President Bore Brunt of the Heavy Fighting at Peace Conference

President Bore Brunt of the Heavy Fighting at Peace Conference

Baker, Ray Stannard, 1870-1946

WWP16052

1919 October 28

Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia

English

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This is the second of six articles by Ray Stannard Baker, descriptive of President Wilson’s fight for his ideals in Paris during the meeting of the peace conference. Mr. Baker stood closer to the President than any other man and is able to tell the inside story of what took place in Paris during the deliberations over the peace treaty. The next article will appear next Sunday, November 2.

BY RAY STANNARD BAKER.

It was inevitable that President Wilson should be forced at Paris to bear the brunt of the heavy fighting—fighting that would have worn out a stronger more robust man than he. For he had a double problem, a double task. He had not only to join the other delegates in making peace with Germany, but he had the far more difficult and delicate task—which grew more and more difficult as the conference progressed—of upholding the disinterested American position against the insistent desires and necessities of the other allied nations.

Most people do not realize that most of the troubles at Paris and every one of the really serious crises arose not out of any differences of view regarding the terms to be imposed upon Germany, but out of deep-seated and often bitter disagreements among the allies themselves. Throughout the six troubled months of the conference the center and focus of the struggle was the conflict between President Wilson, demanding a settlement upon broad principles (which every one had accepted!) and the other allied powers demanding various material reimbursements or advantages.

All Right During War.

While the war was still in progress necessity united the allies; every one accepted Mr. Wilson’s plan of settlement and welcomed his strong leadership—for three reasons:First, because his principles appealed to the great masses of the world as good in themselves, as the true, reasonable and honest basis of settlement. This tended to disarm the opposition of the radicals in all European countries who were becoming more and more restless with the bloody continuation of the war.

Second, because a hearty acceptance of the American idea and American leadership helped to bring America, with her vast resources, more wholeheartedly into the war.

Third, because Wilson’s diplomacy tended to divide and weaken German support of the war.Unity Begins to Fade.The moment the war ended in an unexpectedly complete victory, the high purpose and the unified spirit of the allies began to fade away. They were not, after all, united nations. Each had its strong loyalties, its ambitions, its necessities, and these immediately began to assert themselves. In the high moments of inspiration and enthusiasm of the war men had begun to believe in miracles. When it was over they found themselves back in the old world—and more than that, in a state of exhaustion and demoralization which some one has characterized as national shell shock. It must never be forgotten that it was in this atmosphere of national shell shock, exaggerated appearances, exaggerated fears, that the treaty was made.

The President undoubtedly came to Europe filled with great hope and faith. His plan of settlement—his fourteen points—had been widely accepted and commended throughout the world. He believed that and has always believed in the power of moral ideas, the very statement of them and their approval by masses of men. He had a triumphant progress throughout Europe—there was nothing ever before like it in the world. Never was there such a demonstration in Paris as on that day we saw him driving down through the Arc de Triomphe. I was in Italy in the fall of 1918, before he came. His picture was in every shop window; it was even said that the peasants burned candles before it; quotations from his speeches were in every newspaper and on every dead wall; he was worshiped with an abandon which was truly Italian. His prestige everywhere was enormous—and it was the prestige not of a great soldier, not even of a great political figure, but of a moral leader. He came to Europe conscious of his own high aims and of the real disinterestedness of America.

