Notes on conversation today at luncheon with the Grand Duke of Alexander of Russia
Title
Notes on conversation today at luncheon with the Grand Duke of Alexander of Russia
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP17049
Date
1919 January 27
Description
Notes on Russia included in Grayson's typed diary of the first Paris trip.
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
The Grand Duke told me that he had lately arrived in Paris from the Crimea; that he had been for six months in the hands of the Bolcheviks; that he had no object in speaking concerning them except that of the good of his country; that he had not the least desire in whatever he did to bring about a monarchial restoration; nor was he making any effort whatever in that direction; that he wanted to speak to me as a man of the conditions in his own country, and that the only desire he had was for the establishment of an ordered government in which men could apply themselves to their work and retain the fruits of their labor; that the present Bolchevist regime was a rule of terror maintained by bayonets and of pillage carried out by force; that the promises of peace and well-being which they had made to the populations in the beginning had spread among the people like a sort of Spanish influenza, but that now the majority of the people were disgusted and downhearted with what had taken place; they were disillusioned and realised that the hopes excited were without foundation.
I asked him why the people did not rise against Trotsky and Lenin, and his reply was that the Bolchevists had come into the various countries which they controlled fully armed and equipped, having armed motor-cars, machine guns, and all the paraphernalia of war. That the people, wherever they were in control, had had everything in the shape of arms taken from them, and were left with only their bare hands with which to make resistance, and that it was therefore in the circumference of Russia, that is in Siberia, the Caucasus and the various other regions where opposition was organised, that they could secure the means for this resistance, and with but little help from the outside, except that of being helped in arms and equipment, his view was that the Bolchevists would ultimately be subdued by the Russians themselves. He added: I consider I look at it from a neutral point of view, above faction or party, and there can be no halfway ground of meeting between the Bolchevists and the parties of order; the idea of an orderly democratic government and of a majority rule was totally alien to the notion of the Bolchevist leaders, whose principle was the domination by a faction and a class; that the two ideas, Bolchevism and democracy, are diametrically opposed, just as much as the German militarist idea was opposed to that of the democratic nations of the west, one or the other must survive; and that the question could only be settled by conflict.
He further stated that the Bolchevist forces advanced and were sustained by the lines of railway, and that outside of these lines of communication there was little strength; that the situation was not at all that which obtained when the Russian Armies were holding a front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and that the forces which they controlled were not of the strength sometimes supposed.
He further stated that one trouble at present in Paris was that most of the Russians here belonged to parties of one kind or another, and were influenced in their consideration of the situation in Russia by their prejudices in favor of the party or faction to which they belonged; that he considered himself entirely above party, and all he hoped for was the regeneration of his country so that it could prosper by the arts of peace; that he never intended to return to Russia, and that, as I have stated above, he had no desire for, nor would he make any effort for the return of the monarchists to power, but he again emphasised the fact that according to his view there was no possibility of a compromise between the Bolchevists and a true democratic regime.
He further stated that he had often in his conversations with the Czaremphasised the importance of a liberalisation of government in Russia and the adoption of democratic methods, but that the Czar was surrounded by a a sort of Chinese wall which prevented his gathering correct impressions of the situation, and that his wife very strongly influenced him against making any concessions and insisted upon the necessity and duty of handing down the regime intact to which he had succeeded for the good of the country, and that it was his duty to do so.
I asked him why the people did not rise against Trotsky and Lenin, and his reply was that the Bolchevists had come into the various countries which they controlled fully armed and equipped, having armed motor-cars, machine guns, and all the paraphernalia of war. That the people, wherever they were in control, had had everything in the shape of arms taken from them, and were left with only their bare hands with which to make resistance, and that it was therefore in the circumference of Russia, that is in Siberia, the Caucasus and the various other regions where opposition was organised, that they could secure the means for this resistance, and with but little help from the outside, except that of being helped in arms and equipment, his view was that the Bolchevists would ultimately be subdued by the Russians themselves. He added: I consider I look at it from a neutral point of view, above faction or party, and there can be no halfway ground of meeting between the Bolchevists and the parties of order; the idea of an orderly democratic government and of a majority rule was totally alien to the notion of the Bolchevist leaders, whose principle was the domination by a faction and a class; that the two ideas, Bolchevism and democracy, are diametrically opposed, just as much as the German militarist idea was opposed to that of the democratic nations of the west, one or the other must survive; and that the question could only be settled by conflict.
He further stated that the Bolchevist forces advanced and were sustained by the lines of railway, and that outside of these lines of communication there was little strength; that the situation was not at all that which obtained when the Russian Armies were holding a front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and that the forces which they controlled were not of the strength sometimes supposed.
He further stated that one trouble at present in Paris was that most of the Russians here belonged to parties of one kind or another, and were influenced in their consideration of the situation in Russia by their prejudices in favor of the party or faction to which they belonged; that he considered himself entirely above party, and all he hoped for was the regeneration of his country so that it could prosper by the arts of peace; that he never intended to return to Russia, and that, as I have stated above, he had no desire for, nor would he make any effort for the return of the monarchists to power, but he again emphasised the fact that according to his view there was no possibility of a compromise between the Bolchevists and a true democratic regime.
He further stated that he had often in his conversations with the Czaremphasised the importance of a liberalisation of government in Russia and the adoption of democratic methods, but that the Czar was surrounded by a a sort of Chinese wall which prevented his gathering correct impressions of the situation, and that his wife very strongly influenced him against making any concessions and insisted upon the necessity and duty of handing down the regime intact to which he had succeeded for the good of the country, and that it was his duty to do so.
Original Format
Letter
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Notes on conversation today at luncheon with the Grand Duke of Alexander of Russia,” 1919 January 27, WWP17049, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.