The New Chancellor

No. 19
SECTION I.

THE NEW CHANCELLOR.

While it is yet too early, from the fragmentary comment which has reached us from Berlin, to interpret the full significance of the change in the chancellorship, one point stands out with startling clearness: autocracy has met its first signal defeat; it has effected what the German military bulletins would have announced as a "strategic retirement" and has permitted a radical and unprecedented step forward to be taken in the political development of internal affairs in the German Empire. This step bears careful analysis.Von Bethmann-Hollweg fell as a result of appeasing neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals, or rather of trying to appease both and finally failing owing to their ever increasing divergence. His downfall left open a gap which could be filled only by the Kaiser. Although the Reichstag caused Bethmann's retirement, it had no one to substitute for him and no majority party which could even determine upon a nominee. The choice of a successor remained with the Kaiser alone and such difficulty did he experience in making this choice that three hours before the final decision was made, it is said that the name of Michaelis had not even been brought up for consideration. There seemed to be no outstanding figure in German politics fitted to fill the chancellorship, at least none that combined ability and strength with a definite policy acceptable to a Reichstag which itself was ruled by conflicting and contradictory emotions. The Kaiser took the only course left open and appointed a politically unknown and hence irreproachable, man, Michaelis.Michaelis, the first citizen Chancellor, untried, unversed in politics, free from all party affiliations or support, took up his monumental task on July 16th. Almost immediately the uncertain policies of the various Reichstag factions seemed to crystalize into clear-cut, well-defined lines. Each party realized that an unknown factor was coming into play and that this was the moment to force its hand and bring the new Chancellor into its own party group. The Reichstag peace resolution of July 19th was the result. The oft reiterated principles of Scheidemann and the majority Socialists had at last taken root in the center of the House, and the Catholic Centrists, the pivot of the Reichstag, through their spokesman, Erzberger, swung the whole party to the Left. Though undoubtedly inspired by the Vatican, this shift was largely spontaneous and was the prelude to the formation of a parliamentary bloc which had as its guiding motive certain liberal principles to which the majority of the German people fully acquiesced. A rift appeared in the National Liberal party and a considerable section of this powerful quasi-conservative fraction split away from the leadership of Stresemann to join the newly formed majority bloc.

It was this bloc which confronted Michaelis from the outset of his chancellorship. On the one hand were the military autocrats, on the other the liberals. A decision for either side meant facing concerted opposition. So, like von Bethmann-Hollweg before him, he tried to temporize and avoid the issue. In his opening speech he accepted the principles laid down in the Reichstag Resolution, adding, however, that he accepted them "according to his own interpretation" of them. This proviso allowed broad discussion. The pan-Germans and annexationists at once juggled with the wording of the Resolution and claimed that it in no way bound the Chancellor to an acceptance of the liberal policy. Increasing pressure was brought to bear on him and the next three months of his supremacy show acts of an inconsistent nature, calculated to appease first one and then the other fraction. He tied the question of electoral reforms into a knot which could not be untied according to his scheme until next April, counter-acting this by appointing two members of the Reichstag, Spahn and Muller-Meiningen to ministerial posts. He did nothing to lift the political censorship or to alleviate conditions accruing from the original declaration that "a state of siege" existed in Germany. However, Kuhlmann was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the German answer to the Pope's peace proposal was an obvious concession to the majority bloc. Thus Michaelis wavered, hoping to stall for time until some definite policy should happily fall in his way to satisfy all parties.Michaelis was not an acute enough politician to carry on this situation long. The pan-Germans, turning to good account the food for insidious propaganda contained in the President's reply to the Pope, developed their newly-born Vaterland party into a semi-official movement and brought pressure to bear not only in the Army but on many civilians employed in government industries to accept their program of annexations and war indemnities as a proper retort to one who dared to interfere in their domestic politics. This was accomplished with the knowledge and active cooperation of certain military and government officials. It was strongly resented by the Socialists, and this resentment finally took form in an interpellation in the Reichstag on October 5th.

