Naval Mines
Title
Naval Mines
Creator
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932
Identifier
WWP15640
Date
1919 January 28
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
CONFIDENTIAL.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
Question XVI and Recommendations.- : - : - : - : -
SUBJECT: -Submarine Mines.
Copies to: -Mr. Lansing.
Colonel House.
General Bliss .
Mr. White.
Navy Dept. Files.
28 January, 1919
CONFIDENTIAL.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
Question XVI and RECOMMENDATIONS.- : - : - : - : - SUBJECT: -Submarine Mines.- : - : - : - : -
RECOMMENDATIONS.
What rules should govern the use of Submarine Mines during War?
ARTICLE 1.
It is forbidden -
| (1) | | To lay unanchored automatic contact mines except against a vessel in sight and recognised as an enemy vessel liable to attack, and except that mines so laid are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them.
|
| (2) | | To lay anchored automatic contact mines that do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.
|
| (3) | | For belligerents to lay anchored automatic contact mines outside the territorial waters of belligerents.
|
| (4) | | For neutrals to lay anchored automatic contact mines outside their own territorial waters.
|
| (5) | | To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have ceased to run. |
ARTICLE 2.
When anchored automatic contact mines are employed under the restrictions of Article 1, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. The belligerents undertake to notify the danger zones before the mines are laid by a notice addressed to shipowners, which notice must also be communicated to neutral Governments through the diplomatic channel.
ARTICLE 3.
Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines in their territorial waters must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.
ARTICLE 4.
Observation mines may be laid in territorial waters of any Power by that Power, or by an enemy of that Power, without notification.
ARTICLE 5.
Mine fields of anchored automatic contact mines shall be cleared immediately after the close of the war by those Powers in whose waters the mine fields are. If one belligerent has laid mines in the waters of his enemy, the former shall immediately notify the location thereof to the latter upon the cessation of hostilities.
WS Benson
Admiral, US Navy.
APPENDIX.
Submarine Mines. Submarine Mines were used during the American Civil War for defensive purposes, during the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War, the Spanish-American War, and the Russo-Japanese War. In the latter war they were first used to any considerable extent outside the territorial waters of belligerents. Their use on the high seas excited violent adverse criticism. The sinking of merchant vessels by contact with mines near the area of hostilities especially inflamed public opinion against the use of mines on the high seas.
The sinking of the Japanese Battleship Hatsuse, May 15, 1904, by mines at a distance of ten miles from Port Arthur, and outside of territorial waters was looked upon by the great majority of authorities as an illegal act. Admiral Hersey of the British Navy said — “The laying of mines in the free sea beyond the territorial waters would seem not only inhuman but a breach of international law and practice. If it should prove that the destructions of the Hatsuse was effected by a mine wilfully placed in the open sea, ten miles from land, the act appears to me to be one of wholesale murder and its perpetration hostis humani generis. ”- - - - - - - Professor Woolsey stated — “Mines, whether anchored or intentionally set adrift in the Strait or Gulf of Pechili beyond the coast sea limit, constitute an indiscriminating attack upon neutral and belligerent alike, and are, therefore, illegitimate.” Professor Holland — the international law expert of the British Admiralty stated — “It is certain that no international usage sanctions the employment by one belligerent against another of mines or other secret contrivances which would, without notice, render dangerous the navigation of the High Seas”. Lawrence, Sir John Macdonnell and other prominent International Law writers expressed ideas in harmony with the above, there being a practical unanimity of opinion that the High Seas must not be rendered dangerous to neutral commerce. The right of the belligerent to use mines in his territorial waters was not questioned, but his duty to warn shipping of the danger was insisted upon.The principles governing the case then were: -
(1) The High Seas belong equally to all nations as a safe and peaceful highway for ships. No nation may obstruct this highway by dangers that do not discriminate between friend and enemy.
(2) Territorial waters belong to the State. The State may use them as it chooses, but is bound to safeguard friendly vessels that enter these waters, by indicating danger to them or by prohibiting the free navigation of these waters.
