Thomas Nelson Page to Woodrow Wilson

Things are moving so fast these days that everything I write may be left far in the wake before this letter reaches you. However, it will serve to throw a little light on some of the things connected with the present situation in Italy which will have to be dealt with after this letter arrives.

My telegrams the more important of which I assume you will have seen, have given an accurate and pretty complete reflection of the situation here from day to day as they were sent. There is, however, such an undercurrent of uncertainty if not unrest discernable among the people whom I meet here that I wonder if the situation may not change before my telegrams arrive.

The press generally, that is, the press outside of the Vatican press and the Socialist press, sustain strongly your reply to the German request for an armistice. The Vatican and the Socialistic press are using the situation from their own point of view suiting their purposes. The Osservatore Romano, the Vatican official organ, declared last night that the German reply to your note establishes the sincerity of the Central Empires and declares that it gives the opportunity to consider calmly the proposals referred to in the correspondence. The rest of the press appears quite sincere in the declarations warning against being over-reached by Germany through accepting her response to your note as sincere. They reprint all the warnings to the same affect contained in the American, British and French papers and I confess that my own distrust of Germany is so profound that I feel that no amount of watchfulness would be excessive. I feel, moreover, and in this I am certain that I voice the universal opinion of all thinking men, that even should she promise everything it is necessary to exact from her complete and sufficient pledges to insure her compliance with her promises. The principal pledges mentioned as necessary guarantees to prevent her turning upon us and rending us if the possibility presents itself, are the surrender of her chief fortresses along her western frontier, including bridge-heads along the Rhine, and the surrender of her important artillery now west of the Rhine.

There are numerous other pledges suggested in the press, such as the surrender of her fleet, including her submarines, and including the fleet now in the Black Sea, which, of course, pre-supposes the opening of the Dardanelles. The first mentioned pledges, however, appear to be in the mind of almost everyone, and certainly they were in my mind, and immediately after Germany's request for the armistice I wrote out a telegram suggesting these as effective and probably necessary pledges. I, however, on reflection decided that you were about as likely to know not only the situation but the German people as I was, and would know what pledges to exact. I, therefore, only suggested the occupation of Metz and Strassburgh. You will recall that Germany demanded from France at the outbreak of the war the possession of Toul and Verdun as pledges of her continued neutrality.

You may possibly also recall that along in September, 1914, I wrote you of a casual conversation I had had with the then German Ambassador at Rome, Von Flotow, in which he informed me that Germany had won completely and that it was all over except the details "“ this was during the early stage of the battle of the Marne. I thereupon said to him, "I am not so certain of this as you appear to be, but you know, if you have won, nothing becomes a victor so much as magnanimity." To this he replied, "Oh, we shall not be hard on France. We do not wish any European territory beyond what we have." I said, "What then, will you demand" and he replied, "Oh, perhaps something of her colonies and perhaps her fleet."I wrote this either to you or to the Secretary of State and I think it was to you. In any event this was what Germany had already definitely made up her mind to demand from France.

