William Graves Sharp to Woodrow Wilson

Although there has occurred nothing that is startlingly important or out of the ordinary course of events rumors growing out of the recent Conference in Paris possibly being excepted which have characterized the situation here especially since the arrival of the American troops, yet I have thought, at this time when the actual participation of our forces at the Front may soon commence, that I might well give you some of the conclusions which have been forced upon me after the prosecution of the war along lines that during almost three years have only been changed in their fixed manner of fighting by now and then the use of new and more inhuman means of destruction.

My letter also may serve the purpose of correcting certain false impressions as to conditions affecting the morale of the French people, which I believe grow out of too much generalizing from wholly exceptional incidents. At the outset in one sentence, may I say to you that America need have no concern as to the steadfast loyalty, co-operation and fixedness of purpose of France to "stand by her guns"; enormous losses of men and destruction of property have much weakened her strength, but have not lessened her courage, nor faith in her cause.

Owing in part to the fact that from time to time I have cabled to the Department quite at length, and in a few instances to yourself as occasion seemed to me to require, of events of such a nature that delay by writing would not answer the purpose, I have not written you more frequently; and it is also true that I realize how very much occupied your every hour must be during these days in meeting pressing and most serious problems at home.

Perhaps I may sum up the general situation here by saying that in all but the satisfaction which decided military successes could give from marked material advances, the conditions here are as favorable as could be expected, after such a supreme and long-endured test as France has stood in the face of such a powerful enemy. If there were strong grounds for the hope that the aggressive attacks of the Allies on the Western Front would, before the end of many months, result in ridding French soil from that enemy, one might indeed well feel free from any sense of concern.

It is true that from time to time socialistic agitators have, by making a noise, sought to disturb the public confidence in the stability of the Government, and to weaken the purpose of prosecuting the war to a finish; also that the influences of such movement have resulted at times in fomenting labor troubles, causing strikes in munition factories and some disaffection among the troops though in this latter case undoubtedly other causes had much to do with inciting mutinous conduct. All this manifestation was at its height about two months ago, and you may have read my rather full cablegram (No 2238) of June 27th. to the Department dealing with that situation. At the time, the influence of German money was suspected, and the presence of pro-German instigators from Spain and elsewhere was well-known. Since then proof positive has been secured of the use of German money to corrupt one of the French journals, which was loudest in its denunciation of the Government and the prosecution of the war, and the arrest of the editor and his suicide in prison are events of the last few days.

Speaking with Mr. Viviani, Minister of Justice, while this agitation was at its height, he told me that it possessed no weight or influence, and that such agitation to use his own simile was like the waves of the ocean that, while more or less constantly in action, generally found their level, and the efforts of the radical socialistic elements in France would subside because there was no intelligent public sentiment at the back of them.

Certainly every one even those not so friendly to the Government is perfectly willing to agree that general conditions, as they affect not alone the morale of the people but their attitude toward the Government, have much improved during the past few weeks. Undoubtedly the opportune arrival of the American troops under General Pershing had a splendid effect in helping to bring about this result. Arriving as they did, just at the height of this agitation and following the disappointment growing out of the lack of success in the big offensive movement, with heavy losses to the French troops, and especially the gloom succeeding the Russian defection, this event was psychological. It was like the sudden advent of a big brother upon the scene, coming to help a smaller one in a fight which was going against him.

As to the feeling toward the Government itself, it is quite generally predicted that there will be a radical change in the Ministry upon the re-assembling of Parliament in the Fall, and, according to prevalent opinion, Mr. Painlevé, the present Minister of War, will take Mr. Ribot's place as President of the Council. But somehow, watching as I have the going in and out of four different ministries since I assumed this mission, I have not been able to bring myself to believe that these changes were dictated nearly so much from a desire to have different policies pursued as from the ambitions of certain small factions to place their favorites in power. Happily, despite all these jealousies, there has been a remarkable unanimity on the part of Parliament, the Ministry, and the more enlightened class of people, in favor of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, and all factions vie with each other in their patriotic devotion to the country.

For a long time past the shadow of Caillaux has been thrown across the path of every movement, having for its purpose the changing of the Ministry; that his power and influence give considerable concern to the more conservative men of France cannot be denied.

However, much could be written of rumors given more or less currency affecting this or that man's public acts, supposed intrigues to displace this or that General, and even the members of the Government themselves are quite free to express their opinion of the lack of wisdom of this or that public measure. But I suppose such conditions are, after all, only the evidences that human nature is working pretty much in the normal way.

I may say for your encouragement that it is my firm conviction that neither the Government, Army, nor people of France will shrink from continuing to face with the utmost courage and unanimity the problems which this war imposes. The press of Paris, as well as of the entire country, voices this unanimity in defence of a common cause in such a manner, I am sure, as has never been witnessed in the press of our country. The intervention of the United States in the war has done more than merely give the French people encouragement,it has been accepted by them as the absolutely necessary factor to the success of the Allies. I have myself for a long time past shared that same opinion. A stalemate would have otherwise resulted.

This observation brings me quite appropriately to the second part of my letter, which I will devote to some of my own conclusions growing out of the methods employed by the opposing forces on both land and sea, for I have some strong convictions which, instead of being shaken by all the events that have preceded, have only confirmed me in their accuracy if I may be pardoned for expressing such conceit.