The discussion arising out of the unusual use of mines during the Russo-Japanese War resulted in an attempt to regulate the use of mines by a convention. The VIII Hague Convention of October 18, 19)07, contains various provisions concerning the use of mines, but these are for the most part ineffective through qualifying words and phrases that leave the Convention without force or character, other than as indicating a desire for conditions that could not be attained through the opposition of various States - notably Germany. It is a sufficient commentary on this Convention to note that the following Powers ratified the Convention, without appearing thereby to have been hampered in the unexampled use of mines on the High Seas -
Austria Hungary, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Japan, United States.
The question of the use of submarine mines on the High Seas may be considered therefore an entirely open and unregulated one. We shall examine it to determine what rules should govern the use of submarine mines in war. The basic considerations are:
(1) In war belligerents may injure each other by every weapon which is recognized as a lawful weapon. A Submarine Mine is such a recognised weapon.
(2) Belligerents may fight upon the High Seas, and neutrals approach the scene of battle there at their peril.
(3) Notwithstanding a state of war, neutrals have the right to the free use of the High Seas on their lawful occasions, except as that right may be interfered with by specifically defined rights of belligerents.
(4) The belligerents may not make use of warlike measures that do not and cannot discriminate between friend and enemy.
(5) Every nation has a right of self-defence that should give it a special freedom for self-preservation.
(6) The High Seas are common property, whose prime use is and should be the use required by peaceful pursuits.
Submarine mines to-day are used -
(a) As traps in deep mine fields to destroy submarines.
(b) As barriers in deep minefields to prevent the passage of submarines except on the surface.
(c) As complete barriers to prevent the passage of all vessels whether on the surface or submerged.
(d) As local tactical barriers to destroy vessels that may come in contact with them.
(e) As protective barriers to keep hostile vessels at a distance from the coast.
We can get a better perspective of the subject by examining each of the several uses of mines in relation to conditions of the present day.
(a) Trap Mine Fields.
These are designed to be laid so far below the surface that surface vessels will not make contact with the mines. The uncertain operation of the depth taking mechanism, the disturbing influence of tides and storms, and the gradual deterioration of mine anchors and cables which tend to release mines, all combine to make deep mine fields unsafe for surface vessels. Trap minefields are not likely to be used in fairways unless the mines are of the observation type. The disappearance of submarines would do away with this special use of mines. The retention of submarines would furnish a strong incentive to the retention of this mode of warfare against them.
(b) As barriers in deep minefields to prevent the passage of Submarines except on the surface,
The barrier of mines in the Straits of Dover during the present war is the most conspicuous example of this kind. It was laid outside territorial waters. It was composed entirely of deep mines. It has accounted for about forty submarines in a single year. It would have been extended to the surface if conditions had permitted. It was of great assistance to the British in their strategic control of the North Sea. They were assured by it that any considerable movement out of the North Sea would have to take place northabout, so that they were enabled to keep the principal part of their fleet in the northern area to meet such movement. The barrier had another effect, in that it compelled all neutrals to pass through a narrow gate in the barrier and thus be under the closest possible supervision by allied vessels of war. Such supervision was an undoubted infringement of neutral rights, but at the time it was to the interest of most neutrals that the barrier be maintained to assist in hampering submarines in their operations. If submarine warfare were abolished, the need for deep mine fields, either within or without territorial waters, would disappear. Barrier mines are subject to the same causes of deterioration as trap mines.
As complete barriers to prevent the passage of all vessels whether on the surface or submerged.
There is no question but that such barriers are legitimate when laid wholly within belligerent territorial waters and notified to neutrals; but when the barriers extend into the open sea they are a menace alike to friend and enemy. The difficulties of navigation in darkness and thick weather, the uncertainties of currents, wind and weather, are such that neutral vessels can assure their own safety solely by considering the sea closed in the vicinity of mine barriers. It is plainly an infringement of neutral rights to the free navigation of the High Seas to establish such barriers.
The belligerent may argue the paramount usefulness of such barriers. The North Sea barrier, the Dover Straits barrier, are examples of the usefulness of mine barriers.
