Thomas G. Masaryk to Charles R. Crane

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR
T.S. MASARYK TO
CHARLES R. CRANE.

1. The Allies should recognize the Bolshevik Government (de facto, the de jure recognition not to be discussed); President Wilson's message to their Moscow meeting was a step in this direction; being on good terms with the Bolsheviks the Allies can influence them. (I know the weak points of the Bolsheviks, but I also know the weak points of the other partiesthey are not better nor more able).
2. The Monarchic movement is weak; the Allies must not support it. The Cadets and Social Revolutionists organize themselves against the Bolsheviks; I do not expect great success of these parties. The Allies expected that Alexjeff and Kerniloff at the Don will have a great success; I did not believe it and refused to join them, though invited by the leaders. I say the same about Semenoff etc.
3. The Bolsheviks will maintain the power longer than their adversaries suppose; they will die, as all other parties, on political dilettantism it is the curse of the tsrism, that it did not teach people to work, to administer. The Bolsheviks have been weakened by their failure in the peace negotiations and in the land questions, but on the other hand they are gaining sympathies, learning to work, and because of the weakness of the other parties.
4. I would think a Coalition government of the Socialist parties the left of the Cadets included could after some time gain the general support. (The Bolsheviks of course included).
5. A lasting democratic and republican government in Russia will exercise (through the Socialist and democrats) a great pressure on Prussia and Austria; that is the reason why the Germans and Austrians are against the Bolsheviks.
6. All small nations in the East (the Fins, Poles, Ethonians, Lethons, Lithuanians, Bohemians, Slovaks, Romanians, etc.) need a strong Russia, else they be at the mercy of the Germans and Austrians. The Allies must support Russia at any rate and by all means. After conquering the East the Germans will conquer West.
7. An able government could induce the Ukrainians to be satisfied with an autonomous republic, forming a part of Russia; that was the original plan of the Ukrainians themselves, only later they proclaimed their independence. But an independent Ukrainia will be in fact a German or Austrian province; the Germans and Austrians follow with the Ukraine the same policy as with Poland.
8. It must be remembered that the South of Russia is the rich part of Russia (fertile soil, Black SeaDonetz Basin etc.) the North is poor; Russian politics will gravitate towards the South.
9. The Allies must have a common plan respecting Russia; how to support her.
10. The Government of the Allies must not leave their the functionaries in Russia without directions: in other words, the single Governments must have a clear plan respecting Russia.
11. The Japanese, I hope, will not be against Russia; that would suit the Germans and Austrians; on the contrary the Japanese should fight with the Allies, the chasm between Japan and Germany would be widened.
12. Nowhere in Siberia (-) have I (I have) seen German and Austrian armed prisoners; in Siberia there is no greater anarchy than in Russia.
13. The Allies must fight the Germans and Austrians in Russia:
(a) Organize a company buying up the grain (wheat etc.) and selling it where there is want of it: in doing so the Germans will be prevented from getting the grain. But the Russians (Ukrainian etc.) peasant will not sell his corn for money because it is useless to him, he wants manufactures, boots, clothes, soap, iron, implements, etc. As the Germans and Austrians have no manufactures the Allies have the best opportunity to occupy the Russian market. The plan requires only energy and organization, the capital put in the business will be returned.
(b) Germans and Austrians agents will flock into Russia the necessary counter action must be organized (American etc. agents must bring samples perhaps small (travelling) expositions of choice wares; illustrated catalogues Etc.)
(c) The Germans influence the Russian Press, not only by their special journalistic agents, but the German prisoners of war write in the various papers all over the country (not only in the big cities.) To some extent our Bohemian prisoners work against it, but the whole work must be organized.
(d) The Russian railways must be supported; without railways there will be no army, no industry etc.
(e) The Germans bought Russian securities to control in the future the industry.
(f) It is known that the Germans influenced the prisoners of war (for instance preparing the Ukrainians prisoners for the Ukrainian army etc.)
(g) I succeeded in organizing in Russia out of our Bohemian and Slovak prisoners a corps or 50,000 men; I agreed with the French Government to send it now to France. The Allies can help to transport the army; they are excellent soldiers as they proved in the renewed offensive last June.
We can organize a second corps of the same amount; that must be done to prevent our prisoners returning to Austria, where they would be sent to against the Allies to the Italian or French front.
The Allies agreed to procure the necessary means. In France we have a smaller corps also, partly sent from Russia partly formed of refugees; and I hope to form one in Italy too.
The political significance of a whole Bohemian army in France is evident; and I must acknowledge that France understood the political meaning of the matter from the very beginning and supported our national movement by all means. Minister Briand, was the first statesman who publicly promised to our nation the help of France and it was he who succeeded in inserting the Note to Wilson the explicit demand that the Czecho-Slavaks must be liberated. (The Czecho-Slovaks are the most western Slav barrier against Germany and Austria.
Under given circumstances 100,00 even 50,000 trained soldiers count.
14. My answer to the oft repeated question, whether there can be formed a Russian army: It could be formed in 6-9 months, say one million. The Red Guard is of no use and the Bolsheviks have already invited officers to join their army as instructors (Railroads necessary for the army.)
Note: Today's Advertiser April 11th. brings this news:
(Clipping from Japan Advertiser)
Volunteers Drop Arms.
Slovaks Corps going to France intercepted by Trotzky.

Nokusai Vestnik Service.Moscow, April 5. As the result of an understanding between M. Trotzky and the French Ambassador, a corps of Slovak and Tschen volunteers who were leaving for France surrendered their arms to the authorities of the Soviets. The officers have been discharged with the exception of General Diterichs, who was accompanying the corps to France.This is very favorable: the corps is going to France, they need not have their rifles as they will be armed in France; the officers mentioned are the Russian officers, who joined our army.