Morris to Secretary of State
Title
Morris to Secretary of State
Creator
Morris, Roland S. (Roland Sletor), 1874-1945
Identifier
WWP25205
Date
1918 September 23
Source
Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers
Publisher
Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum
Subject
World War, 1914-1918--Russia
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia
Contributor
Danna Faulds
Relation
WWP25204
WWP25206
Language
English
Provenance
Document scan was taken from Library of Congress microfilm reel of the Wilson Papers. WWPL volunteers transcribed the text.
Text
PT Green
Vladivostok
Dated September 23rd, 1918.
Recd. 6:48pm.
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC
September 23rd, 10pm.
Preliminary to our economic, social, and publicity program in Siberia, and second only to the question of the railways, is the question of the future desposition of our military forces during the approaching winter. The significant factors in the military situation are: First; there are at present in Vladivostok and vicinity approximately 25,000 soldiers. Very few of these forces are now engaged in active military operations. The number in the city will be increased by new arrivals and is already excessive for the requirements maintaining order and protecting stores. Second; the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are particularly open as far as Omsk and beyond and every report we receive indicates the lines to that point are in no way threatened. They are guarded by Japanese and Czech soldiers scattered at intervals along their entire length and are equal to the movements of troops under the present Russian management. Third; the advance guard of the third division of the Japanese army, which is reported mobilizing at Nagoya, has now reached Harbin on its way toward Manchuli and may possibly proceed directly to Chita or even to Irkutsk. Fourth; A small British force is now preparing to leave for the Volga region and will soon be followed by the French and Italian contingents. Fifth; reports from the Volga region all agree that the Czech forces there are seriously menaced from various directions. Their commanding officers are pleading earnestly for immediate assistance. General Gaida has come to Vladivostok for the avowed purpose of urging upon the Allies the necessity of some immediate help without which the Czechs will be compelled to fall back to a position east of the Ural Mountains possibly to Omsk. He fears that if they thus fall back, they will leave their supporters in the evacuated towns defenseless against the general massacres which are likely to follow.
The single question which confronts the Czech leaders is whether they can make some arrangement with the Allies which will permit them to hold the Volga region or failing that, the line of the Urals during the coming winter and thus keep the door open into European Russia. They are clear that this cannot be done unless reinforcements are sent to them promptly.
General Graves is of the opinion that he should go to Omsk with a substantial portion of his command and form a base there for the winter, cooperating, as necessity required with other Allied forces in supporting the Czechs to the west. The advantages of such a movement would be: First, it would give much needed support to the Czech forces in the Volga region and would therefore be consistent with the purpose of the present expedition. Second, it would make more certain the protection of the railway and thus secure a base from which economic and other activities might penetrate even into European Russia. Third, the presence of an Allied force and particularly of American troops in that part of Russia, would have a strong moral effect upon the entire population in a territory which so directly affects European Russia. Fourth, it would have the additional advantage of giving our own forces, during the winter, an opportunity for more valuable service than any that will present itself at Vladivostok when there is so little direct contact with Russian opinion.
The movement suggested is open to the possible objection that it might convey to the Czech commanders and to the Russian people, the impression that the United States Government in cooperation with the Allies, was preparing for much more extended militay operations than are in fact contemplated. This objection could be met by a formal reaffirmation of the limitations clearly announced in the statement of August 3rd. A further possible objection is that this movement of our troops might be interpreted as an indication of our intention to give direct support to the recently organized Siberian Government at Omsk. No doubt such an interpretation would be fostered at the outset but I think could be fully corrected by our subsequent action.
Admiral Knight, General Graves and I have carefully weighed these facts. Admiral Knight is convinced that such an expedition, far from antagonizing the Russian people, would be generally welcomed and would form a very effective center for American activities in that part of Siberia. General Graves has studied carefully the strategic situation and feels that there are no serious military difficulties or dangers involved provided that the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are protected and operated to the extent they now are. He is also of the opinion that the with the line of communication thus secured, their maintenance would not constitute a drain upon the resources of the country.
In my judgment such movement would be entirely consistent with the policy which has been adopted by our Government in reference to Siberia. In fact it seems to me to offer the only practicable way in which that policy can be applied during the winter, for it will accomplish the two main objects which we have in view, to render assistance to the Czech forces represented along the railway and concentrated at railway centers in the Volga region; and to open up the field for social and economic action. If these centers are not properly guarded, they will revert to a condition of anarchy which will prevent any effective service.
Finally I fear that our failure to come into closer contact with the Czech forces and with the Russian people in Western Siberia may have serious results. Already I find that the British and French representatives here, particularly General Knox and General Paris, are influencing the Czech leaders with impracticable plans to create by force a new Russian Army and a new Eastern front. General Gaida, who is very young, has been impressed by these schemes and misled by unauthorized suggestions of ultimate unlimited American support. I believe that General Graves presence in Western Siberia would steady the Czechs leaders and make clear to them and to the Russian people our policy and purpose.
I would therefore recommend for the consideration of the Department the wisdom of granting to General Graves, the privelege of proceeding, in his discretion and with a substantial portion of his forces, to a point in the vicinity of Omsk and wintering there if conditions all justify such action. I further suggest that when General Graves has decided upon the details of such a plan, they be submitted to the Japanese Government with the request that it co-operate by (#) a portion of its troops to the base selected.
In conclusion, I venture to urge that whatever action is decided upon be announced to the Czech commanders at the earliest practicable moment for the reason that as has been clearly pointed out to me by General Gaida, his plans for the winter are dependent upon the character and extent of the assistance which he can count on receiving from our own and the Allied Governments.