Nations whose ports lie close to enemy naval ports may have a special need for the use of mine barriers, as naval actions may develop with such great rapidity, that the defending nation will need arrangements for holding or delaying action a sufficient time in a given sector to permit the arrival of mobile forces. This need of the belligerent, however, is not sufficient warrant for blocking the High Seas with mines against all comers. The primary principle, that the High Seas belong equally to all nations as a safe and peaceful highway for ships, should govern and prevent the pre-emption of the high seas or any portion of them for semi-permanent military use of belligerents.
(d) As Local Tactical Barriers to destroy vessels that may come in contact with them.
Mines used in this manner belong to the floating type. They may be used in fleet actions or in actions against single vessels. As action in a given locality is always of brief duration the mines may be so constructed as to be innocuous in a brief period of time. If submarines continue to be authorised weapons, tactical mine barriers enclosing submerged submaries may develop into the most efficient form of attack against submerged submarines.
The use of mines as above (that become innocuous in a short time) is no serious threat to neutrals and does not impair, except very temporarily, the freedom of navigation of the High Seas.
(e) As Protective Barriers to keep hostile vessels at a distance from the coast.
As examination of our own coastline, and the position of the cities on the coast, indicates that we have no special need for minefields far off shore in order to prevent bombardments. Bombardments from the sea in themselves have no great military value. Experience in the present war has shown that mines were not laid by belligerents in their own territorial waters to any great extent, except as traps for submaries. Balancing the advantages and disadvantages, and remembering the superior rights of neutrals in the High Seas, we conclude that submarine mines should not be laid as barriers outside territorial waters of belligerents.
The above considerations have led us to propose the recommendations already indicated.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
Question XVI and Recommendations.- : - : - : - : -
SUBJECT: -Submarine Mines.
Copies to: -Mr. Lansing.
Colonel House.
General Bliss .
Mr. White.
Navy Dept. Files.
28 January, 1919
CONFIDENTIAL.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
Question XVI and RECOMMENDATIONS.- : - : - : - : - SUBJECT: -Submarine Mines.- : - : - : - : -
RECOMMENDATIONS.
What rules should govern the use of Submarine Mines during War?
ARTICLE 1.
It is forbidden -
ARTICLE 2.
When anchored automatic contact mines are employed under the restrictions of Article 1, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. The belligerents undertake to notify the danger zones before the mines are laid by a notice addressed to shipowners, which notice must also be communicated to neutral Governments through the diplomatic channel.
ARTICLE 3.
Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines in their territorial waters must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.
ARTICLE 4.
Observation mines may be laid in territorial waters of any Power by that Power, or by an enemy of that Power, without notification.
ARTICLE 5.
Mine fields of anchored automatic contact mines shall be cleared immediately after the close of the war by those Powers in whose waters the mine fields are. If one belligerent has laid mines in the waters of his enemy, the former shall immediately notify the location thereof to the latter upon the cessation of hostilities.
WS Benson
Admiral, US Navy.
APPENDIX.
Submarine Mines. Submarine Mines were used during the American Civil War for defensive purposes, during the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War, the Spanish-American War, and the Russo-Japanese War. In the latter war they were first used to any considerable extent outside the territorial waters of belligerents. Their use on the high seas excited violent adverse criticism. The sinking of merchant vessels by contact with mines near the area of hostilities especially inflamed public opinion against the use of mines on the high seas.