This Reichstag sitting marked the beginning of the end. In vain did von Stein, Minister of War, Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor, and Westarp, the Junker leader, try to explain the Government's attitude toward the Vaterland party. The evidence presented by Lansberg, a social-democrat, and Haase, an extreme socialist, was too strong, and the ire of the majority bloc soon gave it a menacing complexion. Michaelis did not attend the session and his representative, Helfferich, tactless, arrogant and always mistaken in sizing up a crisis, was unable or unwilling to accord the Reichstag an explanation or even the courtesy which might have smoothed over the situation. It was accordingly a stormy Reichstag that Michaelis had to confront on October 9th. Perhaps he knew only too well the music he would have to face, for he had carefully prepared a political coup intended to divert the attention of the members from the dangerous question of government aid to the Vaterland Party. On the secret testimony of sailors, who were subsequently shot as traitors, three independent socialists were openly accused of knowledge of and conspiracy in the mutinous uprisings in the fleet during the month of August. Von Capelle himself, the Secretary of the Navy, furnished the details of the indictment. The effect of this thunderbolt was surprising. Instead of producing a wedge of discord between the parties of the Left, it solidified that side of the House into a unit and brought forth a series of sharp protests against Michaelis both for the injustice of the attack, the method of attack, and the attempted evasion of the question under discussion. It was a coup indeed, but one that brought about the downfall of the Chancellor.Although the Reichstag adjourned soon after this heated session, not to reconvene until December, the party leaders and press of the majority bloc continued the attacks against the Chancellor. Never before during the war had the German press been so outspoken against a Government official. But in fairness to Michaelis it must be said that the criticism was directed against him as a vacillating, politically incapable but honest and patriotic vassal of an impossible Government, rather than as an unscrupulous trickster and clever politician. His downfall was inevitable.

When it became evident that Michaelis must go, the two men most prominently mentioned as his successor were Buelow and Kuehlmann, both eligible owing to their political ability and their experience in foreign affairs. But Buelow had permanently sacrificed the confidence of the Reichstag at the time of his downfall from the chancellorship in 1909, while Kuehlmann's appointment appeared to be out of the question owing to the opposition of the Conservatives. The problem was to find a man who could hold the parties of the Left in line, but without representing too much of a concession to them or too much of a break with the existing system. Count von Hertling was selected.Heralded as a thorough Pan-Germanist and Junker, conservative by inheritance and nature and opposed to parliamentarianism, Hertling has apparently been able, whether through policy or conviction, to swing around half the circle of political faith to a position satisfactory to both liberal and democratic elements in the Reichstag, while leaving the Conservatives anything but pleased with the situation. At this distance, so radical an evolution in a statesman 74 years of age savors of something not quite genuine and induces one to wonder whether the leopard can really change his spots so effectually. For the moment, Count von Hertling appears to have made almost revolutionary concessions to the majority program, not only in his reported inclusion of parliamentary Ministers in his Cabinet, Friedrich von Payer, Progressive; Friedberg, National Liberal; Dove, a Radical, and probably others, but also by his acceptance of the following demands of the Reichstag majority:1. That Prussian electoral reform be carried out.2. That political censorship and the state of siege be abolished or mitigated.3. That the foreign policy be conducted on the basis of the German reply to the Pope's peace note.For the first time in German history, the candidacy of the new Chancellor was submitted to the Reichstag for its approval. But pending von Hertling's agreement with the party leaders, the press of the Reichstag majority parties, reflecting the attitude of the leaders in the inter-party conferences, adopted a distinctly hostile tone. In fact, Hertling's acceptance of the chancellorship, which he apparently made conditional upon promised support in the Reichstag, at one time seemed very doubtful. Following his conferences with the party leaders, during which von Hertling apparently acceded to their demands, this hostile tone of the press was altered to one of sceptical gratification, sceptical owing to Hertling's past antagonism to parliamentarianism. It was doubtless this scepticism which led the Socialists to refuse to bind themselves through the acceptance of a ministerial post for one of their members. The gratification of the liberal elements of the German people and press is based upon the assumption that he is entering office as the representative of the Reichstag majority rather than upon his own personality, and he evidently will last only so long as he conducts his administration as the representative of this majority. His success will depend largely upon the Reighstag majority's ability to hold together and agree upon a policy which Hertling will be willing and able to represent. In this he appears to have started well, but there will be pitfalls ahead which it will take all his ingenuity to pass successfully.

