Tasker Howard Bliss to Newton D. Baker

Tasker Howard Bliss to Newton D. Baker

Bliss, Tasker Howard, 1853-1930

WWP25129

1918 August 22-26

Military situation sent to the Secretary of War while at Paris.

Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers

Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum

Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920). Supreme War Council

World War, 1914-1918--United States

Danna Faulds

English

Document scan was taken from Library of Congress microfilm reel of the Wilson Papers. WWPL volunteers transcribed the text.

Supreme War Council,
American Section,
Versailles.

My dear Mr. Secretary:-

I received in due time your No.5, dated in Washington July 28th, which came by courier via Brest and Tours.

1. At first I was rather worried - - and I suppose the misunderstanding is entirely my fault - - by what you expected of me in the matter of ascertaining the assistance that the British would give us in cargo-tonnage for carrying out the 80-division Program, and the assistance from the British and French in the matter of artillery. As you know, the first official knowledge that I had of the original 100-division Program was in remarks made by M. Tardieu at the last meeting of the Supreme War Council, and which I have already reported. Mr. Lloyd-George seemed quite vexed at the idea, which he assumed, that anyone except the British were figuring on the matter of British tonnage. He cut the whole matter short very bluntly by saying that I could find out from the United States Government how much tonnage was needed for the 100-division Program, how much the United States could furnish, and that then the British Government would take up the question of whether it could supply the deficiency. There was no vote taken but the British Secretary (who kept the Minutes) recorded that as the action of the Council.

2. When the 100-division Program went by the board, I was told that Washington was figuring on an 80-division Program, and I assumed that part of that figuring would be the determination through the usual expert agencies of how the necessary tonnage would be obtained. However, the British have got the figures and if there is any hope of their giving us the necessary assistance they are doubtless working at it with their experts and ours in London. The extract from the confidential cablegram of Mr. Lloyd-George to M. Clemenceau dated August 2, quoted to me in War Department No. 81, of August 19, would seem to indicate that the British had already settled the matter adversely.

3. The British seem to take it very much to heart that we are not going to feed our man-power into their organizations in order to enable them to maintain their previous number of divisions; also, that we have not committed ourselves as a matter of policy to maintaining American divisions on the British Front. It is hard to believe that England, who is so vitally interested in the issue of the war, would allow this to stand in the way of her furnishing tonnage assistance provided she could possibly furnish it.

4. In the matter of artillery, Mr. Stettinius’ Commission immediately set some eight or ten experts to work in collaboration with General Wheeler (Chief Ordnance Officer in France) and his Staff. They submitted to the French and British a complete statement of our needs and when I last saw him he hoped for an official reply to them, and a favorable one, by about last Tuesday. He also expected about the same time a reply from the British.

5. As I now understand the situation, we want to carry out at least the 80-division Program; we cannot do it unless we get assistance from the British in cargo-tonnage, varying in amount from a little over 1,200,000 tons in August to a little over 200,000 tons in February next, after which we expect to be able to take care of ourselves by our own shipping-construction program; and that the British have intimated that they can give us no further cargo-tonnage assistance and that they may be obliged to cut down the troop tonnage which they have given us. If that should prove to be the case, then we cannot carry out the 80-division Program by the approximate date desired. Nevertheless, despatches purporting to be dated in Washington and published in English and French newspapers here, state that the authorities in Washington are officially declaring that the 80-division Program will be carried out by the beginning of next summer and that we will then have enough troops here to finish the war on this front. If these despatches are not authentic, they ought to be censored, either in the United States or here, because it seems to me that they will make more difficult the getting of tonnage assistance if we need any, and my official telegrams from Washington are clearly to the effect that we do need it.

6. If Marshal Foch and his subordinates believe that the 80-division Program, carried out by the beginning of next summer will give reasonable hope of ending the war on this front next year; and if, to carry out the 80-division Program we must borrow tonnage from our Allies, I am inclined to think that the only way that we can get it is to force it from them in some such way as suggested in Paragraph 3 et seq, of my No.180. I do not think that I exaggerate when I say that the thing you now have to fear is that the Germans may at any moment make some proposition (far less than what we would accept if we had our own way about it) that will cause the common people over here to force their Governments into a consideration of it, or to overturn one or more of these Governments and put in another that will consider it. If such a proposition should be made and if any of the peoples here should be disposed to consider it favorably in order to put an end to their long-continued sacrifices, they would be very much helped in withstanding German allurements by the knowledge that a definitely and openly expressed hope was being held out to them, that if they endure these sacrifices a few months longer and even increase them if necessary, the war will end the way they want it and they can then demand their own terms.