MORRIS
HAC
(#) Omission.
Vladivostok
Dated September 23rd, 1918.
Recd. 6:48pm.
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC
September 23rd, 10pm.
Preliminary to our economic, social, and publicity program in Siberia, and second only to the question of the railways, is the question of the future desposition of our military forces during the approaching winter. The significant factors in the military situation are: First; there are at present in Vladivostok and vicinity approximately 25,000 soldiers. Very few of these forces are now engaged in active military operations. The number in the city will be increased by new arrivals and is already excessive for the requirements maintaining order and protecting stores. Second; the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are particularly open as far as Omsk and beyond and every report we receive indicates the lines to that point are in no way threatened. They are guarded by Japanese and Czech soldiers scattered at intervals along their entire length and are equal to the movements of troops under the present Russian management. Third; the advance guard of the third division of the Japanese army, which is reported mobilizing at Nagoya, has now reached Harbin on its way toward Manchuli and may possibly proceed directly to Chita or even to Irkutsk. Fourth; A small British force is now preparing to leave for the Volga region and will soon be followed by the French and Italian contingents. Fifth; reports from the Volga region all agree that the Czech forces there are seriously menaced from various directions. Their commanding officers are pleading earnestly for immediate assistance. General Gaida has come to Vladivostok for the avowed purpose of urging upon the Allies the necessity of some immediate help without which the Czechs will be compelled to fall back to a position east of the Ural Mountains possibly to Omsk. He fears that if they thus fall back, they will leave their supporters in the evacuated towns defenseless against the general massacres which are likely to follow.
The single question which confronts the Czech leaders is whether they can make some arrangement with the Allies which will permit them to hold the Volga region or failing that, the line of the Urals during the coming winter and thus keep the door open into European Russia. They are clear that this cannot be done unless reinforcements are sent to them promptly.
General Graves is of the opinion that he should go to Omsk with a substantial portion of his command and form a base there for the winter, cooperating, as necessity required with other Allied forces in supporting the Czechs to the west. The advantages of such a movement would be: First, it would give much needed support to the Czech forces in the Volga region and would therefore be consistent with the purpose of the present expedition. Second, it would make more certain the protection of the railway and thus secure a base from which economic and other activities might penetrate even into European Russia. Third, the presence of an Allied force and particularly of American troops in that part of Russia, would have a strong moral effect upon the entire population in a territory which so directly affects European Russia. Fourth, it would have the additional advantage of giving our own forces, during the winter, an opportunity for more valuable service than any that will present itself at Vladivostok when there is so little direct contact with Russian opinion.
The movement suggested is open to the possible objection that it might convey to the Czech commanders and to the Russian people, the impression that the United States Government in cooperation with the Allies, was preparing for much more extended militay operations than are in fact contemplated. This objection could be met by a formal reaffirmation of the limitations clearly announced in the statement of August 3rd. A further possible objection is that this movement of our troops might be interpreted as an indication of our intention to give direct support to the recently organized Siberian Government at Omsk. No doubt such an interpretation would be fostered at the outset but I think could be fully corrected by our subsequent action.
Admiral Knight, General Graves and I have carefully weighed these facts. Admiral Knight is convinced that such an expedition, far from antagonizing the Russian people, would be generally welcomed and would form a very effective center for American activities in that part of Siberia. General Graves has studied carefully the strategic situation and feels that there are no serious military difficulties or dangers involved provided that the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways are protected and operated to the extent they now are. He is also of the opinion that the with the line of communication thus secured, their maintenance would not constitute a drain upon the resources of the country.
In my judgment such movement would be entirely consistent with the policy which has been adopted by our Government in reference to Siberia. In fact it seems to me to offer the only practicable way in which that policy can be applied during the winter, for it will accomplish the two main objects which we have in view, to render assistance to the Czech forces represented along the railway and concentrated at railway centers in the Volga region; and to open up the field for social and economic action. If these centers are not properly guarded, they will revert to a condition of anarchy which will prevent any effective service.
Finally I fear that our failure to come into closer contact with the Czech forces and with the Russian people in Western Siberia may have serious results. Already I find that the British and French representatives here, particularly General Knox and General Paris, are influencing the Czech leaders with impracticable plans to create by force a new Russian Army and a new Eastern front. General Gaida, who is very young, has been impressed by these schemes and misled by unauthorized suggestions of ultimate unlimited American support. I believe that General Graves presence in Western Siberia would steady the Czechs leaders and make clear to them and to the Russian people our policy and purpose.
I would therefore recommend for the consideration of the Department the wisdom of granting to General Graves, the privelege of proceeding, in his discretion and with a substantial portion of his forces, to a point in the vicinity of Omsk and wintering there if conditions all justify such action. I further suggest that when General Graves has decided upon the details of such a plan, they be submitted to the Japanese Government with the request that it co-operate by (#) a portion of its troops to the base selected.
In conclusion, I venture to urge that whatever action is decided upon be announced to the Czech commanders at the earliest practicable moment for the reason that as has been clearly pointed out to me by General Gaida, his plans for the winter are dependent upon the character and extent of the assistance which he can count on receiving from our own and the Allied Governments.
MORRIS
HAC
(#) Omission.
Original Format
Letter
To
Lansing, Robert, 1864-1928
Files
Collection
Citation
Morris, Roland S. (Roland Sletor), 1874-1945, “Morris to Secretary of State,” 1918 September 23, WWP25205, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.