Confidential Statement on Conversation with Sonnino
Title
Confidential Statement on Conversation with Sonnino
Creator
Merriam, Charles Edward, 1874-1953
Identifier
WWP25209
Date
[1918 September 25]
Description
Italians favor Czechoslovakian independence but are not sure about Yugoslavia and larger break up of empire in general.
Source
Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers
Publisher
Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum
Subject
World War, 1914-1918--Italy
Sonnino, Sidney, 1847-1922
Yugoslavia
Contributor
Danna Faulds
Relation
WWP25208
Language
English
Provenance
Document scan was taken from Library of Congress microfilm reel of the Wilson Papers. WWPL volunteers transcribed the text.
Text
COPY.
“Sonnino believes that the Czecho-Slavs have shown capacity in various ways, especially by action in Russia, and that they have demonstrated strong national spirit. He believes that they have irrevocably broken with Austria. He strongly favors Czecho-Slav independence. He is not certain in regard to the growth of the Jugo-Slav group as an independent organized political body. He would let them have all opportunities possible and wait for developments. He gives me an intimation that they should give more definite proof than heretofore of their ability to conduct independent national existence. He intimates that we should delay talk of modification terms of London treaty until Jugo Slavs show more clearly their capacity and national unity and give unquestionable evidence of definite break with Austria. He is afraid of the possibility that certain groups might even now yield to autonomy under Austrian control in place of absolute independence. He lays emphasis on Italy’s need for national security by means of better boundary lines, and says that Austria has drawn present lines so as to render Italy vulnerably from military point of view. He admits importance of league of nations, but cannot entirely overlook the necessity of territorial equilibrium. Under any circumstances he considers it unfair to let Italy remain with wedge of Austrian territory driven toward her heart. He states that he was interested in negotiating treaties of London and in view of the fact that there was then under consideration division of territory, he could not overlook interests of Italy. Italian representatives had to do likewise as all the others were claiming territory. He is uncertain about possibility of dismembering Austria. That part of Austria which is German would in all likelihood join itself to Germany immediately or within a few years, or at least would submit to German leadership and control. In such case Germany would be strengthened and Italy would have an even more dangerous neighbor while all nations would be in the shadow of impending attack by greater Germany upon balkans. This constitutes all the more reason why new states carved out of Austria should have the ability for resistance and vitality. I gained the impression that he intends to wait for development of Jugo Slavia; that if they make good showing he will give many concessions, but in any case certain territorial demands will be insisted upon by Italy although certain claims in London treaty may be waived. Of course in determining the Italian policy Sonnino is not the only factor, but in view of his ability and experience his attitude is important. He added that in any event the bear should be caught before his hide was divided. He warned that too much weight should not be given to the apparent heat of Italy’s internal controversies, because although they may make bitter declarations, they will finally arrive at internal harmony.”
[There is a handwritten note at top of page which is either smudged or erased, making much of it illegible. The note reads in part: “...analysis from Capt Merriam, our rep in Rome, [who] is in very close…”]
“Sonnino believes that the Czecho-Slavs have shown capacity in various ways, especially by action in Russia, and that they have demonstrated strong national spirit. He believes that they have irrevocably broken with Austria. He strongly favors Czecho-Slav independence. He is not certain in regard to the growth of the Jugo-Slav group as an independent organized political body. He would let them have all opportunities possible and wait for developments. He gives me an intimation that they should give more definite proof than heretofore of their ability to conduct independent national existence. He intimates that we should delay talk of modification terms of London treaty until Jugo Slavs show more clearly their capacity and national unity and give unquestionable evidence of definite break with Austria. He is afraid of the possibility that certain groups might even now yield to autonomy under Austrian control in place of absolute independence. He lays emphasis on Italy’s need for national security by means of better boundary lines, and says that Austria has drawn present lines so as to render Italy vulnerably from military point of view. He admits importance of league of nations, but cannot entirely overlook the necessity of territorial equilibrium. Under any circumstances he considers it unfair to let Italy remain with wedge of Austrian territory driven toward her heart. He states that he was interested in negotiating treaties of London and in view of the fact that there was then under consideration division of territory, he could not overlook interests of Italy. Italian representatives had to do likewise as all the others were claiming territory. He is uncertain about possibility of dismembering Austria. That part of Austria which is German would in all likelihood join itself to Germany immediately or within a few years, or at least would submit to German leadership and control. In such case Germany would be strengthened and Italy would have an even more dangerous neighbor while all nations would be in the shadow of impending attack by greater Germany upon balkans. This constitutes all the more reason why new states carved out of Austria should have the ability for resistance and vitality. I gained the impression that he intends to wait for development of Jugo Slavia; that if they make good showing he will give many concessions, but in any case certain territorial demands will be insisted upon by Italy although certain claims in London treaty may be waived. Of course in determining the Italian policy Sonnino is not the only factor, but in view of his ability and experience his attitude is important. He added that in any event the bear should be caught before his hide was divided. He warned that too much weight should not be given to the apparent heat of Italy’s internal controversies, because although they may make bitter declarations, they will finally arrive at internal harmony.”
[There is a handwritten note at top of page which is either smudged or erased, making much of it illegible. The note reads in part: “...analysis from Capt Merriam, our rep in Rome, [who] is in very close…”]
Original Format
Memorandum
Files
Collection
Citation
Merriam, Charles Edward, 1874-1953, “Confidential Statement on Conversation with Sonnino,” [1918 September 25], WWP25209, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.