7. You say that “the Port situation seems more or less insoluble” from your end of the line. I saw Mr. Day a short time ago, after he had completed an inspection of at least part of the improved port facilities and he said that he was prepared to entirely change his view from the one entertained by him before he left the United States. Many difficulties exist and perhaps will continue to exist; but the French now feel so utterly dependent upon the United States that I am convinced that if we only have the necessary tonnage we will be able to carry out our problem so far as receipt of troops and stores at this end of the line is concerned. I have noticed heretofore that whenever an all-impelling emergency arises, facilities are made available the very existence of which up to that moment was denied. There was a very illuminating discussion which threw light on this subject at the meeting of the Supreme War Council in London last March. It was just a week before the German drive began on March 21; it was known to be coming and everyone was in a state of grave anxiety as to the outcome. The British had become very much alarmed over the railroad situation in France and were tentatively discussing a proposition to suspend for a time all movement of American troops to France, pending the arrival of large numbers of railway cars and locomotives. M. Clemenceau made a very impassioned speech and said that in view of the impending emergency he would, if necessary, sign an agreement then and there to handle all American troops and supplies, so far as getting them from the seacoast to the front was concerned, without suspending the movement of a single man but rather increasing that movement. Of course he spoke somewhat hastily and rashly, but what he meant was that when an emergency was on them the people would stand a great deal more of inconvenience and hardship than they were then enduring.

8. I note what you say about the consultation and agitation at home over the two Russian expeditions. It is a pity that we cannot get more exact information as to what is really happening in Russia. As to the size of the expedition via Vladivostok, the Allies here at Versailles have little hesitation in expressing their opinion that now that they are committed to the expedition it must be carried through. Just now my special interest is in learning as soon as we can whether the Allied movements in Russia will help the Germans in getting any man-power out of that country or out of its seceded territories. The British estimate that by March 1, Germany will have added 400,000 Russians to her military forces. They made that estimate some time before the Allies began their present movements of military intervention. In the estimate of relative strengths of the Allies and the Germans at the beginning of next summer, which I sent home some time ago, I did not give consideration to this British estimate of Russians available for the German army. If their estimate should prove true, it is a very serious thing at a time when we are counting so much on deterioration in German strength.

9. The possibilities of the situation to which we have committed ourselves is shown by a note dated August 18, from the French General Staff to the French Section at Versailles, of which they furnished me a copy. Referring to the operations being conducted by the English General Poole from Archangel toward Vologda it speaks of General Poole’s encountering positions which he could not attack with good chances of success on account of the weakness of his force. The note added “L’envoi de renforts est donc urgent.” In none of the discussions at Versailles did we contemplate General Poole going further than he could go with the force at his disposition. His main object was to hold the port of Murmansk and later, if necessary, the port of Archangel. His own declaration was that if he moved south with a small force, a part only of that which has already been given him, he would rally to him enroute to Vologda at least 100,000 friendly Russians. If the Russians prove friendly and rally to him, well and good; if they do not, and if they prove hostile, he will, by continuing his advance, put himself in the attitude of war with Russia. That is distinctly the attitude, so far as I can gather here, which our Allies expect to take if it should prove necessary to accomplish their purpose. That has not been my idea, but I suppose that it has all been discounted in the United States. If the Japanese and other Allies strengthen the Czecho-Slovaks, I cannot see that it can have any other object than to overturn the present so-called Government in Russia; because they cannot proceed with the consent of that Government to the West and establish a front against the Germans. If that Government should be overturned, it looks to me as though a military dictatorship would have to be established for the remainder of the war.

10. You say that if I should have any opportunity to learn the estimate placed by the people in France on the de Haviland-4 aeroplanes shipped from America, you would be glad to have it. I conferred with my colleague, General Belin, and learned from him that the French Aviation Technical Section of the War Ministry here has stated that it is not possible at present to report upon the qualities of the American-built de Haviland-4, as the trials of the machine assigned to that section for test are still in progress. It stated, however, that the first flights of that machine gave results of “little brilliancy”, clearly inferior, in particular, to those of the Breguet machine fitted with the Liberty motor. Other flights are to be held with a different type of propeller, a modification in the weights carried, and minute adjustment of the machine. On completion of these trials a report will be submitted by the French Technical Section as to the value of the machine, and this report will be transmitted to me by the French Military Representative General Belin. The latter informs me that the de Haviland squadrons sent to the front are reported as satisfactory by their pilots.

