William Thomas Ellis to Josephus Daniels

Washington, D. C.

Pursuant to your request, I am glad to submit to you a memorandum on what I think our course should be in Russia. As you suggest, my background is that of personal travel over more than 15,000 miles of Russia within the past year. I have intimate personal experience of the new mood in that sadly perturbed land, so I shall follow your suggestion that I write in terms of what America ought to do in the present situation.

First and obviously, we ought to recognize clearly, as we are doing, that Russia may become Germany's greatest asset. There is a real possibility that she may raise a Russian army to do her will in the West; for the Russian peasant is as clay in the hard hands of the German drill-master. How completely she can dominate is shown by her experience in Riga. Of course, there is also the ominous likelihood of all the vast material resources of Russia being utilized by the Germans.

Above all, we must recognize the existence of one dominant state of mind in Russia. That is, the peasantry and the working men are obsessed by the spirit of the revolution. Ninety per cent. of the people of Russia care more for the revolution than they do for Russia. The passion for freedom--a fire which was lighted by America's torch--burns brightly in the breast of the people, even during these dark and bewildered days. I have seen soldiers who were deserting from the front fight heroically when they thought the revolution was in danger. The master word of the bolsheviks is "counter revolution". Whenever they can persuade the people that the revolution is menaced, and that there is danger of a return to anything like the old order, then they may be sure of the support of the masses. It is a tragic imitation of liberty that these people of the darkened mind now enjoy, but they would not relinquish even this for anything which smacks of the old regime.

So whatever is done in or for Russia must reckon with the dominance of the revolutionary sentiment, strongly tinged with bolshevikism. There is no shadow of a government in Russia except that of the soviets. No party or group or class would presume to say that it is the real Russia government or nation as opposed to the bolsheviks. Were the foreign powers to ally themselves with the theoretically right but thoroughly discredited Cadet Party, or with the representatives of business and autocracy, they would at once alienate the bulk of the Russian population. Whatever dealings we may have with Russia must be, for the present, with the soviets. (Needless to say, I am not a supporter of the bolshevik regime, and thoroughly disapprove of their methods and of most of their principles. I consider bolshevikism a real and great menace to the world.)

The principal asset of the Allies in Russia to-day is the good will of the Russians toward America. Only those who have passed through the mobs and riots and disorganization of Russia, by means of the magic word "Americansky", can understand how general and how deep is the friendship of all classes of Russians for the people of the United States. They know us better than we suppose, and they trust us entirely. We are their brother democracy. To take any action that would forfeit this friendship would not only be recreancy to a trust, but it would also be to shut ourselves off entirely from the possibility of fulfilling our unique mission to this sorely distressed nation--for, after the tribulations of many years, there will again be a great Russia.

What is the bearing of all this upon the proposed military intervention in Russia? We owe it to the Russians and to ourselves to interpose all possible barriers against German advance, especially in Siberia. At the best, there are serious physical obstacles to be overcome by such an expedition. If we can secure an invitation from the Siberian Soviet to enter Russia to help save the country from the Germans, we should do so up to the utmost limit of our power. Three months ago, I am persuaded, it would have been easily possible to get such an invitation. These soviets are rather easily handled. Let us remember how immature and how used to subordination are the men who are now ruling in Russia. They are really but children of a larger growth, unreasoningly dominated by a few distorted ideals. Even yet it should be possible to secure such an invitation from the Siberian Soviet. It is unlikely that anything could be done with the Central Council of Soviets which assumes to govern the nation.

This invitation can be secured only by America. Men of a sensitive social spirit, keen to understand the Russian people, men like Raymond Robins and A. C. Hart (in charge of the Prison Work of the YMCA) could be entrusted with this delicate task of sitting down with the Siberian soviet and winning its confidence to the extent of securing an invitation for an allied relief force.

Such special emissaries as I have suggested should be accompanied by wise propagandists and by relief workers and economic and administrative helpers. In a friendly way, America should go in with evidences of her desire to help Russia, and then secure from Russia the request for the larger means of staying the advance of the Germans. No matter what military steps are taken, they should be accompanied by a great ministry of helpfulness to the Russian people.

The underlying religious spirit of the Russian people may also be utilized to save the nation from the twin perils of Prussianism and Bolshevikism.

To enter Russia in military force, without the invitation or consent of the Russian soviets, would be invasion, and practically on all fours with Germany's invasion of Belgium. It would give the bolsheviks the best of excuses for reasserting their leadership, and it would surely drive the people into the hands of Germany. Under such conditions, an allied force would have to fight Russians before it could fight Germans, --and that is unthinkable to anybody who takes the American viewpoint.

May I add that the clamor which is being raised by exiled Russians who, for whatsoever reason, failed to stay in their own land to protect and serve her, is given undue weight in the press of America? There is much to be said about the character and state of mind of these exiles, but it is enough to remark that apparently their zeal for the reclamation of Russia is not entirely distinct from their desire for a return of their former estates and privileges.

I think I have written enough, Mr. Secretary, in this hastily dictated memorandum, to fulfill your request. I am so sensible of the gravity of the Russian situation that there is no work of my own that I would not set aside in order to come to Washington at any time to give to the Government any shred of information or judgment that I may possess. I feel deeply that we must serve and save Russia; but with equal confidence I feel that we dare not invade Russia with a military force and against her will.

It is implied in what I have said in the foregoing that should the way be opened for a military expedition to cooperate with the Russian people against the Germans, it should be not exclusively a Japanese enterprise, but that there should be at least a representation of America and our other allies upon it.

With sincere esteem, I remain as ever,