George G. Moore to Colonel House
Title
George G. Moore to Colonel House
Creator
George G. Moore
Identifier
WWP21388
Date
1917 May 17
Source
Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1786-1957
Language
English
Text
Dear Colonel House
I hope the President will not be stampeded by the clamor to rush troops to France. While I believe that every American should die, if necessary, to defeat Germany, my rather intimate contact with the War from its beginning compels a contrary conclusion as to the method of achieving this result. I have a vivid memory of the Dardanelles Expedition conceived with the same enthusiasm and lack of sanity and military thought. Modern artillery gives overwhelming superiority to the army on the defensive and three years of warfare have shown the impossibility of an offensive succeeding against an army possessed of artillery and machine-guns adequately manned. For this reason Ypres, Verdun, the Somme and the Dardanelles were German and British failures. To-day if England and France would go upon the defensive and stop the needless wastage of men, they can maintain their lines indefinitely. This condition may only be altered when economic distress or internal disorders have so weakened the German army that the application of overwhelming superiority in men and material may break their lines and defeat their army. To wait until we have carefully prepared such an army should be our national objective. Political urgency and the personal ambition of commanders have caused a hideous wastage of the man-power of England and France in attacks from which there was no intelligent hope of success, and the fighting of the past thirty days shows that the Germans have learned this lesson but our Allies have not. I suggest that before any troops are sent to France it should be determined:
(1) That the man-power of France and England is inadequate, fighting a defensive fight to maintain their lines and that our man-power is needed for this purpose; or
(2) That if the troops requested are for the purpose of taking part in an offensive, that the President, upon the advice of his military advisers, is warranted in concluding that there is reasonable hope that the application of the forces of the American army shall produce victory.
George G. Moore
I hope the President will not be stampeded by the clamor to rush troops to France. While I believe that every American should die, if necessary, to defeat Germany, my rather intimate contact with the War from its beginning compels a contrary conclusion as to the method of achieving this result. I have a vivid memory of the Dardanelles Expedition conceived with the same enthusiasm and lack of sanity and military thought. Modern artillery gives overwhelming superiority to the army on the defensive and three years of warfare have shown the impossibility of an offensive succeeding against an army possessed of artillery and machine-guns adequately manned. For this reason Ypres, Verdun, the Somme and the Dardanelles were German and British failures. To-day if England and France would go upon the defensive and stop the needless wastage of men, they can maintain their lines indefinitely. This condition may only be altered when economic distress or internal disorders have so weakened the German army that the application of overwhelming superiority in men and material may break their lines and defeat their army. To wait until we have carefully prepared such an army should be our national objective. Political urgency and the personal ambition of commanders have caused a hideous wastage of the man-power of England and France in attacks from which there was no intelligent hope of success, and the fighting of the past thirty days shows that the Germans have learned this lesson but our Allies have not. I suggest that before any troops are sent to France it should be determined:
(1) That the man-power of France and England is inadequate, fighting a defensive fight to maintain their lines and that our man-power is needed for this purpose; or
(2) That if the troops requested are for the purpose of taking part in an offensive, that the President, upon the advice of his military advisers, is warranted in concluding that there is reasonable hope that the application of the forces of the American army shall produce victory.
I believe the higher wisdom lies in perfecting an army of at least two million men with adequate reserves and completely equipped, and when such force is ready, the application of this force of fresh men against the war-wearied Germans will give some real hope of success.
I recognize that at the moment this course is unpopular, but the certainty that such forces are coming will be a stimulant to our Allies and a depressing influence upon the Germans, and will avoid the needless wastage of American lives until the time when the sacrifice is warranted. I have seen the steady dissipation of the man-power of England without any intelligent plan and pray that this may not happen here.
George G. Moore
Original Format
Letter
To
House, Edward Mandell, 1858-1938
Files
Collection
Citation
George G. Moore, “George G. Moore to Colonel House,” 1917 May 17, WWP21388, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.