11. This information, incomplete as it is, is about what might have been expected. A Technical Section, making competitive tests and investigations, “fly-specks” everything. If one machine, in some one particular, is not so good as another, or as the others, it is “damned with faint praise.” The same machine when it gets into the hands of the aviators at the front, who are not making competitive tests of it with others but who consider it on its own merits, are apt to be quite satisfied with it. I think that this gives us a good “pointer” in making contracts for war material. There are plenty of military weapons, of a particular type, each of which is quite good enough for our service, although one of them, perhaps, is better than any of the others. If our facilities for producing that one best type are sufficiently ample to give us all that we want of it in the time desired, we can accept that type and reject the others. But if, as is almost always the case in an emergency such as this war has been for us, we have to call on the manufacturers of different types in order to produce a sufficient number of the machines, I do not think that we ought to waste time in getting them merely because they are not all in every respect up to the same plane of excellence.

12. I have an officer specially assigned to pursue this subject and as soon as I get the report of the French Technical Section I shall forward it, or, if it should seem desirable, cable an abstract of it.

13. As I told you in my last letter that I intended to do,I went on August 11th to Moulliens-au-Bois, the Headquarters of our 33d Division (Infantry only), commanded by General George Bell. There I met General Pershing who arrived an hour later. We talked about the next meeting of the Supreme War Council which I then expected to be held any day, and subjects that we thought would come up for discussion. He told me that he thought the English would make a strong fight for the retention of a certain part of the American Army on their front. The next morning the English King arrived and he almost immediately asked General Pershing and myself into a private room where he stated at considerable length, but not very clearly, his views about the situation. He referred once or twice to what Mr. Lloyd-George had said to him and I think that he was repeating the former’s views. He said that if the English could not get help from us they would have to reduce the number of their divisions to 35 or else retain the present number at very greatly reduced strength, which all their military men thought would be very unwise. He seemed to be perturbed at the idea of the creation of an independent American Army which might remove American troops from the British Front. General Pershing stated in very general terms the object that he had in view, but carefully avoided saying anything that would commit him to a course which seemed to be in the King’s mind. He thanked the King most cordially for all of the assistance that we had obtained from the British and expressed the determination of the Americans to cooperate with everybody on this front in whatever way the military men should agree was the best to end the war quickly and successfully. The King is rather blunt in his manner of speaking and General Pershing handled exceedingly well a subject which might have proved delicate.

14. The night that we stayed at Moulliens-au-Bois, it was heavily bombed by German aeroplanes. I am inclined to think that their spy-service may have given them a “tip” as to the intended visit of the King, and that they thought perhaps he was then there. Immediately after lunch on the 12th, I went to the front to see the Illinois regiment, commanded by Colonel Sanborn, which was then in the attack being made by General Rawlinson’s IVth British Army. I found Col. Sanborn’s headquarters in a dugout on the north bank of the Somme, on the edge of the village of Chipilly. It had been used in the attack along the north bank and evidently had had a hard time of it, but had done exceedingly well, as for that matter all our troops have. The Somme here winds like a serpent. Corresponding to each inward fold a sharp limestone crest runs down to the marshy borders of the river. Between these crests are deep ravines pitted with excavations in the chalk and spotted here and there with a few trees or clumps of brush. Colonel Sanborn said, in a slight criticism of what they had had to do, that they had had to move from one of these crests to another without sufficient reconnaisance. When they attacked one they did not know what was behind it. When they crossed each crest, they found in front of them a deep pocket and the forward slope of another crest, with nests of German machine guns scattered everywhere. In fact, the successive positions looked to me as though they were almost impossible to take except as they were flanked by the Australian troops to the right and left. The thing that surprised me is that our newest troops, apparently, do quite as well as those who have had very much longer training over here. But in the kind of warfare now being waged, it is not a question of maneuvering large masses of men but of pushing forward small units each of which goes as far as it can and then stops while those on the right or left of it free its further advance. This sort of work gives a splendid opportunity for the individual intelligence and courage of our men.