In a letter which I wrote to you at the beginning of the year, I took occasion to refer to the three chief factors which up to that time had resulted in prolonging the war and which gave promise of continuing it indefinitely, unless one or more of them were modified or wiped out altogether. These were: first, the equality in men and resources of the two contending forces; second, the resort to trench fighting; third, the use of the aeroplane, rendering surprise movements by either side practically impossible.Without going into the consideration of the manner in which they have operated to bring about this result, I can only say that at the end of three years of almost constant activity, particularly on the Western front, these same conditions are still present and all important, so much so that if I did not believe that there was a way of overcoming this impasse created especially by the trench system of warfare, I would become very pessimistic as to the prospect.

Even the augmentation, though critically necessary, of several hundred thousand of our own brave boys fighting at the Front in those trenches cannot result for a considerable time in doing more than maintain the equilibrium for the Allies, for, unhappily, their poor bodies are not any more immune from bursting shells than those of their French and British brothers who fight by their side, and, as it has been almost from the start a machine war, personal valor, dash and skill have not counted for so much as in previous wars. If the first and second line of trenches of the enemy have been taken, it is only to know that back of the third yet to be taken are endless series of other trenches with their barbed wire entangling barriers.Under past and present methods of waging this war on land, I long ago came to the conclusion that only the practical giving out of Germany's raw material for guns and ammunitions would cause her early defeat. Fortunately, there seems to be some reliable evidence of her serious need in that respect. The food situation in that country, from what I can learn, does not seem to be now any more acute than a year ago, with the harvests of the autumn to tide them over into another year. The line of those trenches cannot, then, be materially changed though all advances are bound to be in favor of the Allies.

In making this statement, I am aware that the news of the past week or two not only coming from the Italian front but also from Verdun, from the French attacks, and from the North of France from the British advance has been very encouraging, and a considerable number of prisoners have been taken; yet it is only perhaps from the latter direction, where the British troops are staking everything in a mighty assault on a scale not before attempted in the war, that there seems a prospect of material and permanent results.

In this connection Lord Murray told me a fortnight ago that some of his friends, Generals in the British Army, had just informed him while he was at the Front that it was to be a supreme test as to whether, with an unprecedented amount of ammunition at their back and the biggest guns, they could force the Germans back and across Belgium; the particular object being to recover Ostend and Zeebrugge, two of the important bases of the German submarines. He said that six or seven weeks of such campaigning must decide the issue for this year's offensive.But out of it all there is, in my judgment, a way to inflict such damage upon the German forces as to make it impossible for them to retain their ground. This way is pre-eminently through an overwhelming superiority and mastery of the aerial arm of warfare, and nothing has given me more satisfaction than to learn through the despatches during the past few weeks that America has come at last to realize this fact. Could the Allies at this time have 10,000 additional armed aeroplanes, with expert pilots, on the Western Front 20,000 would still prove more decisive I would look for a débâcle amounting to almost a collapse of the opposition, resulting in rapid and marked advances on the part of our forces.What would follow such a pronounced advantage in our aeroplane strength is too obvious to need any elaboration. This, then, is clearly the most important duty of our Government, and with out abundance of steam power and factory output we ought to soon furnish to our Allies this needed support. The chronicle of every day's fighting emphasizes its importance.

In the same way, though of different application in its use, aircraft can be used to great advantage in naval warfare. It is with the rather vain satisfaction which comes to the man who can say "I told you so" that I recalled to Admiral Gleaves, when he was recently in Paris, my statement made in a speech in Congress five years ago on the first day of this month, upon the future use of the aeroplane, that the cost of one modern battleship would be enough to construct a thousand hydro-planes, and he said to me that he would be very glad indeed to trade off one of our battleships for such an aerial fleet. While Admiral Jellicoe, at the recent Inter-Allied Conference held in this city, expressed to me the greatest appreciation for the efficient help of our cruisers over on this side of the water in protecting the merchant vessels, yet I believe that if the war is to continue well into another year, our American naval genius will find a way in which to overcome the serious menace caused by the submarine not merely by convoying ships and protecting them from attack, but in the more effective way of destroying them at their source of egress, or at least preventing them leaving their base. Ingenuity, boldness and dash which qualities, I am forced to believe, the British navy, with all its superiority in ships, has greatly lacked will be brought to bear on the problem.

A number of years ago, while I was serving in Congress, I was invited to witness the test of some of the big guns on the "Tallahassee", and during my stay of nearly a week on board of that ship, I became quite well acquainted with Admiral Glennon who, I understand, was a member of the recent commission to Russia. I was greatly impressed with his qualities and evidence of resourcefulness to meet all emergencies if necessity required, and it is to some such a man, I am sure, will come the great credit of achieving something worth while in the co-operation which we may be able to give to the Allies on the seas.But to what extent our own forces will be yet called upon to give aid in the actual warfare, no one can tell. In a situation where events seem to have no relation to precedent or logic, anything may happen in a day. I only know that while I have been pessimistic as to the power of the Allies to accomplish big results which presage an early conclusion of the war the result of so many military movements at the greatest sacrifice pointing to the contrary yet, somehow I have believed that when the mad Kaiser and his mad advisors come to appreciate and really feel the tremendous pressure which is getting under way from America, their hands will be thrown up in surrender to the inevitable as suddenly as their swords were drawn in launching this horrible war. It has been my prayer that this may come before our young men have had to give their lives, even though it be for a duty so necessary and in a cause so exalted.

At another time I will write acquainting you with some of the embarrassing situations which I personally know are confronting the Allies themselves, as they have to do with reconciling their interests not alone in plans affecting the prosecution of the war but of final adjustments to be made of their respective claims at the conclusion of peace.

In my intercourse with all my diplomatic colleagues, it has been a source of exceeding gratification to me to note the unmeasured confidence which they place in the unselfish purpose of America, and the wisdom and strength with which you have set forth her position.With high personal respect,

I am, dear Mr. President,