View on the Mexico Situation

Mr. (HL) Wilson’s statement
In the despatch dated October 31, 1910, attention is called to the great parade which had just taken place in the country, a magnificent celebration, but that there were underlying indications of unrest which the general public had little, if any, knowledge of. This situation is due to the fact that the Presidnent had practically ceased to govern, and that he was govenred by a syndicate of wealthy and powerful Mexicans, which had grown up around him, of great intelligence and ability, but very corrupt, the p rincipalle factors being his Minister of Finance, Limantour, and the Vice–President, Corral, both of whom were deeply immersed in various corrupt business and financial ventures, ramnifying all over the Republic, Limantour being the man of greater ability and Corallral of greater ingenuity, both intensely unpopular with the people.Madero appeared as an agitator first, of about the relative importance and type as the leader of the Industrial Workers of the World. He was generally ridiculed and laughed at in the country, had no pretige whatever, and it is known to me that his family sent to the President and told him that they were not responsible for his acts, that he was of disordered mind and had been in the asylum.
Discontent in the country began to increase, not only among the pororer classes and people who had just grounds for protest, but among the richer classes, many of whom were not included in the inner circle, and it became evident to me, before sending this diespatch that fully ninety per cent of the country were against Diaz, but none, so far as I was able to ascertain, was for Madero; they were simply what you would call “anti”.
I predicted that a revolution against Diaz would occur before a gun was fired, in this diespatch of October 31, 1910. In this despatch, the character of the government of Mexico is fully outlined, and the corruptions and abuses which existed throughout the Republic are fully analyzed, namely the abuses of the legislative and executive and judicial powers. Attention is called to the fact that the power of the Executive is so great that the legislative and judicial powers were but creatures in the hands of the Exectutive. This vicious system is shown to extend to all the different state governments upon precisely the same lines.President Diaz was a great man and a great patriot. He loved his country and he hoped eventually to see her a constitutional republic; but he believed the Mexicans to be unfit for self–government and that they could only be kept in order by a frim hand. The policy of governing in this way he maintained until his physical powers began to decay, and then the inevitable process of disintegration set in and was quick in bringing about the subsequent revolution.
The direct abuses complained of at this time were:

1. Concentration of wealth and lands.

2. Taxation.

3. The abuses of the judiciary.
The direct causes which made the revolution possinble were:

1. The growth of a distinct middle class, limited in education, but with certain ideas about government and human rights which made them able to control the great masses of the people with of pure Indian blood, who were totally without education.