15. In our work here political questions are, as yet somewhat vaguely but more and more persistently, pushing themselves to the front, and I have a hard time in steering the American Section clear of them. It cannot be denied that in certain of the campaigns in which our Allies are deeply interested, world-politics play an important part. I have already told you that it has been more or less openly said by prominent political and military men that they look to the United States to settle the Balkan question and my colleagues were inclined to shrug their shoulders when I showed them my No.66 of July 1st, from Washington, which was to the general effect that the United States has no interest in the Macedonian question. Of course, when the peace-terms come to be discussed, I suppose that questions relating to the Balkans will have to be considered by us, as well as other questions; but what people here are now interested in is getting the United States involved in these political questions for the purpose of enabling them better to shape their military campaigns. For their purpose, they want certain questions settled before peace comes, instead of after.

16. Moreover it would seem that the Allies are fearing that they cannot themselves agree on the settlement to be made of some of these questions after the war. I think that it is for this reason that my English colleagues are primarily anxious to have an Inter-Allied political agreement arrived at now when there is still enough pressure on them to keep them more or less together. But the English tell me quite plainly that they believe no one but the United States can lead them in this “get-together” political movement. They constantly refer to the situation in the Balkans as showing the necessity of an ante-peace agreement. They say that in the advance made a little while ago by the Italian Army west of Lake Ohrida the movement would have been far more successful and might possibly have caused a falling back of the entire Austro-Bulgarian line had it not been for disagreements between the Italians and the French. The French had put in a certain force to assist the Italians. After the movement began, the Italians said that the French must not go to the town of EL BASEN; or, if their natural line of advance took them there, they must agree to immediately surrender it to the Italians. They made this demand a sine qua non to further cooperation by the French, although they had themselves asked for this cooperation. The British tell me that the French commander telegraphed this demand to Paris and that M. Clemenceau then ordered the immediate withdrawal of the French contingent.

17. My colleagues have committees in their Sections here which interest themselves in such questions. Some days ago a representative of the British Section came to see me about the necessity, in his opinion, of the establishment of a politico-diplomatic representation on the Supreme War Council, in which all four Governments should take part, and which should serve to get the Allies together on political questions, precedent to the preparation of plans for campaigns. His idea, although not definitely stated, seemed to be that the Military Representatives should call attention to the necessity of this; at least I drew that inference because when I asked why Mr. Lloyd-George, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Orlando did not get together on the matter, he said that he did not believe that the French would accede to a proposition emanating from the British and that the French and Italians would not, probably, agree. But he seemed to think that they could be made to work together under pressure from the United States.

18. I immediately foresaw all sorts of complications. I told him that, under instructions from my Government, I could not and would not mix myself up in any question which, although it might ultimately have a decidedly military bearing, was primarily political; that I was not in a position, nor was I expected to be in a position, to know the political views of my Government on these delicate questions; and that, unless instructed so to do, I could take no part in a Joint Note such as he seemed to contemplate. Later, he brought me a paper on the subject of “Strategy without Policy”, of which I give you immediately below a paraphrase in order that you may know the line of thought of some minds here.

Paraphrase. The paper begins with a statement that successful war requires unity of direction and that successful military strategy must carry out a definite unified policy, -- both being controlled and directed by a single executive authority; that for three years of misfortune and mistakes there was an enforced unity in Allied counsels only when fear of defeat and enemy pressure forced the Allies to act together; “but directly the pressure is removed they tend to drift apart, and to think first of their own interests which are not always in harmony with the common aims”;

That it required the misfortunes of three years to establish a reasonable approach to unity of command and strategical direction;

But the paper goes on to say that the Allies have never had, even now, “unity in policy”; that the Balkans, Austria Russia, and Roumania, show the serious results of a want of united policy to guide strategy;

That the idea that inconvenient political questions may be shelved until a military victory is gained is a delusion because it postpones military victory as the result of the military force not being employed to the best advantage; that it will be far more difficult to agree after the enemy has sustained a defeat, because when the enemy’s power is most in evidence is the time when the Allies have pulled together, and that now that a new period of success is beginning they will do well to discover what are the causes of dis-union and remove them;

That it is necessary to find or invent some appropriate machinery for the solution of political questions; that the problem cannot be dealt with by the ordinary method of diplomatic procedure; that the Allied nations have agreed to accept the decisions of the Supreme War Council as binding them in the military sphere in which the Council is advised by a single con-joint staff after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief; but that the Council receives no advice in the political sphere, which is necessary in order that strategy should be properly based and that there are no political advisers to work out a common policy for the consideration of the Council; that, therefore, when political questions arise, national divergencies of view also tend to arise, and that the conduct of the war is hampered because the Council is unable to lay down a clear and agreed statement of what it wants, for the achievement of which its military advisers are to be called upon to work.