There is undeniably much anxiety felt here by government people as to the danger of the people, under the inspiration of the anti-war Socialists and of the Vatican influences and owing to their being so tired and so poor, suddenly taking the matter in their own hands and declaring for peace. Every effort is being bent to prevent this. Yesterday there was a demonstration in Milan, but it was quickly overcome by a larger counter-demonstration in favor of standing firm. There was also a demonstration in Bologna which is a danger point, where women marched with pieces of bread on poles to the cry of, "Give us peace and bread." This demonstration, however, was soon stopped. These are important only as indicative of the sub-current which undoubtedly exists among the poor and to some extent also among another class who are well enough off but are against continuing the war. I believe that the Government is firm. I know that Baron Sonnino is and that if he had his way the war would be fought through to a final conclusion. My telegram sent you yesterday gives his views on this point. Sonnino is also for Italy's making an offensive even though she may not succeed in it"“he believes that the effect on the whole situation, especially on Italy's morale would be highly advantageous. In fact there is on the part of many thinking men here a feeling that a peace at this time would be against Italy's permanent interests. They believe that before a great while Austria will break and they will be able to recover the regions which they lost last Autumn, and they feel sure that they could do this if they had the aid of a reasonable number of American troops.Sonnino's position is, I have reason to know confidentially, that even an insuccess -- to render literally the Italian word -- would be better than no effort at this time. It is because of this view: that Italy would be at a great disadvantage should peace be made immediately, that the Italians are so eager to have troops sent them from the outside. They believe that the presence of American troops coming in now would inspire Italy to make a supreme effort which might possibly clear the road to the Trentine. I feel myself that the presence of American troops in any reasonable number in Italy or on the way to Italy would have an inspiriting effect which would not only relieve all danger of the people giving way but would send the Italian armies forward in what might prove a successful offensive, and would in any event serve to recall from the Servian front and from the French front whatever Austrian divisions there may be there. It is said that there are four and a half Austrian divisions now in Servia.

In his conversation with me last night Baron Sonnino was very earnest in his reference to the difference between the old frontiers of Italy and the frontiers of France. The position held by him and by the other Italian men who are responsible for the government, is that owing to her geographical conformation and to the way in which the Italian frontiers were laid down by Austria, the old frontier was completely dominated and now that the defenses of those frontiers have been destroyed by Austria, the old frontiers could not be held without the possession of strategic points which dominate the frontiers being in the possession of Italy. They think that this question should be studied by military and naval experts, as it includes the strategic points on the Adriatic, so that when the time comes for demanding pledges it may be understood what pledges are necessary to render Italy secure against attack.

The feeling here against France has grown noticeably and although it is not openly expressed, it is often very bitter. They think that France is "squeezing" Italy both on the east and on the west, and undoubtedly one reason that they have not been willing to place the Italian armies under the command of Marshal Foch is their distrust "“ not of him personally, but of French influence which many persons honestly believe would tend to sacrifice Italy. I think this feeling, which is certainly much more apparent than it was some time back, has to be reckoned with. And I think that if we took a hand here "“ that is, send American troops here, it would give us an opportunity to counteract what may become a very dangerous feeling in the future. Moreover, it would give us, first a better knowledge of the real situation of Italy, and, secondly, a more authoritative position when it comes to settling the vexed question of the Italian aspirations and of aspirations which may conflict therewith. On every account I feel it of great importance that we should send troops here. As I have said before, the despatch of American troops to Italy would be worth all the diplomacy that this generation could carry through. The Italians will never forget it if we send them troops, and they will never forget it if we do not. I am not speaking without warrant when I say that you are to-day the idol of the Italian people. You are the hope of every plain man and woman in Italy. They look to you with a confidence which is touching. You are the hope also of the struggling masses who are beginning to lift their faces towards the light, and I believe if you could know what they feel about you and about America you would feel as I do that this is something to be cherished. I know very well that you personally have great sympathy with these people, and that you are working for them as much as for our very own. I feel, however, that the military authorities have so subordinated every sentiment to the more tactical rules that Italy is losing that which but for this she would recieve.

My friend and colleague, Sharp, in Paris, when I was arguing earnestly not long since about getting aid to Italy, said to three or four other gentlemen who were present, by way of "jollying" me, "It is easy to tell who is the Ambassador to Italy." I replied, "The American Ambassador to Italy. You think I am pressing thus for Italy. Well, I am, but only incidentally. I am working for America first. It is America more than Italy that I have in mind in trying to get aid for the Italian army. I know that field down there and no one else that I have seen among the Americans in France has the least conception of it."Pray, pardon this long letter and the way in which it is written. If I do not keep you informed of the situation here I fear no one will, so this must be my excuse; and in closing I want to say that I think the way in which you have handled this peace proposal on Germany's part has not been excelled by anything that you have done since the war began.

Yours most sincerely,

Always, my dear Mr. President,
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.