Political Situation in the US
Title
Political Situation in the US
Creator
Peter Goelet Gerry
Identifier
WWP15789
Date
1919 June 7
Description
Senator Peter G. Gerry writes a memo on the political situation in the United States, especially in the Senate.
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
Peter Gerry, the young Senator from Rhode Island, who has been in Europe a month making a careful survey of the situation with a view to his course in the Senate, has given me the following statement of his conclusions on the eve of sailing for America:
“When I left home I was convinced that the sentiment of America strongly supported the President in the effort he was making to bring our Associates together in an organized scheme for peace. The attitude of the independent press and the pronouncements of such men as Mr. Taft and President Lowell of Harvard, and the comparatively insignificant opposition carried on by partisans and men little distinguished for their statesmanship and enlightened views, indicated clearly to my mind that the best American opinion favored the effort made by the President in Europe. The Republican Party, which in the previous history of the country had at times of crises stood in a general way for Americanism, found itself at present without a definite policy and took the place that my party had been known to occupy at times as a party of opposition. Not a single strong voice, so far as I could observe, was raised against the scheme of a League of Nations and a treaty that would embody the advanced liberalism without which a change from the old order of balance of power and militarism was impossible. I am speaking now not of the Republican masses, because, I believe that they are represented by Mr. Taft and President Lowell of Harvard rather than by their leaders in Congress.
I want to be careful to make due allowance for two facts: The first is that America is remote from the arena of action. The second is that perhaps during the times of war a strict censorship, and the habit formed thereunder of suppression, has prevented the dissemination of the knowledge essential to the formation of public opinion in a democracy. What has been lacking during the difficult processes of treaty-making has been the kind of American opinion which in our domestic matters furnishes such a wholesome influence and guidance in the shaping of action. In my investigations here I have found no difference of opinion practically among Americans, whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and a study of conditions onf the spot invariably results in their giving support to the American course of action, both in the diplomatic proceedings and in our military management. Men like Mr. Wickersham and Mr. Hitchcock have come here with the questioning point of view perhaps, but when they have familiarized themselves with conditions, fair and intelligent men as they are, they have gone home with a new opinion and have frankly expressed it. There is among those who have come here on various duties no partisan line at all. I am not expressing merely a Democratic opinion when I say that the President in his general management of the war -- and he was personally responsible for all the big decisions that were made -- and General Pershing as Commander-in-Chief and General Bliss as member of the Supreme War Council, as well as Admiral Benson and Admiral Sims and their associates in the Navy - have made a record that, instead of being pecked at by partisan demagogues and ex-patriated Americans, entitles them to and they will ultimately receive the grateful recognition of the American people. Before leaving this subject I want to deprecate the unfortunate tendency at Washington to rip up particular phases of our operations in the field, which can only result in discrediting in Europe, and to some extent in America, a leadership which on the whole, both at the front and in the rear, was efficient, conscientious and gloriously successful. Any American who undertakes to pick out faults in battle where the general effort was so splendid and so fully vindicated by the result is doing a disservice. Every one knows that war in its nature is a mixture of success and failure in detail, of efficiency and error, and must be judged by results. The initiative is what counts, and in this war, although we were young and inexperienced in technique and would cheerfully concede superiority in that respect to the more experienced French, we were fortunate in furnishing to the whole Allied cause the North Americanism in leadership which history will show resulted in the energetic action which shortened the war and saved hundreds of thousands of lives.
When one looks back at the Spanish-American War and realizes the possibilities growing out of unpreparedness and inexperience, one’s heart is filled with gratitude that we had in command and in key positions generally men who were so capable and sleepless in their effort for the cause that there is not a single fatal mistake that any one can find in the management in the field; and that the war was brought to an end so speedily with a minimum of sacrifice after the President’s great decision to send disorganized units to Europe in the Spring of 19171918. I consider that decision, and his decision - made practically on his own responsibility and against the main body of technical opinion at the time, to put the barrage in the North Sea against the submarine (and fight the submarine at its base) as having had more to do with the winning of the war than any other decisions made.
