John Bassett Moore to William Jennings Bryan
Title
Creator
Identifier
Date
Description
Source
Subject
Text
Referring to the conference between the President and yourself on the 18th instant, at which I had the honor to be present by request, I beg leave with all deference hereby to state in writing my opinion on the present situation, the expression of which I deferred till I had had an opportunity to read Governor Lind’s dispatch and thus to gain more definite information as to the nature and objects of his mission.
In a memorandum of the 14th of May last, the correctness of whose reasonings and forecasts has, as I think, been confirmed by events, I advised the recognition of the Government at the City of Mexico in a particular manner and for definite ends, the attainment of which I then believed and still believe to be of high importance to the people of the United States. The step which I then recommended would, in my opinion, be the appropriate step to take today, but for certain intervening incidents which it is beyond my province to discuss.
In considering the present situation, I proceed from certain fundamental principles, which may be shortly summarized.
1. The paramount duty of a Government is to its own citizens, at home and abroad.
2. In the conduct of diplomatic relations, the fact should be accepted, as an elementary guide, that we are dealing with peoples who are not subject to our authority and control.
3. Interposition in the domestic affairs of other nations, even for what may seem to be a laudable purpose, is always a delicate matter, and, as it invites rebuff, arouses resentment and tends to defeat its professed ends, never can be admitted as a sound rule of action. Governments, like individuals, being liable to error in their own affairs, may properly practice a prudent reserve as to their inerrancy regarding the merits of political action in foreign countries.
Bearing in mind these fundamental principles, we may lay down with regard to the special situation in Mexico the following propositions:
1. The history of Mexico and the character of its population clearly indicate that the prime requisite in the management of its affairs is the maintenance of order. This essential condition was first attained under the stern rule of Diaz, under whose administration the country made its first real progress.
2. The forces of the present revolution, which, although it covers extensive portions of territory, represents a decidedly minor part of the population, are not coherent and embrace a large bandit element, under leaders such as Zapata and Urbina, whose conceptions are well illustrated by the savage conduct of the latter in the capture and pillage of Durango.
3. Any proposal that the ban on the shipment of arms and ammunition to the revolutionists be lifted, coupled with the admission that the revolutionists cannot be expected to do more than hold their own territory, necessarily assumes the form of a proposal that we shall do what we can to promote the dismemberment of the country. From a legal point of view such a proposal need not be discussed: into the discussion of its merits from any other point of view I am not called upon to enter.
4. If the Northern States of Mexico now in revolt should be able to maintain themselves against the Federal Government, the question of the maintenance of public order would still exist. There is credible information that in Chihuahua there have been at least six independent bands, operating in the name of the revolution, who recognize no allegiance to any authority. There have been and perhaps still are five similar bands in Coahuila. In Durango the number has been much greater. Between these bands there is no coherence. Their forces are mostly hordes of marauders depredating upon property and extorting money, and their leaders, except in the case of persons such as Chao and Carranza, have no conceptions of government or of public order.
5. While the Joint Reosolution of March 14, 1912, goes beyond what international law requires, its adoption and enforcement have placed this Government in an attitude which cannot be reversed without creating certain unmistakable implications.
By this Act it is made unlawful to export arms and munitions of war to any American country, (except under such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe) where the President has by proclamation declared that there exist in such country “conditions of domestic violence” which “are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States.”
On the day on which this Act was passed, namely, March 14, 1912, the President of the United States issued a proclamation declaring that the conditions indicated existed in Mexico, and since that time, under the regulations then adopted, the export of arms and munitions of war from the United States to Mexico, except to the Government at the City of Mexico, has been unlawful.
The lifting now of the ban on the shipment of arms and munitions of war to the revolutionists would in these circumstances constitute, in effect if not in form, a recognition of their belligerency. Besides, it would be equivalent to a declaration that both sides equally represent the cause of public order and that public order would be promoted by contributing to the means of their carrying on hostilities with each other.6. It is admitted in the dispatch of Governor Lind that the present Government of Mexico has, even under the disability resulting from nonrecognition by the United States, made progress towards the pacification of the country, and this fact is evident from other sources. The reversal of our attitude as to the export of arms and munitions of war to the revolutionists would therefore, besides requiring us to treat their various leaders as lawful de facto authorities, also be tantamount to an avowal of sympathy with them and would manifest a readiness to sacrifice the peace and order of a neighboring country to that sentiment. If we are to be guided by a consideration for our own past, we should recall the fact that, during the four years of bloody war in which the Govenment of the Union asserted its authority by force over the seceeding States, which it eventually conquered, it repeatedly declared that acts of sympathy towards the Confederate States, even though they were not accompanied with material aid to those States, constituted an unwarranted intervention in our affairs and were accordingly and justly to be resented. The Government of the United States, in promoting in any way the dismemberment of an American country, would assume an attitude which the precedents of our own civil war would render embarrassing. It is further to be recalled that, for more than ten years after our civil war, the States of the South, forcibly coerced into submission to the national authority, enduroed what were to them great humiliations.7. Regarding the interests of our own citizens in Mexico, it is to be borne in mind that the effect of measures on our part to defeat the progress of pacification and to add to the means and activities of hostile operations, would be to increase the dangers of their situation and the hazards to life and property gorrowing out of civil strife. It would place arms in the hands of marauders, whose bands are numerous and whose numbers are large, as well as in those of patriots.8. It is further to be borne in mind that along our border there are important points which are now in the possession of the Federal forces. Any act on our pafrt which would have the effect of encouraging and aiding the revolutionists would therefore necessarily lead to the spread of hostile operations on the frontier and, by exposing life and property on our own as well as on the Mexican side of the line to injury, would greatly augment the chances of hostilities between the United States and Mexico.9. The policy of bringing all our citizens out of Mexico and then leaving the country to settle its own differences havs never seemed to me to be practicable, but has on the contrary always seemed to carry with it certain necessary consequences. One of these is that the American people would not indefinitely stand by and witness the continuance of disorder in Mexico. Another is that such a policy on our part would lead other governments to feel that they should be permitted to do such things as might seem to them to be necessary for the protection of their own interests. Yet another consequence would be that difficulties would attend the actual removal of Americans from Mexico. It might not be safe for those at a particular place to be removed at a particular time. If we should endeavor to correct this condition by sending in our own forces, this would necessarily involve the invasion of Mexican territory; and such a step would inevitably increase the danger to which our citizens were exposed by inflaming native hostility toward them.10. In view of these considerations, if a change in our present attitude should be deemed to be necessary, the least injurious course would seem to be to forbid all shipments of arms and munitions of war to Mexico. In refusing to recognize the Federal Government as the representative of public order, it would hardly be congruous to ascribe a representative character of that kind to the revolutionary bands, whose operations must in any event be suppressed by force.Moreover, in view of the always existing possibility of serious trouble between the United States and Mexico, so long as the domestic troubles in the latter country continue, it would not appear to be good policy to increase the shipment of arms and munitions of war which may eventually be used against ourselves.
The numbers 53679, 53680, 53681, 53682, 53683, 53684, and 53685 are printed in the lower left corner of pages one through seven respectively.
Original Format
To
Files
