British Embassy to Woodrow Wilson

The British Ambassador in Petrograd saw the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 1 and found him somewhat more despondent as to the state of affairs on the fighting line in Roumania. He feared that it might be necessary to evacuate at all events a portion of Moldavia, though he again promised that the Russian armies would do all in their power to check the Germans on that front. He further informed Sir G. Buchanan that the Ministry would proceed to Moscow on August 4 in order to be present at a large political meeting which was to be held on August 5, & that three of the Moscow school of politicians appeared to be inclined to join the Ministry but beyond this he had no precise news concerning the political crisis. But, apart from this question altogether, there are such vast difficulties of every kind besetting the Russian Government that it would be vain to look to them for any help in the military way, in the course of the current year. When the Ambassador told the Minister that this was the case, and that the real fact was that the Russian army would be quite unable to take any offensive action before the early part of 1918, the latter could not but admit that this was true. Sir G. Buchanan is entirely at a loss to see how the Russian army is to be kept in existence, & to be properly supplied, especially with winter clothing which he understands is lacking in a very great degree, though he is of opinion that with strict discipline it might be remodelled and brought into a condition fit for resuming the offensive well before the end of the present year. It is his opinion, and he has several times mentioned it to the Foreign Minister, that the right course to pursue is to establish compulsory military service, to recall as many troops as possible to work behind the lines, and to leave at the front only that number as is absolutely indispensable for the purpose of maintaining the defensive. He considers that the real reason underlying the whole of the disastrous situation is the deplorable state into which the means of transportation have fallen. For instance when Kerensky returned to Petrograd from the front, the train broke down four times and fresh engines had to be procured. The tracks, the engines and the rolling stock are all alike used up: the Russian Government with its own resources will never be able to reestablish them, and the aid which the United States Government have agreed to give, will fall far short of what is necessary. The Russian Government have great hopes of the result of their action in placing the railroads under a purely military organization: this undoubtedly is a wise measure but it is not adequate, alone, to meet the situation. Suitable workshops are necessary, and skilled labour for repair work, but it is very questionable whether this latter can be found in large enough numbers, and it is equally doubtful whether there are any men in the Ministry of Communications who have the ability to organize on a large enough scale.

The only suggestion which the Ambassador has to offer is that the Entente Powers should succour the Russian Government by the despatch of a considerable body of men skilled in every department of railroad administration together with a number of efficient employees. He is, however, uncertain to what degree this idea would be welcome to the Russians, whilst it would be necessary for the Allies, in the event of their being prepared to put it forward to define accurately the lines of the work which was to be taken in hand. A not unsuitable point of contact might perhaps be found in the communication recently sent to the British Bondholders: the reply might contain the suggestion of helping in the task of setting the railroads anew in good order.

August 5, 1917