Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson
Title
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson
Creator
Lansing, Robert, 1864-1928
Identifier
WWP25204
Date
1918 September 24
Description
Secretary of State worried about the military situation in Russia.
Source
Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers
Publisher
Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum
Subject
World War, 1914-1918--Russia
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia
Contributor
Danna Faulds
Relation
WWP25205
WWP25206
Language
English
Provenance
Document scan was taken from Library of Congress microfilm reel of the Wilson Papers. WWPL volunteers transcribed the text.
Text
My dear Mr. President:
I know that you have read the enclosed telegram (23d, 10 pm) from Mr. Morris with the same anxiety that I have. It presents very clearly a situation full of difficulties because the Russian communities of the Volga region, which have been friendly to the Czecho-Slovaks, being unarmed, will be at the mercy of the Red Guards, who have committed such monstrous crimes within the past six weeks in Moscow and other cities, if the Czecho-Slovaks withdraw to the east of the Urals.
I must confess that I sympathize with the spirit of the Czecho-Slovaks when they say that they cannot abandon their helpless friends to certain massacre and pillage. I believe that the world would be disposed to condemn such a course, and that the Czecho-Slovaks with their high sense of honor would rather die on the Volga than bear the charge of such ingratitude.
It seems to me that we must assume that the Czecho-Slovak force west of the Urals will remain there and do the best that they can to protect the friendly Russian communities from Bolshevik excesses.
The question is what ought we to do in the circumstances and what can we do in case we feel it our duty to assist them? It is an extremely difficult question to answer because I think that we must assume that, justly or unjustly, we will be blamed for the consequences unless we can show conclusively that it was utterly impossible to give aid to the Czecho-Slovaks in eastern Russia.
We could of course say, adhering rigidly to our announced policy, that it is their duty, regardless of their Russian allies, to join their compatriots in Siberia and that we ought not to be asked to come to their assistance if they do not follow that course. But I fear that such a declaration of attitude would be generally criticized and would place the blame upon us if disaster should fall upon the communities of eastern Russia.
Yet, assuming that we ought to aid these people if we can, what can we do? I do not see how, with the small force which we have in Siberia, we can do more than hasten arms and ammunition to them and refrain from urging them to withdraw at the present time. But, even with sufficient munitions and supplies, I doubt if so small a body of troops can avoid final annihilation unless a considerable force is sent to cooperate with them in repelling the Bolsheviks. Where is such a force to come from? A few thousands would appear useless. There seems to be only one source and that is Japan, and I feel quite convinced that the Japanese Government, even if it were physically possible, would hesitate to enter on so hazardous an adventure.
The more I consider the matter the more perplexing and distressing it becomes. We cannot abandon the Czecho-Slovaks on the ground that they will not abandon their Russian friends. Of course that would never do. And yet, what is the alternative, or is there any?
In view of the recent examples of the blood-thirsty character of the Bolsheviks, which has introduced a new factor into the problem of relieving the Czecho-Slovaks, I feel that we should give most careful consideration to the suggestions of Mr. Morris.
I would be grateful for your instructions or opinion as to the policy we should adopt in dealing with this new situation which was not foreseen when the Aide Memoire of July 17th was prepared and which has resulted from the extreme terrorism which has recently been resorted to by the Bolsheviks.
Faithfully yours,
Robert Lansing.
Enclosure:
I know that you have read the enclosed telegram (23d, 10 pm) from Mr. Morris with the same anxiety that I have. It presents very clearly a situation full of difficulties because the Russian communities of the Volga region, which have been friendly to the Czecho-Slovaks, being unarmed, will be at the mercy of the Red Guards, who have committed such monstrous crimes within the past six weeks in Moscow and other cities, if the Czecho-Slovaks withdraw to the east of the Urals.
I must confess that I sympathize with the spirit of the Czecho-Slovaks when they say that they cannot abandon their helpless friends to certain massacre and pillage. I believe that the world would be disposed to condemn such a course, and that the Czecho-Slovaks with their high sense of honor would rather die on the Volga than bear the charge of such ingratitude.
It seems to me that we must assume that the Czecho-Slovak force west of the Urals will remain there and do the best that they can to protect the friendly Russian communities from Bolshevik excesses.
The question is what ought we to do in the circumstances and what can we do in case we feel it our duty to assist them? It is an extremely difficult question to answer because I think that we must assume that, justly or unjustly, we will be blamed for the consequences unless we can show conclusively that it was utterly impossible to give aid to the Czecho-Slovaks in eastern Russia.
We could of course say, adhering rigidly to our announced policy, that it is their duty, regardless of their Russian allies, to join their compatriots in Siberia and that we ought not to be asked to come to their assistance if they do not follow that course. But I fear that such a declaration of attitude would be generally criticized and would place the blame upon us if disaster should fall upon the communities of eastern Russia.
Yet, assuming that we ought to aid these people if we can, what can we do? I do not see how, with the small force which we have in Siberia, we can do more than hasten arms and ammunition to them and refrain from urging them to withdraw at the present time. But, even with sufficient munitions and supplies, I doubt if so small a body of troops can avoid final annihilation unless a considerable force is sent to cooperate with them in repelling the Bolsheviks. Where is such a force to come from? A few thousands would appear useless. There seems to be only one source and that is Japan, and I feel quite convinced that the Japanese Government, even if it were physically possible, would hesitate to enter on so hazardous an adventure.
The more I consider the matter the more perplexing and distressing it becomes. We cannot abandon the Czecho-Slovaks on the ground that they will not abandon their Russian friends. Of course that would never do. And yet, what is the alternative, or is there any?
In view of the recent examples of the blood-thirsty character of the Bolsheviks, which has introduced a new factor into the problem of relieving the Czecho-Slovaks, I feel that we should give most careful consideration to the suggestions of Mr. Morris.
I would be grateful for your instructions or opinion as to the policy we should adopt in dealing with this new situation which was not foreseen when the Aide Memoire of July 17th was prepared and which has resulted from the extreme terrorism which has recently been resorted to by the Bolsheviks.
Faithfully yours,
Robert Lansing.
Enclosure:
Original Format
Letter
To
Wilson, Woodrow, 1856-1924
Files
Collection
Citation
Lansing, Robert, 1864-1928, “Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson,” 1918 September 24, WWP25204, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.