The paper goes on to ask - What is the policy of the Allies with regard to Poland? Is it their object to reconstitute the old, historic Kingdom of Poland as it existed before the first partition? Have the Allies got a policy in the matter at all? It states that it is evident that the whole future of Eastern Europe in general, and of the Balkan States in particular, depends upon this. If the Allies have, as yet, no agreed policy in the matter it is necessary that there should be a Committee of national representatives permanently sitting together to work out a scheme for one. It will be for the Supreme War Council itself to accept or reject their results, but by no other means is it to be expected that definite, agreed schemes for the solution of this problem, and of all the other complicated problems of the Near East which hinge upon it, will be worked out. And unless they are worked out the objects to the attainment of which the military effort is to be directed will be left in vagueness.

The paper goes on to call attention to the hesitation of the Allies in deciding upon a common policy in regard to Siberia; the unedifying quarrels between the French and the Italians which have recently put a stop to promising operations in Albania; the inconsistent aspirations of the Italians and the Yugo-Slavs; the conflicting views of the different Allied Propaganda Organizations, etc, etc., -- all of which the writer thinks illustrate the necessity for the establishment of machinery to make definite con-joint political decisions.

The paper winds up with a definite recommendation for the establishment of a permanent body of diplomatic representatives in whom the Allies have confidence, to sit permanently together at some common center and work out schemes of Allies policy everywhere in co-operation with one another, just as the military staffs at Versailles work out military schemes. End of Paraphrase.

19. After reading the above-mentioned paper, I had another conference with the British officer who had submitted it, and asked him why the heads of the Allied Governments in Europe could not take this question up, if they so desired, through the regular diplomatic channels, with the Government in Washington. He said that he did not believe they would all agree to do so. I then said that the military Representatives were bound by the instructions they might receive from their Governments in a particular case; that if the political heads of the Governments could not agree to consult Washington through diplomatic channels, How could it be expected that they would agree to a Joint Note of their Military Representatives on the same subject? From his reply I gained the idea that he thinks that the political men of the Governments here want to agree, but that there is a certain political cowardice which prevents them from doing so; and that for this reason they might welcome military pressure based on the ground that political agreement was a necessary condition to military success.

20. I called his attention to the fact that the Supreme War Council is made up of the political heads of the four great nations primarily engaged in the war on the Western Front; that each of them had already their political advisers in their political cabinets; that the political questions which worried him related to distant fronts and not to the Western Front; that the military operations on those fronts should be subordinated to those on this one; that, for example, an offensive in Macedonia or in Italy or elsewhere should be undertaken provided the Supreme Command said that it would facilitate the final decision on the Western Front; and that just now the common policy of the Allies should be a military policy to thoroughly beat the Central Powers.

21. The reply to all this was simply that if we did not agree on a policy before our decisive military success, the Allies will never agree on it afterwards. And that confirms me in the opinion which I have several times expressed to you, that what concerns some of the Allies is not so much a political agreement, as being a necessary basis for sound military strategy, as it is a pure and simple political agreement which they think can be arrived at only under enemy pressure and before the final victory. In other words, their apprehension increases the slower that victory comes without an antecedent political agreement having been reached as to what they will do after the war. Personally, I cannot see what military bearing a political agreement as to the future of Poland will have on the successful progress of a campaign to which the Allies are now devoting every possible effort. I cannot see the bearing a political agreement as to the future of Russia will have on the progress of the war except a possible unfortunate result from some such political agreement that would oblige the Allies to divert an increasing part of their strength from the Western Front. A political agreement as to the settlement of all European political questions after the war might have a bearing on the military conduct of the war; but an unsuccessful attempt at such an agreement might have an unfortunate effect; for example, it might be that, at the end, the Allies may be unwilling to grant to Italy all that was promised in the Secret Treaty of April 26, 1915, and if that fact should develop in an attempt to now reach a political agreement, it might seriously affect the attitude of Italy toward the war.

