Walter Hines Page to Robert Lansing

CONFIDENTIAL. 

London, Dated July 11, 1917.

Red'd July 12, 6 a. m. 6910, July 11 6 p. m.

Extremely confidential for the President from Admiral Sims:
"Your , July fourth. I have sent by the last mail to the Secretary of the Navy an official paper dated this month giving the present British naval policy, the disposition of the vessels of the fleet and the manner and method of their employment. This will show to what extent the various units of the fleet, particularly destroyers, are being used to oppose submarines, protect shipping and convoys. It is hoped and believed that the convoy system will be successful, it is being applied as extensively as the number of escorting cruisers and destroyers available will permit. The paper shows also that there remains with the main fleet barely enough destroyers and auxillary forces to meet a possible sortie of the German fleet on equal terms. The opposition to submarines and the application of convoy system are rendered possible on the whole because of the British main fleet and its continuous readiness for action in case the German fleet comes out or attempts any operations outside of shelter of its fortifications and mine fields. I am forwarding by next pouch the copy of a letter from the Minister of Shipping to the Prime Minister of June twenty-seventh showing the present shipping situation and forecasting the result of a continuance of present rate of destruction. This shows briefly that this rate is more than three times rate of building. A certain minimum amount of tonnage is required to supply allied countries and their armies. The letter shows that at present rate of destruction this minimum will be reached about next January, this is not an opinion but a matter of arithmetic. It means simply that if this continues the Allies will be forced to make an unsatisfactory peace. The North Sea is mined by the British and German mines for more than a hundred miles north and west of Helgeland up to the three mile limits of Denmark and Holland, over thirty thousand mines, and additional mines are being laid. It is through these neutral waters that almost all submarines have been passing. A sea attack alone upon German ports or any heavily fortified ports could not succeed against the concealed guns of modern defenses. I have just been informed that preparations are now being made for a combined sea and land attack to force back the German right flank and deny them the use of Zeebrugge as a provisioning base, though not yet definitely decided by the War Council. This would have been done long ago but for disagreement between the Allies. The German fleet has not left neighborhood of Helgeland for about a year. I am aware of but two plans suggested by our Government for preventing egress of German submarines. These were contained in Navy Department's despatch April seventeenth and May eleventh and were answered in my despatches April eighteenth and May fourteenth respectively. These same suggestions and many similar ones have been and continue to be made by people of all classes since the beginning of the war. I have been shown studies of the proposed plans and I consider them impracticable. It is my opinion that the war will be decided by the success or failure of submarines campaign. All operations on land must eventually fail unless the Allies lines of communication can be adequately protected. For this reason and as further described in my various despatches sea war must remain here in the waters surrounding the United Kingdom The latest intelligence is available here and can be met only by prompt action here. It is wholly impossible to attempt to direct or to properly coordinate operations through the channel of communications, letter or cable, therefore as requested by you if I had complete control of our sea forces, with the success of Allied cause solely in view, I would at once take the following steps:First. Make immediate preparations to throw into the war area our maximum force. Prepare the fleet immediately for distant service. As the fleet, in case it does move, would require a large force of protective light craft, and as such craft would delay the fleet's movements we should advance to European waters all possible craft of such description either in service or which can be immediately commandeered and put into service. That is, all destroyers, submarines, armed tugs, yachts, light cruisers, revenue cutters, mine layers, mine sweepers, gunboats, trawlers and similar craft.

Second. Such a force while waiting for the fleet to move should be employed to the maximum degree in putting down enemy submarine campaign and in escorting convoys of merchant vessels and troops and would be in a position at all times to fall back on our main fleet if it are without these waters.

Third. Prepare maximum number of supply and fuel ships. Establish at once lines of supply to our forces in France and be prepared to support our heavy forces in case they are needed.

Fourth. Concentrate all naval construction on destroyers and light craft and postpone construction of heavy craft, and depend upon the fact, which I believe to be true, that regardless of any future developments we can always count upon the support of the British navy. I have been assured this by important government officials.

Fifth. As far as consistent with the above building program of light craft, particularly destroyers, concentrate all other shipbuilding on merchant tonnage, divert all possible shipping to supplying the Allies.

Sixth. As the convoy system for merchant vessels at present affords better promise than any other means for insuring safety communication lines to military and naval forces on all fronts, we should lend every support possible to insure success. To this end we should cooperate with British authorities in the United States and here who are attempting to carryout convoy system.

Seventh. To carry out the above policy questions of economy should not be allowed to influence military decision and every consideration of the nature of ( ? ) methods of peace should be swept aside. Our entire naval war activities will be wholly dependent efficiency organization, similar in all respects to British squadron, and successful commercial organization I believe the above advice to be in accordance with Government's principles of military warfare. The first step is to establish here London branch of our War Council upon whose advice you can thoroughly depend. Until this is done it will be impossible to insure that the part which the United States takes in this war whether it is won or lost will be that which the future will prove to have been maximum possible. It is quite impracticable for our interest nearly single handed to accumulate all the necessary information and it is not only impracticable but unreasonable to depend upon decisions which must necessarily be based upon incomplete information since such information cannot be efficiently communicated by telegraph or letter. This can be assured if I be given adequate staff but they must be competent officers of the required training and experience. I urgently recommend that they be selected from the younger and most progressive types, preferably War College graduates, men of the type of Knox, Pratt, Twining, McNamee, Cone, Sterling, Pye, King, Cotten, Coffee. I wish to make it perfectly clear that my reports and despatches have been in all cases an independent opinion specific facts and official data which I have collected in the Admiralty, and other government departments. They constitute my own conviction and hence comply with your request for an independent opinion.
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