Cary T. Grayson Diary
Title
Cary T. Grayson Diary
Creator
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938
Identifier
WWP16998
Date
1918 December 8
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
SUNDAY.
The President attended church in the enlisted men’s quarter at ten o’clock. This service was held in what was called the “Old Salt Theatre”.—on D deck, well below the water line. There was a conglomeration of smells from the cook’s galleys and the Chaplain, who conducted the service, was noticeably nervous. However, he essayed his best, and the President was not inclined to be in any way critical.
During the afternoon the President sat for a while on deck with Mrs. Wilson, and later he and I walked two miles around the deck. Afterward the President had an informal conference with Secretary of State Lansing, and another with former Ambassador White, at which they discussed the latest wireless reports received from Colonel House, who was in Paris attending to the preliminaries dealing with the peace conditions.
After dinner the President invited the three newspaper correspondents to come to his office, and he talked with them quite freely. The President in part said:
“The plot is thickening! I think it now is necessary that we get a clear comprehension of exactly my position in this situation. As you know, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando have held a meeting in London. Colonel House was unable to be there. He has not yet been able to throw off his attack of the influenza as rapidly as he expected. The men apparently got together on a programme which I have just received. It was badly garbled in the cable; hence the delay in my getting it. It is very obvious in reading between the lines of Colonel House’s report to me that these representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy are determined to get everything out of Germany that they can. They know Germany is down and out. Instead of going about the thing in the fair way, namely, determine what they think they are justly entitled to demand of Germany and then seek the means of securing it through learning how Germany may be expected to meet the demands—if she can meet them at all—and arranging their claims accordingly, they favor the appointment of a commission to study exactly what Germany has got today and the naming of another commission to apportion what Germany has among the governments that have fought her in this war. I am absolutely opposed to this. A statement that I once made that this should be a ‘a peace without victory’ holds more strongly today than ever. The peace that we make must be one in which justice alone is the determining factor.
“Upon the first occasion that I have after meeting these gentlemen and letting them know what sort of a fellow I am and giving myself the opportunity of determining what sort of chaps they are, I will say to them, if necessary, that we are gathered together, not as the masters of anyone, but that we are the representatives of a new world met together to determine the greatest peace of all time. It must not be a peace of loot or spoilation. If it were such we would be an historical scourge. I for one shall, if necessary, tell them that if that is the kind of peace they demand, I will withdraw personally and with my commissioners return home and in due course take up the details of a separate peace. Of course, I do not believe that that will come to pass. I think once we get together they will know that we stand for no bargaining but will hold firmly by the principles we have set forth; and once they learn that is my purpose, I think that we can come to an agreement promptly.”
The President explained that he favored having himself and the premiers of England, France and Italy get together, much as the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate get together, and go over the details of the proposed peace treaty, and later submit these as propositions to the conference of all the belligerent nations. He did not favor having all of the allotted commissioners of Great Britain, France, and the United States and Japan get together and formulate the treaty and then call in the balance of the belligerents merely to approve it. He recognized the difficulties of 25 or 30 belligerents attempting to mull over the details of a treaty at the same time, and thought the same purposes could be accomplished more quickly and just as satisfactorily by having the tentative proposals prepared in advance of the full meeting by a selected few. This would embody secret conferences, even as confidential matter is mulled over in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, but so far as the final gathering of the peace commissioners is concerned, he believed the debate should be open to the public.
In agreeing to the fourteen principles, the President pointed out, England was in the peculiar position of submitting to the principle of disarmament while simultaneously announcing through her statesmen that she meant to retain naval supremacy. On this point he said he had talked with Andrew Tardieu, the French High Commissioner, saying laughingly but pointedly, that if England hoped to retain a naval dominance, the United States could and would build the greatest navy in the world.
“If England holds to this course,” the President said, “it means that she does not want peace, and I will so tell Lloyd George. I can do it with a smile, but it will carry its point.”
The President definitely set forth his views on the freedom of the seas. The war had brought the necessity for material and specific changes in present international law, and he mentioned the need now for increasing the limits of territorial waters about any nation, owing to the greater carrying power of naval guns. Also, there was the need to accurately define regulations of blockade, in peace as in war times. England, the President pointed out, very seriously infringed on America’s rights before we became a belligerent through the improper use of her blockade,—in fact did the same thing on the seas as Germany did to Belgium, and on the same grounds—necessity. He declared that at one time if it had not been for his realization that Germany was the scourge of the world, he would have been ready to have it out with England.