The Pan-Germanists and the large business newspapers have answered the appointment of Hertling and his concessions with loud denunciations of the change to the parliamentary system, wherein they see gross violations of the rights and dignity of the Crown. They are furthermore dubious as to his future attitude towards the question of peace terms and the belief that he will now be inclined to make peace on a basis which will permit later a rapprochement with the Western powers. His views regarding Belgium, however, at least as late as his programme speech before the Bavarian Diet on October 23, are not those which the Entente powers would be likely to find acceptable. These views intimated that a settlement of the problem of Belgium would be obtainable under an "offer to guarantee that this land in the future be no longer the object of the means of hostile intrigues", meaning that Belgium's ante bellum policy must be altered in favor of Germany, presumably by some checks inconsistent with its full independence.

Whether von Hertling is regarded as the right man to lead Germany into and through the eventual peace negotiations, or whether his appointment is considered only as of a stop gap nature, to tide over the present crisis in domestic affairs, his appointment is in any case counted upon to serve important purposes. First, there is the desire to remove all causes of friction between Berlin and Munich, both military and political. Bavarians have complained that their troops have been called upon for the hardest service, while Prussians have been spared. If any feeling of that sort persists in Bavaria, and if there are any lingering jealousies not only about the conduct of the war, but about political management, then the choice of the Bavarian Minister-President as German Chancellor must have a soothing and uniting effect. Count von Hertling himself seems to attach a significance of this kind to his selection. Second, the new Chancellor is a Roman Catholic; he enjoys the confidence of the powerful Center Party and furthermore possesses relations with the Vatican which may well be useful in further efforts on the part of Germany to use the Pope as a tool in her peace manoeuvres. On the whole his appointment is not so surprising as it may at first have appeared.

In describing the solution of the recent political crisis, Herr Erzberger, the leader of the Center Party and therefore at present the most powerful force in the Reichstag, is reported to have said: "While the troops of the Central Powers were forcing their way across the Tagliamento, Germany at home quietly crossed the political Rubicon and in the space of five days changed from an autocracy into a democracy. This has been the most momentous week since the founding of the Empire and its achievements represent a permanent political gain for the German people. In view of the July and October happenings, the majority leaders were convinced of the hopelessness of permitting the old system to prevail. Through the Chief of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet, they imparted their convictions to the Crown, urging the imperative need of a coordinated, cohesive governmental policy in foreign and domestic issues, and harmonious governmental collaboration with the Reichstag, during the war at least." Herr Erzberger then told how Count von Hertling reserved his decision to accept the chancellorship until he had conferred with the party leaders. On the advice of the latter, the Emperor's plan for separating the chancellorship and the presidency of the Prussian ministry, he said, had been dropped. Von Kuehlmann had also participated in the conferences, Erzberger said, and had urged the need of instituting a parliamentary procedure, because it was the only solution of the crisis and because of the unfavorable impression that would be made abroad if the current attempt failed to succeed.From all reports, von Hertling, Von Kuehlmann and the majority leaders are now in harmony with regard to both foreign and domestic issues and the arrangement appears to have the sanction of the Emperor who, whether voluntarily or against his will, has given the Chancellor a free hand. The Clerical Party (the Center) possesses the chancellorship, the Progessive Party will in all probability be awarded the post of Vice-Chancellor and one other important secretaryship, while the National Liberals will be represented in the vice presidency of the Prussian cabinet. The Socialist Party, while renouncing office for itself, definitely demanded the inclusion of radical deputies in both the Imperial and Prussian cabinets and agreed to support the administration if it should keep its promises. Otherwise, according to Scheidemann, the party would fight the new government as it did the Michaelis regime. Once equal rights in Prussia were granted and control of the Reichstag majority over the composition of the Government and its policy were established, Scheidemann is reported to have said, there would be no excuse for refusing to negotiate peace with Germany on the pretext that it was ruled autocratically. Evidently the President's reply to the Pope is having its effect in the heart of German politics.

