Arthur James Balfour to Colonel House

Sent. March 6th.

Received. March 7,12.30 P. M
Cable from Balfour to House.

I am grateful for your telegram of the 4th March, and much appreciate the frank exposition of your views which it contained.

Up to the moment when the Bolshivic Government decided to accept the German peace terms, I was opposed to Japanese intervention, as I hoped the Bolshivic resistance to German aggression might continue.

When the Bolshivic surrendered unconditionally, it became of the utmost importance to prevent the rich supplies in Siberia from falling into German hands, and the only method by which this could be secured was by Japanese intervention on a considerable scale. Information reached us that Japanese Government were making preparations to take action in Eastern Siberia, while, owing to the public discussion of the question, it seemed likely that considerable resentment would be aroused in Japan if, the Japanese Government being willing to act on behalf of the Allies, a mandate were refused. The formidable pro-German party in Japan would have asserted that such a refusal was due to mistrust, and I fear that, however erroneous in fact, this sentiment would have predominated in Japanese opinion.

I need hardly emphasize the advantage to be gained by substituting for Japanese action alone and in her own interests action as mandatory of the Allies Powers. I am in full agreement with the proposals made in the last paragraph of your telegram, a telegram I sent to our Ambassador in duplicate on March 4th following these lines. This telegram was repeated to Lord Reading and I am telling him to send a copy to Sir William Wiseman immediately for your information.

Although reports have reached us that enemy prisoners in Siberia are being armed under Bolshevic instructions, yet the Bolshevic Government assert that they still intend to organize resistance to German aggression in spite of having signed a peace treaty. I have therefore telegraphed our agent to suggest to the Bolshevic Government that they should invite Japanese and Roumanian cooperation for this purpose. I fear, however, that there is little chance of the proposal being entertained, nor do I know how the Japanese and Roumanian Government would regard such an appeal.

I have done this so that we can put ourselves right with public opinion, if and when a statement is made on the whole subject.

I hope and believe that the action which has been taken and which will, I feel sure, meet with the President's approval, will enable us to justify completely the intervention which we are asking Japan to undertake.

It will show that the Allies have been actuated by no selfish or mean motives, and if Japan consents to undertake the obligation on such terms, might not it contribute to allay the suspicion which exists in many quarters both here and in the United States.