed a memorial setting forth that he (the Premier) must stand for the infliction upon Germany of an assessment for war claims that would compel the payment of Germany’s last cent. He said that he had been warned if he did not stand out for such a program the opposition would move a vote of lack of confidence, and as they had the votes would remove him as Premier and force the downfall of the present Cabinet. The President did not seem to consider this in the nature of a catastrophe if it should come and told Lloyd-George that nothing would be finer than to be put out of office during a crisis of this kind for doing what was right. Should some one succeed him and discover that he had assumed a task which could not be accomplished, the roof of the temple would fall about his head, swallowing him, and history would give him (Lloyd-George) the fine distinction of standing for what was right and for not being awed by the opinion of the majority who were in the wrong. The President added: “I could not wish a more magnificent place in history.”
Another very interesting development which tended to show the British and American viewpoint regarding the question of excessive indemnity came today when Lord Sumner called at the temporary White House to present to Lloyd-George figures arrived at by the British experts, and which covered the British indemnity claims. These figures were very excessive and a sharp colloquy between the President and Lord Sumner developed. The President said that if the demands which Lord Sumner had presented were to be enforced they would inevitably lead to Bolshevism throughout all Germany. In reply the British representative said that they (Germany) would be cutting its own throat. To which the President responded that it would be inhuman for any normal being to contribute to anything that would lead to the murder of a nation; in other words, the President said: “You would be willing to have Germany murder itself rather than give up the indemnity. Any man who would express an opinion like this should not be permitted to participate in a peace settlement.”
Original Format
Diary
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Cary T. Grayson Diary,” 1919 March 26, WWP17116, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.