Even before the peace conference met, however, certain ominous things happened.Adverse Things Happen.At the same time that Wilson was making sanguine speeches in England regarding the league of nations, Clemenceau was telling the chamber of deputies in Paris that he still believed in the old-fashioned system of alliances as the only way of safety for the world, and notable French leaders were advancing claims which would, if granted, defeat the very principles to which the allies had agreed at the armistice. A little later the British elections returned a heavily conservative parliament indorsing a hard peace with Germany, and defeating some of Mr. Wilson’s strongest supporters in the house of commons. In Italy there began to be talk of the wide expansion of Italy in the Adriatic and elsewhere. And finally, the November elections in America, which returned a Congress in opposition to the President, and the attacks made upon him by various republican leaders in the Senate, tended to weaken his influence at Paris. To any one who had been in Europe during the last year of the war, before the peace conference began, as I had been, this change of attitude toward Wilson among the leaders (not among the people) was most evident.No sooner had the peace conference got down to business, sitting within the double-doored, soundproof room in the French foreign office, than the struggle began—and it centered at once upon an issue between President Wilson, demanding the acceptance of a broad principle of policy, and the other allies demanding that their interests be served. President Wilson had wished to have the hardest problems, those relating to European conditions, taken up first, because he believed that the danger to the world arose from the unsettled conditions there. But the irrestible temptation, as in all such conferences, was to put off the hard questions, assign them to committees and take up what seemed to be the easy problem first.Spoils Are Big Issue.The easy problem here seemed to be the disposition of the German colonies. Every one was agreed from the beginning that they should not be returned to Germany. They appeared, therefore, to be the easy spoils of war; the jackpot of the great game. And one morning, without any introduction, without a word of warning, they prepared to carve them up and distribute them around. Apparently everything had somehow, somewhere, been worked out. Japan was to have certain islands in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand certain others, the South African federation was to have a big slice in Africa, France was to have such and such colonies and Great Britain itself such others.

One of the most extraordinary things about the peace conference throughout was the efficiency of the British and French foreign offices, or diplomatic machines. They always had a plan ready; always had it mintely worked out. Even in the minor committees, upon one or two of which I sat, no sooner was a question broached than the French or British had an elaborate plan, beautifully typewritten, to put down. There is an enormous advantage in this, as these experienced negotiators well knew, for a plan tends to shape the views of every one present and place all other conferees in the position of critics. I could give numbers of instances in the high councils in which, although the Americans were the suggesters of an idea, the actual resolutions were presented by Mr. Lloyd George or some other member. A man or a nation, also, that desires a specific material thing—an island, for example, or a sum of money—is always in a very much stronger and more definite position than a man or a nation that seeks to apply difficult general principles to a complicated situation. It is so easy to play the old familiar game; so difficult to play the new. It was the new game that Mr. Wilson had to play throughout, and every one knows how wearing it is, mentally and physically, to be constantly in opposition, constantly forced to play a lone hand.Claim Territories.That the plan for the division of the German colonies had all been worked out—and without any reference to the establishment of a new or a general principle—was clear enough when the prime ministers of several of the British colonies came into the conference on January 24, quite unexpectedly, and made prepared statements of their claims to the annexation of certain former German territory. Canada made no such demands, although she had had great losses and made great sacrifices in the war—far greater in proportion than those of the United States—she made no selfish claim whatever for herself. It developed, also, at once, that Japan expected to annex certain colonies, and France certain others, and that possibly Italy and Belgium would have to be permitted more extensive territorial concessions. It was January 27 before Mr. Wilson got an opportunity to present his idea of a new principle of world colonial policy. He was against annexation: he declared for the developmentof each colony, not for the advantage of the nation that controlled it, but for that of the people who lived there. He thought the emphasis should be placed upon the welfare of the people, not upon the ownership of the land. The world should act as a trustee for these weak and backward people until the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained. Colonies should be assigned to certain mandatories or trustees, who should be under the supervision of the league of nations. And he wanted the principle to apply not only to German colonies, but to all those parts of Turkey which were not to be returned to the Turks.

Starts Controversy.