It must definitely set forth, the President explained, that no one nation or group of nations can say what shall or shall not be done on the high seas. A league of all nations could declare a blockade or override international laws for purposes of punishing a country which threatened the peace of the world, but this power could not be vested in any single nation. He said it was going to be very difficult to give everybody everything they wanted out of this war. Italy, for instance, the President declared, had an entirely different idea of what she was entitled to under his principles than his advisers felt she had any right to expect, but he expressed a desire to be very generous in the matter of Italy’s demands.
On the Polish question there also were problems to be solved in holding to his determination to give Poland an outlet to the sea the President explained. If this plan were followed literally, he said, it would mean that part of East Prussia would have to be turned over to Poland, leaving another part of Prussia between two sections of Poland, which would be very confusing. These problems, he indicated, would have to be worked out deliberately.
On the question of the league of nations, he said that Germany’s present chaotic state would make it necessary to put her on probation, as it were, until she showed herself fit for reception into the League. He indicated that a similar policy probably would be necessary toward the other “war babies” which have come out of the war, such as Jugo-Slavia, etc. As for Russia, he said his policy toward her must now naturally be altered, “owing to the fact that Russia has broken up into several different states.” It will be necessary to follow the principle of self-determination in ascertaining under what sovereignty these various states desire to come, he explained.
An interesting problem, the President said, has arisen under this same principle of self-determination in the purported decision of German Austria to become affiliated with the original German empire. Such affiliation, he pointed out, would mean that the new Germany would be one of the most powerful countries in Europe. Also, it would constitute a great Roman Catholic power. While he said he had not objection to the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, there was danger of its becoming a powerful political entity should such a situation as this develop. Applying the principle of self-determination, however, he said that the problem was certainly vexatious, but might be handled by the associated powers demanding that Austria and Germany act separately until they had proved their sincerity and worth.
Discussing the general programme of the league of nations, he declared emphatically that it must constitute part and parcel of the peace treaty itself and not be left to any later consideration. The President thought it might be advisable to turn over the captured German war vessels to France and Italy, thus bringing about a situation whereby the navy of one power would be as great as the combined navies of the other powers associated in the league. The nucleus of the league, he said, could readily be formed of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan; the others would of necessity come in to preserve their own interests.
The President regretted the apparent acquiescence of the American people in the idea that England won the war and therefore should get what she wanted out of it. He mentioned also with regret that some of our own representatives abroad have shown marked signs of becoming pro-British, mentioning specifically Admiral Sims, who, he said, might as well be a British Admiral.
The President said that Premier Borden of Canada, on a recent trip back from England with Representative Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, declared that Canada did not want the mother country to attain any more colonies, and indicated a desire that the German colonies if turned over to anybody be turned over to the United States. “But,” said the President, laughing, “we don’t want them and won’t have them.” He regarded as very interesting and rather significant the premier’s attitude on this point.
Asked how Premier Clemenceau lined up with him on general issues of peace, he said that he did not know. The only indication he had of Clemenceau’s personal attitude toward him, he added laughingly, was that once Clemenceau said that “General Pershing is the stubbornest man I know and I am saying that knowing Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States.” He added, however, that he felt that on most points any one of the associated goverments would rather be lined up with the United States than with any other nation. In other words, he said, Italy would far prefer to be on the American side than the French or British side on most points, and the same held wtih the other governments. In view of this, he said, in the preliminary conferences it probably would be a question of standing pat on his own interpretation of the fourteen principles and trying to accomodate the others one by one in an effort to prevent any combination in which this country would not figure.
The President indicated that he would have to be back before the close of the present Congress to take care of bills. He intimated that it might be necessary for him to return to Europe later. He assumed also that after the present peace conference is concluded, there will be a later conference of the nations of the world to formulate a new international code.
He designated as absurd London press accounts that England would demand indemnities amounting to $40,000,000 from Germany, and that France’s demands would probably exceed that. He declared it would be impossible to get that much money out of Germany within a generation, unless she repudiated her entire public debt.