22. As I have said to you before, I shall take no part in these political matters, knowing that my sole function is to give what help I can in the immediate problem of beating the Germans. Of course I cannot abdicate the functions of my mind; these questions are intensely interesting to anyone who is in the least concerned about the future of the world; but whilst I think about them and listen to discussions about them, I shall speak of them only in this personal way to you.

August 24, 1918.
23. Colonel Stead, who has been representing the British War Office at Salonica and who tells me that in one capacity or another he has passed the last fifteen years in the Balkans, came to see me today on his way to London. He gave me a very complete statement about the situation on the Macedonian Front, from the British point of view. He confirmed what I said in paragraph 16, above. He tells me that with the Greeks the war is very unpopular; that Mr. Venizelos with difficulty raised a force of six weak divisions, the total amounting to something like 40,000 men; that under the guise of a service-of-the-rear force, he gradually accumulated at Salonica between 200,000 and 250,000 men; that these men are required to be fed by the Allies, and that the whole thing was a device of Mr. Venizelos to feed a lot of people who otherwise would make trouble at home; that their families get separation allowances. In addition to this, he says that there are about 70,000 refugees in Salonica over and above the usual civil population and the garrison. He thinks that an offensive on the Macedonian Front is desirable whenever proper preparations shall have been made for it, but that if undertaken under present conditions it might prove a failure. If the enemy should break through the present line, he thinks that the Italians would withdraw, for political reasons, to Valona, while the rest of the line would be forced to withdraw to Salonica, because practically all the supplies for the army are concentrated there. He says that the French have large financial interests at Salonica and that this fact controls to an unfortunate extent their military policy. A long time ago the Military Representatives recommended, and the Supreme War council approved, that bases of supply be created in Old Greece with an improvement in the lines of communication to them, so that in the event of necessity the Allied Army of the East could fall back in such a way as to continue to protect Greece, even though Salonica might have to be abandoned or held as long as possible by a small force. We have repeatedly called attention to the small progress that has been made in this work but as all of the orders that go to the Italian contingent on the Macedonian Front are sent from Rome and those to the remainder of the Allied force there are sent by the French Government from Paris, it is difficult to enforce the decisions of the Supreme War Council in these remote theatres. I have sometimes thought that the only way to secure prompt and unified action in such cases would be to give Marshal Foch a strong Staff and give him general control on all other theatres as he now has detailed control on the Western Front.

24. Colonel Stead’s fear is that the Germans may make a serious effort against the Macedonian front. He thinks that they will be unwilling to enter the winter with a knowledge on the part of the German people that they have been unsuccessful everywhere at the end of the year; and that, therefore, if they are able to stabilize their line on the Western Front they may send a certain number of divisions to the Balkans. Military operations there can be continued until at least into the month of January and unless a Winter Campaign can be fought on the Western Front, they might be able to withdraw a few Divisions for the above purpose. As you know, the last decision of the Supreme War Council was that preparations should be continued in Macedonia for an offensive somewhere about October 1st unless at that time the Supreme War Council should decide that it was unwise. I think that Colonel Stead has been summoned back to London to give his views on the situation to the British War Cabinet.

August 26th
Marshal Foch has just sent word that he would like to have the Military Representatives come for a conference at his Headquarters, at 3.30 this afternoon. The courier for Washington leaves here to-day and I must, therefore, close this letter hastily. After I return from the Marshal’s Headquarters to-night I shall try to get word to you by the Navy courier as to the subject and result of the Conference.

I received yesterday another paper from the British Section on the same subject as the one outlined in my paragraph 18, above. Notwithstanding the success which the Allies are now having, the British talk a good deal about some form of German “Peace Proposals to which the Allies will be compelled to give a definite reply.” They do not agree with Colonel Stead in the opinion that the Germans may attempt a serious movement on the Macedonian front; nor do they believe they will try it in Italy. The paper which I received yesterday expresses the general opinion that the German Armies are faced with the prospect of fighting indefinitely on the defensive against increasing odds, with famine at home and Allies ready to desert them at the first safe opportunity; that only an accident, such as a general strike in England and return of a Pacifist majority to Parliament in October, the fall of the French Cabinet, or a quarrel between some of the Allies, all unlikely contingencies, could delay the ultimate end; that under the circumstances the only course for Germany seems to be to purchase peace before her remaining manhood is destroyed and her country invaded. After a somewhat lengthy discussion of the “pros and cons” the paper concludes that Germany may propose peace without delay, that is, in the course of the next few weeks; that she may propose terms so alluring to one or another of the Powers here that the Governments will be forced to consider them; that no Government could give an independent reply without risking the breaking up of the Alliance; that, therefore, the Supreme War Council, or some other body representing the Allied nations would have to be hastily summoned and this body would find itself confronted with the necessity of hastily agreeing upon a policy on the many questions upon which, as yet, there is no agreement.