This at once precipitated a red-hot controversy. Mr. Hughes of Australia, especially, attacked the whole mandatory principle, and was supported less vigorously by the other British colonial premiers. M. Simon, the French colonial minister, appeared and made a long statement in support of the idea of frank annexation and set forth the French colonial demands to the Cameroons and Togoland. In this it was clear that he had the support of Clemenceau, who called attention to the various secret treaties or “conversations” under which some of the colonies had already been disposed of.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was in favor of the principle of the mandatory, but he was also in favor of having the British colonies get what they wanted. They were all in favor of dividing up the colonies first and adopting the principle afterward. It was clear enough, thoughout the discussion, that no one of the three except Mr. Wilson had any real faith in the league of nations. M. Clemenceau treated both the mandatory system and the league of nations with finely turned irony which mirrored his entire opposition more clearly than any direct attack could have done. Mr. Wilson was placed in the position of having to defend a new principle, the working of which in minute detail no one could prophesy.

It was plain at the outset that by these tactics they thought they could ride roughshod over Mr. Wilson. It was the first test of his quality. He had talked his principles; would he now be able, with such forces against him, to secure their application?

Brings Bitter Comment.

When it was seen that the President would not give in, there began to appear at once—the very next day—bitter comments upon him and his “impractical ideals’ in certain French newspapers. Although the proceedings behind the muffled doors at the Quai d’Orsay were supposed to be absolutely secret—so that American correspondents could get next to nothing at all concerning what was going on—the French papers were evidently fully informed. Certain British papers also published quite completely an account of the controversy between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hughes of Australia, which lost nothing in emphasis and dramatic importance, nor, it may be said, in the essential truth of the facts stated, because the proceedings had been secret.

Mr. Wilson had to protest to the conference against these outside attacks, and he did so diplomatically, but positively, by declaring that if they continued he would publish exactly what happened. At once the attacks in the French press ceased, for the French press is largely controlled by government influences—but from that time onward, in a certain number of the papers, there was an underlying, subtle spirit of critcism of the President. This constant, clever, witty opposition, so evasive as not to be easily met—the kind of criticism of innuendo of which the French are past masters—read every day by all those connected with the peace conference, had an undoubted influence in making the President’s task more difficult. There were even those in the American commission who suggested the removal of the conference to some neutral capital like Geneva to escape this atmosphere.Sticks to Principles.

But the President stuck obstinately to his position that the private interests of the nations were not alone to be served, but that the conference must consider first the interest of the people of the colonies in question, and, second, the desire of the common people of the world. He argued that annexation was contrary to the principles accepted by the nations at the armistice, and that the public of the world would at once turn against the conference and it would lose all its influence if its very first action was to divide up the spoils of war. He insisted upon the application of the principle laid down in the fifth of the fourteen points of peace, which all the nations had adopted—the one relating to colonial claims—which says that “the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”

And there he stood and would not budge. Mr. Lloyd George, as quoted in one of the London papers, said that the situation filled him with despair, and Mr. Clemenceau argued that such discussion only made for delay. Mr. Hughes of Australia gave out interviews with scarcely veiled attacks upon Mr. Wilson. They were trying days—those in late January. Many other difficult questions were before the conference—Poland, Russia, the revision of the armistice terms and the ever–irritating problem of publicity, which would never stay settled—but the colonial question occupied for many days the center of the stage. To understand why the President today lies ill at Washington one must visualize some of these things.

Finally Wins Out.

Finally, Lloyd George called a separate meeting with the delegates from the British dominions, persuaded them to accept the mandatory principle and came in with a set of resolutions providing for its application. This caused further heated discussions, but finally, with certain changes and after reservations by both France and Japan—for France was determined to have the privilege of raising troops in the colonies for her own defense—it was adopted by the conference, and the essence of it was later incorporated as article XXII in the league of nations covenant.

Please read it in your own copy of the covenant; it is a very interesting statement of policy. This is the longest article but one in the covenant and it establishes firmly the contentions of the President. It places the control of colonies upon a broad basis of principles. In short, the machinery for a new and liberal policy in world colonial administration is established; it will work or fail to work exactly in proportion to the good will and determination of the governments of the world to make it work—a generalization which is true also regarding the whole league of nations covenant.

This was the first great crisis, the first decisive battle, of the conference, and the President came out of it a winner. An account of the next crisis will be given in a following article.