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Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia

John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson

http://resources.presidentwilson.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/WWI0592.pdf

Title

John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson

Creator

Williams, John Sharp, 1854-1932

Identifier

WWP21802

Date

1917 August 10

Source

Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1786-1957

Text

My Dear Mr. President

I notice that ex-Senator Root, in the newspaper account of his report -- whether the account is accurate or not, I do not know -- has recommended that we send "at least a few troops to Russia for the moral effect," and that "our mutual friend" James Ham Lewis has suggested we send a whole army.

Outside of the general impolicy of separating forces so that the enemy may conquer each, some thoughts occurred to my mind which are not original but which grow out of conversations with people who know Russian conditions and out of a somewhat long-extended study of the Russian national character in politics and literature which I have made.Senator Root's idea is the moral effect: That sort of moral effect is very well in France, and you will remember I advocated it upon the floor, and I am glad that Pershing has gone there, and I hope it is possible to get our boys into action pretty soon, with the Red, White and Blue floating with the Blue, White and Red right upon the battleground. That sort of thing appeals to the Frenchman; it would not appeal to the Russian. The Russian officers would be jealous of a lot of West Pointers who have never seen actual service if they should attempt to teach them, and they regard themselves as old veterans and think that they know a lot more about the practical art of war than the West Pointers could know merely theoretically. The Russian private soldiers would misunderstand the situation owing to the fact that we are not at war with Austria. The troops whom they mainly meet upon the battlefield are Austrians, and they would say at once: "Here are a lot of Americans coming over here to serve in our Armies and they are not even at war with our enemies." The Russian don't like the Germans and he hates the Austrians, especially the Hungarian-Austrians even more than the German-Austrians.

The general body of the people of Russia, outside of the officers and soldiers in the Army, would properly & wisely say: "What we want from America are ambulance corps, doctors, surgeons, railway transportation experts, experts in the manufacture of munitions. We have the men; we may not have all the money we want, we would like to have a little of that from the United States -- though we can get along without it."

Instead of Mr. Root's few men, or small army, having "a moral effect," as suggested, it would, in my opinion, considering the sentimental character of the Russian people, the ignorance of many of them, the very high racial pride of the balance, have an absolutely immoral effect, or, rather, a demoral effect: that is a better word although it is not English.

The long single line of railway from the Pacific Ocean to Petrograd, thence out, is already overburdened. What is needed is more transportation facilities and better administration of the railway facilities which already exist across the Asiatic-European Continent. To crowd the lines with Regular American troops when what they want is to have the lines crowded with to their utmost capacity are munitions and men who are expert in making munitions, and locomotives, cars and rolling-stock, & ambulance service would be, I think, a very grievous mistake.

Outside of all that stands the central idea which Napoleon Bonaparte, Stonewall Jackson and Julius Caesar understood and which men not trained in military science have failed to understand, that is, you must select some point to strike at with all your force, and stand upon the defensive elsewhere. That point undoubtedly now is in Western France and Belgium, and reaching down to the seacoast line upon the Allied left and the German right. If we can break them off from the sea, even if it cost the lives of a quarter of a million men, we will win this war, because that would throw out men upon their right flank and upon their right flank rearwhich of itself is not a very conclusive move though very important; but the movement would be almost conclusive in this sense, that it would separate the German Army from the seathe narrow part of the English Channel and the North Sea, and would destroy the opportunity for submarine bases along there, and destroy all chance of taking advantage of the territorial waters of Holland for Army purposes in cooperation with their Navy, and would force a realignment of the Germans not from the sea to Switzerland, as now, but from the Dutch border, somewhere about or below Antwerp, to Switzerland.

I hope you won't think that I am foolish enough to think I am a great military expert, and I hope you won't think I am foolish enough even to attempt to tell you what should be done, what you know, that I am not but any man who has read military history is possessed of the elementary knowledge upon the strategics which I have recited although he may be ignorant of other strategics and thoroughly ignorant of all tactics.

I am, with every expression of regard

Very truly yours,
John Sharp Williams

To

Wilson, Woodrow, 1856-1924