The President attended church in the enlisted men’s quarter at ten o’clock. This service was held in what was called the “Old Salt Theatre”.—on D deck, well below the water line. There was a conglomeration of smells from the cook’s galleys and the Chaplain, who conducted the service, was noticeably nervous. However, he essayed his best, and the President was not inclined to be in any way critical.
During the afternoon the President sat for a while on deck with Mrs. Wilson, and later he and I walked two miles around the deck. Afterward the President had an informal conference with Secretary of State Lansing, and another with former Ambassador White, at which they discussed the latest wireless reports received from Colonel House, who was in Paris attending to the preliminaries dealing with the peace conditions.
After dinner the President invited the three newspaper correspondents to come to his office, and he talked with them quite freely. The President in part said:
“The plot is thickening! I think it now is necessary that we get a clear comprehension of exactly my position in this situation. As you know, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando have held a meeting in London. Colonel House was unable to be there. He has not yet been able to throw off his attack of the influenza as rapidly as he expected. The men apparently got together on a programme which I have just received. It was badly garbled in the cable; hence the delay in my getting it. It is very obvious in reading between the lines of Colonel House’s report to me that these representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy are determined to get everything out of Germany that they can. They know Germany is down and out. Instead of going about the thing in the fair way, namely, determine what they think they are justly entitled to demand of Germany and then seek the means of securing it through learning how Germany may be expected to meet the demands—if she can meet them at all—and arranging their claims accordingly, they favor the appointment of a commission to study exactly what Germany has got today and the naming of another commission to apportion what Germany has among the governments that have fought her in this war. I am absolutely opposed to this. A statement that I once made that this should be a ‘a peace without victory’ holds more strongly today than ever. The peace that we make must be one in which justice alone is the determining factor.
“Upon the first occasion that I have after meeting these gentlemen and letting them know what sort of a fellow I am and giving myself the opportunity of determining what sort of chaps they are, I will say to them, if necessary, that we are gathered together, not as the masters of anyone, but that we are the representatives of a new world met together to determine the greatest peace of all time. It must not be a peace of loot or spoilation. If it were such we would be an historical scourge. I for one shall, if necessary, tell them that if that is the kind of peace they demand, I will withdraw personally and with my commissioners return home and in due course take up the details of a separate peace. Of course, I do not believe that that will come to pass. I think once we get together they will know that we stand for no bargaining but will hold firmly by the principles we have set forth; and once they learn that is my purpose, I think that we can come to an agreement promptly.”
The President explained that he favored having himself and the premiers of England, France and Italy get together, much as the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate get together, and go over the details of the proposed peace treaty, and later submit these as propositions to the conference of all the belligerent nations. He did not favor having all of the allotted commissioners of Great Britain, France, and the United States and Japan get together and formulate the treaty and then call in the balance of the belligerents merely to approve it. He recognized the difficulties of 25 or 30 belligerents attempting to mull over the details of a treaty at the same time, and thought the same purposes could be accomplished more quickly and just as satisfactorily by having the tentative proposals prepared in advance of the full meeting by a selected few. This would embody secret conferences, even as confidential matter is mulled over in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, but so far as the final gathering of the peace commissioners is concerned, he believed the debate should be open to the public.
In agreeing to the fourteen principles, the President pointed out, England was in the peculiar position of submitting to the principle of disarmament while simultaneously announcing through her statesmen that she meant to retain naval supremacy. On this point he said he had talked with Andrew Tardieu, the French High Commissioner, saying laughingly but pointedly, that if England hoped to retain a naval dominance, the United States could and would build the greatest navy in the world.
“If England holds to this course,” the President said, “it means that she does not want peace, and I will so tell Lloyd George. I can do it with a smile, but it will carry its point.”
The President definitely set forth his views on the freedom of the seas. The war had brought the necessity for material and specific changes in present international law, and he mentioned the need now for increasing the limits of territorial waters about any nation, owing to the greater carrying power of naval guns. Also, there was the need to accurately define regulations of blockade, in peace as in war times. England, the President pointed out, very seriously infringed on America’s rights before we became a belligerent through the improper use of her blockade,—in fact did the same thing on the seas as Germany did to Belgium, and on the same grounds—necessity. He declared that at one time if it had not been for his realization that Germany was the scourge of the world, he would have been ready to have it out with England.