Coming to the question of the President’s negotiation with the other government heads on the subject of peace, I have tried to make a careful and open-minded study of what has been happening in Paris. People who sit in their arm-chairs in America and criticise, as I have indicated before, do not have a full conception of the difficulties of the European situation. In the first place, far away from the scene they do not realize to what extent Europe was ruined and shattered. The heads of the governments - none too secure in their tenure to begin with - had behind them shell-shocked communities, each clamorous for its own particular point of view. The President came into the situation with his high ideals, and, having no narrow self-interest of any kind, but representing that spirit of good will and ideality which animates the American people. It was complained when he came that he was a doctrinaire. If he is a doctrinaire it must be conceded that he is a very practical one. He has sat down with his colleagues, and if I had any criticism on his course it would be that he has been too considerate of their point of view. At every stage of the proceeding it would have been to his profit, for example, to have complete publicity. His aims, his personal convictions, his way of playing the game of politics would have been advantaged at every stage by having the fullest possible newspaper accounts of what was going on. The European condition, however, was otherwise and not a government in Europe could have survived the publication of what was being attempted while the action was still uncrystallized and undetermined. You would have had Clemenceau succeeded first by one and then another, with perhaps a drift in the direction of extreme socialism. Something like that would have happened in England, and something worse in Italy. The President soon saw the situation and realized that it was necessary to make a personal sacrifice, and to subject himself to a back-fire at home that resulted from lack of knowledge as to what was going on. He has not permitted himself at any time to be confused or disturbed by the unfair attack, which, while as I think of little account at home, has come to the European people with sinister effect. They have been encouraged in their natural eagerness for individual advantage by the belief that there was in America an opinion much more favorable to their ambitions than that entertained by the President. Thus he has found himself between these two fires, and the success of his negotiations while as I believe it has been very great in the end, has been compromised to some extendt by the character of the opposition at home especially as to the length of time in obtaining his result.
It is not for me to defend the President. He is amply able to defend himself. He has not chosen to keep himself or his activities before the American public, and perhaps in that respect he has made a mistake. As a matter of fact, he is a poor publicity man, believing more in results. But the time will come when he will face his critics. I am sure that nobody will deny that this is a field in which he can take care of himself. And he will go to America with a case so full of merit that it is very difficult for me to imagine the opposition maintaining itself against him.
I want to say that I think that America is in the position in Europe that the people in America would wish her to occupy. Their idea of helping a crippled world to its feet and of making practical the great lesson of this war against similar calaimities in the future has been well carried out.”
----
“When I left home I was convinced that the sentiment of America strongly supported the President in the effort he was making to bring our Associates together in an organized scheme for peace. The attitude of the independent press and the pronouncements of such men as Mr. Taft and President Lowell of Harvard, and the comparatively insignificant opposition carried on by partisans and men little distinguished for their statesmanship and enlightened views, indicated clearly to my mind that the best American opinion favored the effort made by the President in Europe. The Republican Party, which in the previous history of the country had at times of crises stood in a general way for Americanism, found itself at present without a definite policy and took the place that my party had been known to occupy at times as a party of opposition. Not a single strong voice, so far as I could observe, was raised against the scheme of a League of Nations and a treaty that would embody the advanced liberalism without which a change from the old order of balance of power and militarism was impossible. I am speaking now not of the Republican masses, because, I believe that they are represented by Mr. Taft and President Lowell of Harvard rather than by their leaders in Congress.
I want to be careful to make due allowance for two facts: The first is that America is remote from the arena of action. The second is that perhaps during the times of war a strict censorship, and the habit formed thereunder of suppression, has prevented the dissemination of the knowledge essential to the formation of public opinion in a democracy. What has been lacking during the difficult processes of treaty-making has been the kind of American opinion which in our domestic matters furnishes such a wholesome influence and guidance in the shaping of action. In my investigations here I have found no difference of opinion practically among Americans, whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and a study of conditions onf the spot invariably results in their giving support to the American course of action, both in the diplomatic proceedings and in our military management. Men like Mr. Wickersham and Mr. Hitchcock have come here with the questioning point of view perhaps, but when they have familiarized themselves with conditions, fair and intelligent men as they are, they have gone home with a new opinion and have frankly expressed it. There is among those who have come here on various duties no partisan line at all. I am not expressing merely a Democratic opinion when I say that the President in his general management of the war -- and he was personally responsible for all the big decisions that were made -- and General Pershing as Commander-in-Chief and General Bliss as member of the Supreme War Council, as well as Admiral Benson and Admiral Sims and their associates in the Navy - have made a record that, instead of being pecked at by partisan demagogues and ex-patriated Americans, entitles them to and they will ultimately receive the grateful recognition of the American people. Before leaving this subject I want to deprecate the unfortunate tendency at Washington to rip up particular phases of our operations in the field, which can only result in discrediting in Europe, and to some extent in America, a leadership which on the whole, both at the front and in the rear, was efficient, conscientious and gloriously successful. Any American who undertakes to pick out faults in battle where the general effort was so splendid and so fully vindicated by the result is doing a disservice. Every one knows that war in its nature is a mixture of success and failure in detail, of efficiency and error, and must be judged by results. The initiative is what counts, and in this war, although we were young and inexperienced in technique and would cheerfully concede superiority in that respect to the more experienced French, we were fortunate in furnishing to the whole Allied cause the North Americanism in leadership which history will show resulted in the energetic action which shortened the war and saved hundreds of thousands of lives.
