Cary T. Grayson Diary
Title
Cary T. Grayson Diary
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP17030
Date
1919 January 9
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
THURSDAY.
The President had a two-hour conference with Premier Orlando of Italy who had come to Paris in order to press Italian claims in Dalmatia and secure for Italy control of the Adriatic. Orlando came to speak confidentially, not wishing Sonnino to know of his visit, because of the personal relations between them which were decidedly strained. Orlando gave many reasons for Italy’s claims; among them that her boundaries should extend far to the north in order that she might never again be at the disadvantage of having a foe attack her from an elevated position and also because, he said, otherwise the Italian Army always would have the disadvantage of having the sun in their eyes. Orlando pushed Italy’s claim to the whole eastern shore of the Adriatic, including the fortified islands, which are to be in the Yugo-Slavia Republic. The President, while having warm sympathy for Italy’s ambitions, simply could not support this claim, because he felt that to give Italy a military control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic would be to create a serious military menace to the new governments coming into being in that region. The President’s own idea at this stage was that Italy should have the Trentino and Trieste, but neither Polo nor any material portion of the Dalmatian Coast. The President’s idea was that the fortified islands on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, should be dismantled and that, inasmuch as the Yugo-Slavia Republic would not have a Navy, therefore having no menace to the east of her Italy would have no strategic claim to the territory. This proposal also took into consideration the internationalization of the straits of Ontranto. This was rather a bitter pill to the Italians, but I recalled an indication of how the people felt about it. When in Rome, Mr. Page, the Ambassador, told the President that he had a conversation with an Italian, who asked him how much of the territory he thought Mr. Wilson would let Italy have and finished up by saying: “Well, I suppose if Mr. Wilson does not want us to have it, we should not get it.” This was an indication of the popular confidence which the President had aroused in Italy. At this stage, however, the President was debating, “in his own mind,” as he expressed it, how far he could disappoint the Italian popular ambitions and still get through an amicable settlement. There was one other incident which illustrated the way in which territorial ambitions were being carried out. In Rome, the President learned that the one regiment of American troops, which had been assigned to the Dalmatian territory, had been divided by the Italian Commander into platoons and used as a “cover” for the Italian advance into the disputed territory. The President learned that the Italian military chiefs had found when they advanced into the towns of Dalmatia, Albania and Yugo-Slavia, rioting followed the appearance of Italian troops. The Italian commander then adopted the expedient of sending in small bodies of American soldiers. They were received with popular rejoicing. During the night however, the Americans would be withdrawn and replaced by Italian soldiers. In this way, the Italian commander had been using the popular esteem for the Americans to advance his own troops far across the armistice line. The President directed that the whole regiment should be assembled at once, under its own colonel. One young lieutenant in this regiment, who refused to take the American troops over the armistice line into Montenegro, when the Italian commander so directed, had made possible the discovery of the plan. The President did not know his name, but remarked that he thoroughly appreciated his good sense.
DIARY ENTRY:President had about two hours conference with Orlando. He showed me the Italian map—what they, the Italians wanted from Trieste & Dalmatia and what he could not grant—and why—and drew a line explaining on the map—why Dalmatia could not be included—The effects of sun in their eyes—Italy—The line must extend to the top of the mountain to give all an equal show in combats—The Hugo Slavs to have no navy—forts to be dis armed.Orlando did not want Soneno to know he was seeing the President.WW. attended conference Crillon Hotel. WC Slusher, Jesse Jones, Raymond Dickinson dined at Abbeys Alberts restaurant—
The President had a two-hour conference with Premier Orlando of Italy who had come to Paris in order to press Italian claims in Dalmatia and secure for Italy control of the Adriatic. Orlando came to speak confidentially, not wishing Sonnino to know of his visit, because of the personal relations between them which were decidedly strained. Orlando gave many reasons for Italy’s claims; among them that her boundaries should extend far to the north in order that she might never again be at the disadvantage of having a foe attack her from an elevated position and also because, he said, otherwise the Italian Army always would have the disadvantage of having the sun in their eyes. Orlando pushed Italy’s claim to the whole eastern shore of the Adriatic, including the fortified islands, which are to be in the Yugo-Slavia Republic. The President, while having warm sympathy for Italy’s ambitions, simply could not support this claim, because he felt that to give Italy a military control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic would be to create a serious military menace to the new governments coming into being in that region. The President’s own idea at this stage was that Italy should have the Trentino and Trieste, but neither Polo nor any material portion of the Dalmatian Coast. The President’s idea was that the fortified islands on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, should be dismantled and that, inasmuch as the Yugo-Slavia Republic would not have a Navy, therefore having no menace to the east of her Italy would have no strategic claim to the territory. This proposal also took into consideration the internationalization of the straits of Ontranto. This was rather a bitter pill to the Italians, but I recalled an indication of how the people felt about it. When in Rome, Mr. Page, the Ambassador, told the President that he had a conversation with an Italian, who asked him how much of the territory he thought Mr. Wilson would let Italy have and finished up by saying: “Well, I suppose if Mr. Wilson does not want us to have it, we should not get it.” This was an indication of the popular confidence which the President had aroused in Italy. At this stage, however, the President was debating, “in his own mind,” as he expressed it, how far he could disappoint the Italian popular ambitions and still get through an amicable settlement. There was one other incident which illustrated the way in which territorial ambitions were being carried out. In Rome, the President learned that the one regiment of American troops, which had been assigned to the Dalmatian territory, had been divided by the Italian Commander into platoons and used as a “cover” for the Italian advance into the disputed territory. The President learned that the Italian military chiefs had found when they advanced into the towns of Dalmatia, Albania and Yugo-Slavia, rioting followed the appearance of Italian troops. The Italian commander then adopted the expedient of sending in small bodies of American soldiers. They were received with popular rejoicing. During the night however, the Americans would be withdrawn and replaced by Italian soldiers. In this way, the Italian commander had been using the popular esteem for the Americans to advance his own troops far across the armistice line. The President directed that the whole regiment should be assembled at once, under its own colonel. One young lieutenant in this regiment, who refused to take the American troops over the armistice line into Montenegro, when the Italian commander so directed, had made possible the discovery of the plan. The President did not know his name, but remarked that he thoroughly appreciated his good sense.
DIARY ENTRY:President had about two hours conference with Orlando. He showed me the Italian map—what they, the Italians wanted from Trieste & Dalmatia and what he could not grant—and why—and drew a line explaining on the map—why Dalmatia could not be included—The effects of sun in their eyes—Italy—The line must extend to the top of the mountain to give all an equal show in combats—The Hugo Slavs to have no navy—forts to be dis armed.Orlando did not want Soneno to know he was seeing the President.WW. attended conference Crillon Hotel. WC Slusher, Jesse Jones, Raymond Dickinson dined at Abbeys Alberts restaurant—
Original Format
Diary
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Cary T. Grayson Diary,” 1919 January 9, WWP17030, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.