It must definitely set forth, the President explained, that no one nation or group of nations can say what shall or shall not be done on the high seas. A league of all nations could declare a blockade or override international laws for purposes of punishing a country which threatened the peace of the world, but this power could not be vested in any single nation. He said it was going to be very difficult to give everybody everything they wanted out of this war. Italy, for instance, the President declared, had an entirely different idea of what she was entitled to under his principles than his advisers felt she had any right to expect, but he expressed a desire to be very generous in the matter of Italy’s demands.
On the Polish question there also were problems to be solved in holding to his determination to give Poland an outlet to the sea the President explained. If this plan were followed literally, he said, it would mean that part of East Prussia would have to be turned over to Poland, leaving another part of Prussia between two sections of Poland, which would be very confusing. These problems, he indicated, would have to be worked out deliberately.
On the question of the league of nations, he said that Germany’s present chaotic state would make it necessary to put her on probation, as it were, until she showed herself fit for reception into the League. He indicated that a similar policy probably would be necessary toward the other “war babies” which have come out of the war, such as Jugo-Slavia, etc. As for Russia, he said his policy toward her must now naturally be altered, “owing to the fact that Russia has broken up into several different states.” It will be necessary to follow the principle of self-determination in ascertaining under what sovereignty these various states desire to come, he explained.
An interesting problem, the President said, has arisen under this same principle of self-determination in the purported decision of German Austria to become affiliated with the original German empire. Such affiliation, he pointed out, would mean that the new Germany would be one of the most powerful countries in Europe. Also, it would constitute a great Roman Catholic power. While he said he had not objection to the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, there was danger of its becoming a powerful political entity should such a situation as this develop. Applying the principle of self-determination, however, he said that the problem was certainly vexatious, but might be handled by the associated powers demanding that Austria and Germany act separately until they had proved their sincerity and worth.
Discussing the general programme of the league of nations, he declared emphatically that it must constitute part and parcel of the peace treaty itself and not be left to any later consideration. The President thought it might be advisable to turn over the captured German war vessels to France and Italy, thus bringing about a situation whereby the navy of one power would be as great as the combined navies of the other powers associated in the league. The nucleus of the league, he said, could readily be formed of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan; the others would of necessity come in to preserve their own interests.
The President regretted the apparent acquiescence of the American people in the idea that England won the war and therefore should get what she wanted out of it. He mentioned also with regret that some of our own representatives abroad have shown marked signs of becoming pro-British, mentioning specifically Admiral Sims, who, he said, might as well be a British Admiral.
The President said that Premier Borden of Canada, on a recent trip back from England with Representative Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, declared that Canada did not want the mother country to attain any more colonies, and indicated a desire that the German colonies if turned over to anybody be turned over to the United States. “But,” said the President, laughing, “we don’t want them and won’t have them.” He regarded as very interesting and rather significant the premier’s attitude on this point.
Asked how Premier Clemenceau lined up with him on general issues of peace, he said that he did not know. The only indication he had of Clemenceau’s personal attitude toward him, he added laughingly, was that once Clemenceau said that “General Pershing is the stubbornest man I know and I am saying that knowing Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States.” He added, however, that he felt that on most points any one of the associated goverments would rather be lined up with the United States than with any other nation. In other words, he said, Italy would far prefer to be on the American side than the French or British side on most points, and the same held wtih the other governments. In view of this, he said, in the preliminary conferences it probably would be a question of standing pat on his own interpretation of the fourteen principles and trying to accomodate the others one by one in an effort to prevent any combination in which this country would not figure.
The President indicated that he would have to be back before the close of the present Congress to take care of bills. He intimated that it might be necessary for him to return to Europe later. He assumed also that after the present peace conference is concluded, there will be a later conference of the nations of the world to formulate a new international code.
He designated as absurd London press accounts that England would demand indemnities amounting to $40,000,000 from Germany, and that France’s demands would probably exceed that. He declared it would be impossible to get that much money out of Germany within a generation, unless she repudiated her entire public debt.
Original Format
Diary
Files
Collection
Citation
Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Cary T. Grayson Diary,” 1918 December 8, WWP16998, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.