John Bassett Moore to Woodrow Wilson

I beg leave to enclose herewith a draft, made on Saturday, of a telegram drawn, I believe, in diplomatic form, in the sense of your written instructions, handed to me by Mr. Bryan. (Enclosure 1.)In handing to me your memorandum, I understood Mr. Bryan to suggest the inquiry whether, in connection with the course of the European Powers in recognizing the administration at the City of Mexico, the Monroe Doctrine might not be invoked, especially if it should be assumed that they acted under the influence of financial interests. I answered that the Monroe Doctrine did not appear to embrace this question. Recognition is an act performed in the ordinary course of diplomatic relations. As the independent States of America are not protectorates of the United States, we do not supervise their diplomatic relations; and it has therefore never been considered necessary for foreign Powers to ask our consent to their recognition of an American government, or to explain to us their reasons for such a step. Nor can there be any doubt that the American Governments would themselves deeply resent any attempt on our part to assume such a supervision.
They would as surely resent the attempt on our part to prevent them from obtaining European capital for their industrial development or for their governmental necessities. It is an elementary and well known fact that the United States cannot today finance even its own needs. To say nothing of the money that we have borrowed for governmental purposes, we have from the beginning developed our industries and are still developing them with foreign capital, invested under what we here call “grants” or “charters”, and what the Latins call “concessions”, the difference being one of language. Naturally, however, the conditions required by the investor vary with the risk. Whether a grant or concession might be of such a character as to raise a political question, as Brazil conceived to be the case with the concession made by Bolivia to the Anglo–American “Bolivian Syndicate” in the Acre territory ( a territory then claimed and now owned by Brazil), would depend upon its terms. But, on the whole, in Latin–America as in the United States, the use of foreign capital has helped to develop industrial and financial strength and has thus contributed to political stability and independence.
One of the latest definitions of the Monroe Doctrine is that which was given in 1901 by President Roosevelt, to whom it has not, I believe, been usual to impute undue or shrinking conservatism as a fault. It being understood that certain European Powers, particularly Germany, intended to take forcible measures in order to collect from Venezuela various pecuniary demands, President Roosevelt, in his annual message of December 3, 1901, said:

“The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non–American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. ...... This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. ...... We do not guarantee any State against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non–American power.”

On December 11, 1901, the German Embassy at Washington presented a pro–memoria, in which it was stated that the German Government, after delivering an ultimatum to Venezuela, intended in the first instance to institute a blockade of the more important Venzuelan ports, and that, if this measure should not be found to be sufficient, it would be necessary to consider the temporary occupation of such ports and the levying of duties in them. The German pro–memoria contained the following statement: “We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory.

”Mr. Hay replied by a memorandum of December 16, 1901, which concluded as follows:“The President of the United States, appreciating the courtesy of the German Government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question, believes that no measures will be taken in this matter by the agents of the German Government which are not in accordance with the well–known purpose, above set forth, of his Majesty the German Emperor.”