When one looks back at the Spanish-American War and realizes the possibilities growing out of unpreparedness and inexperience, one’s heart is filled with gratitude that we had in command and in key positions generally men who were so capable and sleepless in their effort for the cause that there is not a single fatal mistake that any one can find in the management in the field; and that the war was brought to an end so speedily with a minimum of sacrifice after the President’s great decision to send disorganized units to Europe in the Spring of 19171918. I consider that decision, and his decision - made practically on his own responsibility and against the main body of technical opinion at the time, to put the barrage in the North Sea against the submarine (and fight the submarine at its base) as having had more to do with the winning of the war than any other decisions made.
Coming to the question of the President’s negotiation with the other government heads on the subject of peace, I have tried to make a careful and open-minded study of what has been happening in Paris. People who sit in their arm-chairs in America and criticise, as I have indicated before, do not have a full conception of the difficulties of the European situation. In the first place, far away from the scene they do not realize to what extent Europe was ruined and shattered. The heads of the governments - none too secure in their tenure to begin with - had behind them shell-shocked communities, each clamorous for its own particular point of view. The President came into the situation with his high ideals, and, having no narrow self-interest of any kind, but representing that spirit of good will and ideality which animates the American people. It was complained when he came that he was a doctrinaire. If he is a doctrinaire it must be conceded that he is a very practical one. He has sat down with his colleagues, and if I had any criticism on his course it would be that he has been too considerate of their point of view. At every stage of the proceeding it would have been to his profit, for example, to have complete publicity. His aims, his personal convictions, his way of playing the game of politics would have been advantaged at every stage by having the fullest possible newspaper accounts of what was going on. The European condition, however, was otherwise and not a government in Europe could have survived the publication of what was being attempted while the action was still uncrystallized and undetermined. You would have had Clemenceau succeeded first by one and then another, with perhaps a drift in the direction of extreme socialism. Something like that would have happened in England, and something worse in Italy. The President soon saw the situation and realized that it was necessary to make a personal sacrifice, and to subject himself to a back-fire at home that resulted from lack of knowledge as to what was going on. He has not permitted himself at any time to be confused or disturbed by the unfair attack, which, while as I think of little account at home, has come to the European people with sinister effect. They have been encouraged in their natural eagerness for individual advantage by the belief that there was in America an opinion much more favorable to their ambitions than that entertained by the President. Thus he has found himself between these two fires, and the success of his negotiations while as I believe it has been very great in the end, has been compromised to some extendt by the character of the opposition at home especially as to the length of time in obtaining his result.
It is not for me to defend the President. He is amply able to defend himself. He has not chosen to keep himself or his activities before the American public, and perhaps in that respect he has made a mistake. As a matter of fact, he is a poor publicity man, believing more in results. But the time will come when he will face his critics. I am sure that nobody will deny that this is a field in which he can take care of himself. And he will go to America with a case so full of merit that it is very difficult for me to imagine the opposition maintaining itself against him.
I want to say that I think that America is in the position in Europe that the people in America would wish her to occupy. Their idea of helping a crippled world to its feet and of making practical the great lesson of this war against similar calaimities in the future has been well carried out.”
----
Files
Collection
Citation
Peter Goelet Gerry, “Political Situation in the US,” 1919 June 7, WWP15789, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.