2. The anti–American feeling throughout the country which was possibly fanned and encouraged by the Government for political purposes, and which got beyond their control, and led to a cohesive movement, which was taken advantage of by Madero for political purposes.
It would have been possible for Diaz, by the use of force, to have manintained himself in power. Madero’s following in the field was pitiful and undisciplined; but a series of exchanges were perfected through the medium of Limantour which weakened the prestige of the Government, encouraged the rebels and eventually led to disorders in the Republic which the President refused, at the request of his wife, to suppress by the use of the military.
On May 26, 1911, President Diaz resigned the office of President. Upon the announcement of the President’s resignation and before it was actually made, mobs took possession of the streets and did a great deal of damage to life and property. The mob showed especial animosity towards Americans, and riddled with stones almost every American business establishment in the business part of the City.
The fall of Diaz was accomplished without firing a single shot inside of the capital. In other words, he resigned and withdrew from the country peaceably and has never since interfered with its politics, turning over the executive power to the provisionally elected President, de la Barra, and thereafter the dates for the constitutional election of the President and Vice–Presidnent were fixed for the month of June 1911, and were then duly held, but the important fact must be noted that only 22,000 votes ouyt of 14,000,000 people were cast in the Presidentaial election, which the President must note is not a fair, just or legitimate expression of popular approval. Madero entered the capital on the 7th of June, 1911, after having been elected, and amid universal plaudits. At that time, I sent a confidential despatch predicting his downfall, calling attention the to the fact that while no dangerous demonstrations were occurring at that time, that it was entirely possible that movements would be inaugurated either by Madero osor by partisans of the vanquished government.
After the resignation of the President, on May 26, the new provisionsal President, de la Barra, issued a proclamation asking the people to retire to their homes. This produced no visible effect, as the mobs increased in numbers, but the violence decreased. On this day President Diaz left the city on an armed train for Vera Cruz. The trains was attacked en route by people calling themselves Maderistas, but their real character was unknown. No harm was done.
In February I came to Washington at the request of the President who, previeous to my visit appeared to have not been fully informed as to the situation in Mexico. After his interview with me, he ordered the national troops on the border and the assembling of the fleet on the Mexican coast. This had a most excellent effect, so far as the army movement was concerned, but the naval movement was abortive on account of misinterpretation of telephone orders, which led to a parade of the fleet up and down the coast of Mexico instead of a quiet and effective demonstration.Mr. Madero assumed power with a highly altruistic program which included free elections, universal eduvcation, one Presidential term, a policy of a division of public lands, reduction of taxation, the maintenance of friendly relations with the government of the United States, and an effort, general and sweeping in character to elevate the masses at the expense of the accumulated wealth of the country. He called to assist him in this work a cabinet of unknown and untried men, who quicklty proved themselves incapable, impotent and, in some cases, corrupt. The real power and control of the Madero administration rested in family government, and this family government was dominated at different periods by two factions, one composed of his brother Gustavo Madero, an exceedingly corriupt and wicked man, ambitious and unscrupulous in the extreme; by his father, who was equally corrupt but not so courageous, and by his wife, who was not corrupt, but exceedingly cruel, ambitious and revengeful. On the other hand, Ernesto Madero was a man of the old school, of frirm character, quick decision and great ability. He leaned rather to the Diaz methods of government, but was aloof from the corruption of the Madero government and not am imitator of the corrupt methods of the Diaz bgovernment. Whenever the President was under his control, which happened at intervals, Mexico had what might be called a Dr. Jekyl government, and whenever Gustavo Madero, Mrs. Madero and the father were in control, the country suffered from what might be called a Mr. Hyde government. There was no fixed or definite policy, but in the confusion of counsels and the rivalry in of the ambitions of different factions endeavoring to control the Presidnent, all of the principles upon which the government had come into power were lost sight of, and an era of tyrrany, despotism and corruption was inaugurated. Through the intrigues of Gustavo Madero one hundred and fourteen of the Madero family were put into public office. Through his influence, the vast accumulations of the Treasury, which the wise, and frugal administration of Porfirio Diaz had left as an asset for the new Government, were disipated in chimerical legislation for the supposed benefit of the people but really for the benefit of the people who were instrumental in having the laws passed.Madero entered upon power pledged to free elections, and yet his government interfered in every single state election which was held at the time he was in power, and so far as it was able with the imperfect machinery it had organized, in the election of members of the House and Senate. His administration entered into power pledged to the establishment of universal education, and during the entire time he was in office not a single school house was built notr an additional accomodation for a single child. His administration entered into power pledged to to the redistribution of the lands and the reduction of the large land holdings in Mexico, yet not a single distribution or reduction was made. His administration entered into power pledged to economy in administrative methods, and yet it disbursed all of the accumulations of the Treasury, even taking the most sacred reserves, and no new economies of any kind were put into force. His administration entered into power pledged to a reduction and equalization of taxation, yet the only changes that were made were to place export taxes upon the output onf American industry in the country, especially upon oil and rubber, wghich are distinctively owned by Americans. Pledged to a pro–American policy, his administration immediately began a series of persecutions of American railway employes, which eventually led to the withdrawal in a body of seven hundred of them from the country. Some of these men had been as long as thirty years in the employ of the railway, and yet they were even denied the right of transportation to their own country, a course which forced President Taft to seek employment for these unfortunate men with the various railways of the United States. In addition to this, the administration kept the embassy constantly occupied with defending American interests against surreptitious and collusive judicial attack upon American property, some of which were so open and brazen that the Ambassador was compelled to call the attention of the President directly to the acts of his own family.
The dissatisfaction with the administration of Madero soon became evidenced, not only among those who were originally opposed to him, but among those who had constituted his chief and most active partisans when he assumed power. The diessatisfaction among the foreign elemnt was unanimous, and especially among the American colony, who, as a rule, support the Meixican administration without any question as to its character or authority.
After eight months of Madero government, it became evident to every thinking man that the government [] must eventually fall, but no one knew how or when.