Before proceeding upon the assumption that foreign governments, in recognizing and continuing to recognize the administration at the City of Mexico, have acted in a spirit of subserviency to financial interests, it would seem to be expedient to consider the subject in all its aspects. One of these is the fact that that administration has since its installation been the only government at the Mexican capital, and that we have ourselves accordingly continued to conduct diplomatic relations with it, though without formal recognition. Nor is such a situation by any means unprecedented. The Diaz government was officially recognized by various European Powers in 1877, almost a year before its recognition by the United States, our recognition having been delayed for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear to secure the performance by the new government of certain obligations, particularly with reference to the suppression of border troubles and the payment of a large sum of money due under the Claims Convention of 1868. Our Government took no notice of the recognition of Diaz by other Powers, nor was it assumed that this was a question with regard to which other Powers were obliged to consult us.
The recognition by Great Britain of the present administration at the City of Mexico was sent out on the 1st of April and was officially presented on the 3d of May. That of Spain was also despatched on the 1st of April. Colombia gave her recognition on the 5th of May. That of France was given, as was also that of Austria–Hungary, on the 12th of May. Japan and Salvador gave their recognition on the 13th of the same month; Italy, Germany, Portugal, and China on the 17th; Belgium and Guatemala on the 21st, and Norway on the 25th. Russia recognized the government on the 1st of June. Switzerland and Honduras are stated to have extended their recognition in July. It thus appears that recognition was extended by seventeen governments, four of which were American; and our records indicate that other American governments would have followed suit if the United States had extended recognition.
There is nothing in the record to show that the governments that recognized the administration at the City of Mexico in May, June, and July last felt that they were doing anything unusual or requiring explanation, or that they were actuated by any other design than that of recognizing, in conformity with practise, what appeared to them to be the only governmental authority holding out the prospect of being able to re–establish order in the country. Nor had the United States said anything to indicate to them that it entertained a different view of their conduct. On the contrary, the first statement made by the United States of its own position was that which was conveyed to Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, then Ambassador to Mexico, on the 15th of June; and this was a statement called forth by his urgent request. It appears by the records that Mr. Wilson tendered his resignation as Ambassador on the 5th of March. On the 17th of May he insisted upon its immediate presentation to the President. On the 9th of June, his resignation not having been accepted, he asked to be furnished with a statement by telegraph of the views and policy of the President, in a confidential way in order that he might reflect them. It was in response to this request that Mr. Wilson was furnished with a “personal statement” of the President’s position. This message was declared to be confidential and to be intended for his personal guidance in response to his request of the 9th of the month, and not to be intended as a message to the Mexican authorities. Nor was it communicated to foreign governments. The first public announcement of the policy of the United States was made in the President’s message to Congress of the 27th of August. The circumstance that other governments have not since withdrawn their recognition is by no means remarkable. Recognition, once given, continues till the government falls or is replaced, or till severance of diplomatic relations, which is in itself an unfriendly act. The mere withdrawal of a Minister, leaving relations in charge of a secretary, does not operate as a withdrawal of recognition. Of these facts it is pertinent to take note in judging the motives and conduct of other governments, as well as in discussing the grounds on which they may be asked to reconsider their action.A striking illustration of the spirit in which the governments have been acting has come to me only this morning. The Italian Ambassador, calling on a matter of business, stated that a new Minister was on his way from Italy to Mexico and intimated the hope that this would not be considered as being in any way offensive to the United States, the press having intimated that we were offended at the presentation by Carden of his credentials. He said that the sending of a new Minister by Italy was in fact primarily due to his own suggestion; that when the government of the United States in August, in view of a possible crisis growing out of the sending of Mr. Lind to Mexico, invoked the aid of the European and other governments to impress upon Huerta the propriety and necessity of giving serious consideration to what Mr. Lind had to say, the Italian government was obliged to reply that it had no Minister at the City of Mexico and was able to speak only to the Mexican Minister at Rome. The Ambassador then suggested to his government that it was hardly respectful to the United States not to be able to meet its wishes more directly, and that it ought to send out a new Minister, which has now been done. He seemed to be much disturbed lest he had misinterpreted our wishes and done something to displease us. Before inferring that other governments, in failing to act in accordance with views which we subsequently announced, were actuated by motives that were either unfriendly or censurable, it is important to reflect upon our telegram of the 8th of August, above mentioned.In considering the effect of a particular or special imputation to the government of Great Britain of improper or sordid motives for its course in Mexico, it may be expedient to view the situation somewhat broadly. I do not refer particularly to the fact that, while British oil interests are said to have given Huerta their support, certain oil interests in the United States have been equally pronounced in antagonsim to him. There are still other matters to be taken into account. Among these may be mentioned the following:

1. The exemption by act of Congress of American “coastwise” vessels from tolls in the Panama Canal is regarded and is no doubt deeply resented by Great Britain as a violation by the United States of a solemn treaty. Without regard to the question whether this view is necessarily correct, account should be taken of the fact that the contention of the British Government has been unreservedly sustained by many persons of authority in the United States, include a former Secretary of State of great distinction, who has in the discharge of his public duties had occasion to discuss the effect of the treaty. The exemption was advocated by the coastwise shipping interests, which constitute perhaps the closest monopoly in the United States.

2. Various arbitration treaties, of very limited scope, made for the purpose of simply renewing similar treaties previously existing, remain unacted upon in the Senate; and it is a notorious fact that this is due to the apprehension that the treaty with Great Britain embraces an obligation to arbitrate the tolls question.3. On the eve of the meeting of an International Congress, which we ourselves were instrumental in convoking and in which we are to be ably represented, the Senate has adopted what is known as the Seamen's Bill, which not only embraces matters on which we have agreed to confer with other Powers but which proposes to deny to other governments the right to regulate even the terms of shipment of their own seamen on their own vessels in their own ports, and to subject these matters to our own legislation. It is not denied that this strikes most directly at Germany and Great Britain.4. Because of the opposition of local interests in Michigan and Puget Sound, our treaty with Great Britain of April 11, 1908, for the preservation of food fishes in waters contiguous to the United States and Canada, has remained unexecuted on our part, although it was carried into effect on the part of Canada two years ago.
The clause in the new tariff act providing for a five per cent discount on goods imported in American vessels opens to us the prospect of serious questions with the leading maritime powers.
These things are enumerated not for the purpose of offsetting a grievance on one side with a grievance on the other, but for the more important purpose of suggesting whether anything short of the clearest proof would at this juncture justify us in attributing to other governments, by means of a direct diplomatic communication, motives the imputation of which they would necessarily repel and resent. Expressions in the foreign press during the past week indicate a great reluctance in England and in other European countries to get into difficulties with us over Mexico under any circumstances whatever. It is not desirable to check his disposition.With regard to the present proposed communication to foreign governments, there is, finally, one thought to be borne in mind. As we have, since the sending of Governor Lind to Mexico, held towards that country an attitude of interposition in its internal affairs, though not as yet in the physical sense, it may not be advisable too strongly to urge those governments to follow our example. For this reason they are not asked to “cooperate” with us.I beg leave to annex hereto two documents relating to Mexican affairs in and prior to 1860. I mentioned them to Mr. Bryan yesterday, and, as he expressed an interest in them, I enclose them.
One is an extract from President Buchanan's Annual Message of December 19, 1859. (Enclosure 2.)The other is a summary of two treaties between the United States and Mexico concluded at Vera Cruz on December 14, 1859, for the purpose, among other things, of providing the Mexican Government with some ready cash. (Enclosure 3.)These treaties were not approved by the Senate.