In other words, the paper reinforces the argument in the one which I paraphrased in paragraph 18, above. The paper then goes on to state some of the questions on which a broad policy would have to be agreed upon by the Allies before an answer could be given to any peace proposals. These questions are enumerated as follows:

(a) The future of Alsace-Lorraine;
(b) Compensation to Belgium;
(c) The rectification of the Italian Frontier;
(d) The future of Poland, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs;
(e) The future of Russia and Finland;
(f) The whole Balkam territorial settlement, including Roumania and Thrace;
(g) Turkey, Palestine, Persia;
(h) The German Colonies;
(i) The German Fleet;
(j) Economic Policy and the question of Raw Materials;
(k) “The Freedom of the Seas”.

The paper goes on to say that the Allies would not only have to come to a decision with regard to these and other points, but in refusing (if they did refuse) the German offer they would have to state their own terms with sufficient definiteness to satisfy their own people at home who, it thinks, are already beginning to show signs of restlessness owing to the absence of any precise definition of war-aims by their respective Governments. The following is interesting as a British view and I quote it in full:

“Great Britain is in a peculiar position in regard to the terms of peace. In framing their peace proposals the German Government are likely to make great use of the fact that such territory as has been taken by the Allies is all in the hands of Great Britain, viz:- The German Colonies, Mesopotamia and Palestine. By offering to exchange these territories for others in the hands of the Central Powers (Belgium and Northern France, Lorraine and the Trentino, etc) Germany will hope to cause dissension among the Allies and to create the impression that Great Britain is responsible for the prolongation of the war. Such tactics are likely to be a source of danger to the Allies and to Great Britain in particular, who will be placed in an embarrassing position if she has to put forward apparently selfish reasons for refusing a German offer. On the other hand, any attempt of this kind would be rendered abortive if the Allies had already agreed upon a policy with regard to the territories in question.

“To the Allies in general and to Great Britain in particular the actual terms of peace are not so important as the circumstances in which peace is made; from this point of view a peace made on good terms before the Prussian militaristic theory is discredited in the eyes both of Germany and of the whole world would be less desirable than a peace made on worse terms when Prussian “Militarism” has been crushed. On the other hand, the time will come when Germany will be ready to accept such terms of peace as of themselves will proclaim the defeat of her “militarism” and such terms if offered by her it would be impossible for the Allies to reject.

“It is not suggested in this paper that such circumstances have yet arisen or that such terms will be offered by Germany as will ensure for the Allies the achievement of the high aims with which they embarked on this struggle. But it is conceived that the time has come when it will no longer be possible for the Allies to subsist on catchwords and proclaim that the Germans must be beaten before peace terms can be discussed.

“The proposals put forward by Germany are certain to be attractive in form and their summary rejection would produce among the mass of the peoples concerned a state of feeling which the Governments would disregard at their peril. An offer of peace by Germany in the near future would, in fact, create a crisis in the fortunes of the Allies. Such an offer must be met with serious and honest consideration by the Allied Governments and a reasonable statement of their position.

“The possibility of a situation such as is indicated above arising in the very near future cannot safely be disregarded. Unless they have previously agreed on the main outlines of a policy such as will both be acceptable to the Allied Governments and win the approval and acquiescence of their peoples they will be in the position of a Commander who waits to formulate his scheme of defense until the enemy has attacked, and has also to obtain the approval of his suboordinates to every detail of his plan. In such a situation agreement will be infinitely more difficult to obtain. The whole discussion will be conducted in an atmosphere of haste and mutual suspicion and the result is likely to be an unreasoned refusal with no agreed statement of alternative terms. This result would greatly strengthen the Pacificist Parties in all the Allied countries except in America, and would imperil the position of the Governments and the harmony of the Alliance. The only remedy is for the Supreme War Council without delay to decide on the broad outlines of a policy.”

The above are the British views.

I am about leaving for the Marshal’s headquarters and hope to write you tonight the result of the conference.

With kindest regards, believe me

Cordially Yours

Tasker H. Bliss

Letter

Baker, Newton Diehl, 1871-1937