The first revolution, which occurred iunder the leadership of General Felix Diaz, was universally popular throughout the country and especially in the Capital City, but through certain traits of character, General Diaz allowed his opportunities to pass, and gave the Madero people, under the direction of Ernesto Madero, time to call in sufficient solldiers to hold in awe the populace and to mass sufficience forces in Vera Cruz to prevent the entry of Diaz into the Capital City, otherwise the revolution would have been successful at that time. It is an open and notorious fact that nearly all the Federal generals at this time were paid large sums of money by the Government to remain loyal, especially Generals Beltran and Blanquette. Beltran was paid $50,000 by Felix Diaz to surrender Vera Cruz to the rebels, and next day was paid $100,000 by Madero to recapture it for the Federals, and Madero said that if he did not recapture it Blanquette would be sent and paid $150,000. A few days after, Beltran and Blanquette together paid $400,000 for a plantation in Northern Vera Cruz.
In the month of November, I came north and had several long discussions with the President and Secretary Knox in reference to the situation in Mexico. I recommended additional diligence and an additional show of force as the only method by which we could secure protection for our people. This was done. I also recommended and partially drafted a note to the Mexican Government, drastic and menacing in character, which was approved by the then solicitor of the Department of State, the Chief of the Latin American Bureau and by the President, not by Secretary Knox, who emasculated the communcaication by striking out the time limit and the attack on the Mexican judiciary. The premature publication of this note, after it had been emasculated, so displeased Secretary Knox that he refused to send the note at all.Secretary Knox was largely guided in his ideas of conservative action by his desire not to define a policy for the new administration, but he entirely overlooked the obvious fact that the old administration was charged ii with governmental responsilbility until the 4th of March. After conferring with the Secretary and the President, I went to New York, where I met Mr. Lascurain, the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mexico. Mr. Lascurain appeared to be anxious to discuss the situation with me and to get the benefit of my advice. In response to his direct request, and not spontaneously, I advised him to go to Washington and to agree with the Washingoton Government uplon pending and irritating questions. This he agreed to do, thanking me for my advice. He visited Washington, but so far as the record shows, he only produced the impression that he intended to do something if he had an opportunity to do so. He nevertheless convinced the Department that a more moderate policy ought to be pursued, and that if the Mexican government were given time, it would work out the problems which our government was insisting upon. I assured the Department at the time that he was deceiving them, either intentionally or because he he did not understand that he could not speak for the Madero administration.Later on, the Department of State, which had been very much imposed upon by Mr. Lascurain at the time of his visit, adopted my views entirely, and while no action was taken in response tob the practically ultimatum note which I drafted and forwarded to the Department after reaching Mexico, I have been advised by the President since that if sufficient time had remained the note would have been addressed to the Mexican government.(See Information Series A.#91, Mexico No. 16, pp 47 to 50 inclusive).
I arrived in Mexico again in the early part of January and found an atmosphere of universal unrest existing and a general belief that the Government was on the eve of downfall, though no one could conjecture how the downfall would be brought about. General Diaz and General Reyes were at that time prisoners in the National penitentiary in Mexico City. On the 9th of February, 1913, as reported in my Confidential Despatch, No. 1901 (Information Series A #95, Mexico #18, pages 55 to 120 inclusive), a revolution broke out by an assault on the penitentiary where Generals Reyes and Diaz were vconfined, by the National Cadets. General Reyes immediately took charge of one column and led it against the National Palace, and General Diaz, at the head of another column, captured the Ciudadela, in the center of the City, where all the national supplies of arms and ammunition are stored, after an assault lasting twenty–five minutes. General Reyes was killed during the attack on the National Palace, not by a bullet from the front but by an assassin who shot from the rear and from above. In the meantime, the President was installed in the National Palace, and believing that, or being informed that some of his officers were not true, be called them out and without trial or inquiry had them shot. Among this number was General Ruiz, one of the most universally beloved soldiers in the Mexican army.
On the second day, Madero was seized with a panic and, in spite of the remonstrances of all his firiends, tried wto escape from the City, and did. Concealed in the tender of an engine, he went to the City of Cuernavaca, which was under the command of his most trusted military supporter, General Angel, to seek protection. General Angel remonstrated with him, and told him that his [] post of duty was in Mexico City and that unless he returned there and showed a firm front, all of his friends would be demoralized and probably killed. I ought to say at this point that this is the only instance in which to my knowledge Madero showed any lack of courage. He was finally prevailed upon to return to Mexico City.From this time on, the City was the scene of a battle between two contending forces, one with batteries at the National Palace, another in the vicinity of the British Legation and the other in Ciudadela. At this stage of the proceedings I called on the President, in company with the German and Spanish ministers, and remonstrated strongly against the character of the warfare which was being waged in the City ( See telegram, Feb. 12, 8 p. m. page 61, Mexico #18). His manner was excited and incoherent, but he informed us that he was on the eve of subduing a rebellion and would soon be in entire posesssion of the City. As we retired from the conference, the Spanish and German ministers agreed with me that he knew nothing whatever about the situation and that he was being misled and betrayed by those immediately about him or by agencies unknown to us. I ought to say that the President absolutely declined to change the kind of warfare that was being carried on and gave us no encouragement whatever. Afterwards, with the knowledge of the President, I went to the Ciudadela, accompanied by the German, British, and Spanish ministers, for the purpose of making similar representations to those made to the President. We were received by General Diaz who said that the character of qwarfare which he must wage was necessarily the kind which the enemy provoked; that he would not fire into any part of the residence district except to answer fire from the enemy. Our reprsentations had a most excellent effect upon General Diaz but none whatever upon the Government’s action, whose forces continued to fire indiscriminately into all parts of the City inflicting an infinite amount of damage upon noncombatants.
On February kl6, (See Page 68, Mexico No. 18) I called upon Military Attache, Captain Burnside, to inform me whether it was possible for the Government forces to capture the Ciudadela. He informed me, deliberately and emphatically, and after thorough ezxamination of the situation and with some knowledge of the materials of warfare that remained in the hands of the Government, he was decidely of the opinion that the Government forces could not capture the Ciudadela, even with double the number of soldiers it then had in the City and that all future engagements would simply mean the useless slaughter of human beings, either innocent non–combatants or soldier