While awaiting interesting developments at the next meeting of the Reichstag, called by the Chancellor for November 22, a fortnight earlier than previously planned, we may be assured that the liberal movement in Germany, which has steadily gained momentum during the last few months, has achieved a very material victory and that new conditions for which the advocates of parliamentarianism have long been striving have at least temporarily been established. Whether these new conditions will keep pace with the increasing demands of the liberal and socialistic elements in the country remains to be seen. As power begets thirst for power, so we may be sure that the Reichstag majority and the people it represents will not be content with one step forward but will soon strike out for further capitulations from the Crown and a further expansion of democratic influence in the government of the country. The wedge between autocracy and democracy has been inserted; the rift is already visible; will it widen naturally with the momentum already started, or will it eventually encounter unyielding material which only the axe of revolution can disperse? It is the political checks and not the advances which we shall find of particular significance in the future, possibly, indeed, within the next few months.

THE DRIVE INTO ITALY.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the recent political events in Germany, described above, is that they happened in spite of, not because of, the successful drive into Italy. It is the moral effect even more than the military results of this success which must be taken into consideration, and one of the obvious purposes of the drive was to strengthen the power of the German military party. If then, the military party in spite of its Italian success was obliged to make political concessions of a far-reaching nature and if the time has arrived when such a success exerts no influence on domestic political affairs in Germany, the power of the military party must logically be considered as on the wane.Another purpose of the drive was to stimulate the German people out of the war-lethargy, dissatisfaction and unrest which continued and increasing economic hardship is inducing. The German Government understands the psychology of the man in the street, and especially the woman in the street, in Germany somewhat better than it understand the psychology of other nations. They must have their minds taken off their troubles by distraction. This policy of providing suitable distractions at regular intervals has been only too obvious throughout the course of the war. The Russian drive, the Servian and Roumanian drives, the unsuccessful attack on Verdun, no less than the Chancellor's peace proposals of December 12, 1916, and the inauguration of the unrestricted submarine warfare on January 31, 1917, were used successively by the Government to take the peoples' minds off their difficulties and the politicians' minds off their agitations at moments embarrassing for the Government and hence embarrassing for the military party. The Italian drive was undoubtedly prepared with that end in view, but whatever effect it may have had on the people, it seems to have had singularly little effect on the politicians.But there were still other ends to accomplish and not the least of them was to bring Austria back into the fold, from which she was, if not actually straying, at least longing for freedom. There is little question in our minds that Austria has for some time been far from satisfied with her German ally, less and less in sympathy with her methods of conducting warfare and less and less eager to carry on the conflict. By rushing to Austria's support and not only saving Trieste but pushing far down into Italian territory, Germany has re-cemented the alliance of the Central Powers.Nor are these the only political elements in the Italian drive. Every spectacular military success increases the influence of the pacifists and pro-German elements abroad; it would be counted upon to stimulate dissension among the Italian people, no less than to strengthen peace propaganda in other countries. Just as surely, therefore, as the first German peace proposals of a year ago followed hard on the heels of the successful drive into Roumania, and the Pope's note of last summer synchronized with what the German military leaders probably believed to be the high water mark of their submarine campaign, just so surely is this drive into Italy intended to create an atmosphere favorable for further steps looking toward peace and just so surely may the steps be expected to materialize when the end of the drive, if finally successful, shall have been reached.

J. C. G.