The sinking of the Japanese Battleship Hatsuse, May 15, 1904, by mines at a distance of ten miles from Port Arthur, and outside of territorial waters was looked upon by the great majority of authorities as an illegal act. Admiral Hersey of the British Navy said — “The laying of mines in the free sea beyond the territorial waters would seem not only inhuman but a breach of international law and practice. If it should prove that the destructions of the Hatsuse was effected by a mine wilfully placed in the open sea, ten miles from land, the act appears to me to be one of wholesale murder and its perpetration hostis humani generis. ”- - - - - - - Professor Woolsey stated — “Mines, whether anchored or intentionally set adrift in the Strait or Gulf of Pechili beyond the coast sea limit, constitute an indiscriminating attack upon neutral and belligerent alike, and are, therefore, illegitimate.” Professor Holland — the international law expert of the British Admiralty stated — “It is certain that no international usage sanctions the employment by one belligerent against another of mines or other secret contrivances which would, without notice, render dangerous the navigation of the High Seas”. Lawrence, Sir John Macdonnell and other prominent International Law writers expressed ideas in harmony with the above, there being a practical unanimity of opinion that the High Seas must not be rendered dangerous to neutral commerce. The right of the belligerent to use mines in his territorial waters was not questioned, but his duty to warn shipping of the danger was insisted upon.The principles governing the case then were: -
(1) The High Seas belong equally to all nations as a safe and peaceful highway for ships. No nation may obstruct this highway by dangers that do not discriminate between friend and enemy.
(2) Territorial waters belong to the State. The State may use them as it chooses, but is bound to safeguard friendly vessels that enter these waters, by indicating danger to them or by prohibiting the free navigation of these waters.
The discussion arising out of the unusual use of mines during the Russo-Japanese War resulted in an attempt to regulate the use of mines by a convention. The VIII Hague Convention of October 18, 19)07, contains various provisions concerning the use of mines, but these are for the most part ineffective through qualifying words and phrases that leave the Convention without force or character, other than as indicating a desire for conditions that could not be attained through the opposition of various States - notably Germany. It is a sufficient commentary on this Convention to note that the following Powers ratified the Convention, without appearing thereby to have been hampered in the unexampled use of mines on the High Seas -
Austria Hungary, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Japan, United States.
The question of the use of submarine mines on the High Seas may be considered therefore an entirely open and unregulated one. We shall examine it to determine what rules should govern the use of submarine mines in war. The basic considerations are:
(1) In war belligerents may injure each other by every weapon which is recognized as a lawful weapon. A Submarine Mine is such a recognised weapon.
(2) Belligerents may fight upon the High Seas, and neutrals approach the scene of battle there at their peril.
(3) Notwithstanding a state of war, neutrals have the right to the free use of the High Seas on their lawful occasions, except as that right may be interfered with by specifically defined rights of belligerents.
(4) The belligerents may not make use of warlike measures that do not and cannot discriminate between friend and enemy.
(5) Every nation has a right of self-defence that should give it a special freedom for self-preservation.
(6) The High Seas are common property, whose prime use is and should be the use required by peaceful pursuits.
Submarine mines to-day are used -
(a) As traps in deep mine fields to destroy submarines.
(b) As barriers in deep minefields to prevent the passage of submarines except on the surface.
(c) As complete barriers to prevent the passage of all vessels whether on the surface or submerged.
(d) As local tactical barriers to destroy vessels that may come in contact with them.
(e) As protective barriers to keep hostile vessels at a distance from the coast.
We can get a better perspective of the subject by examining each of the several uses of mines in relation to conditions of the present day.
(a) Trap Mine Fields.
These are designed to be laid so far below the surface that surface vessels will not make contact with the mines. The uncertain operation of the depth taking mechanism, the disturbing influence of tides and storms, and the gradual deterioration of mine anchors and cables which tend to release mines, all combine to make deep mine fields unsafe for surface vessels. Trap minefields are not likely to be used in fairways unless the mines are of the observation type. The disappearance of submarines would do away with this special use of mines. The retention of submarines would furnish a strong incentive to the retention of this mode of warfare against them.
(b) As barriers in deep minefields to prevent the passage of Submarines except on the surface,
The barrier of mines in the Straits of Dover during the present war is the most conspicuous example of this kind. It was laid outside territorial waters. It was composed entirely of deep mines. It has accounted for about forty submarines in a single year. It would have been extended to the surface if conditions had permitted. It was of great assistance to the British in their strategic control of the North Sea. They were assured by it that any considerable movement out of the North Sea would have to take place northabout, so that they were enabled to keep the principal part of their fleet in the northern area to meet such movement. The barrier had another effect, in that it compelled all neutrals to pass through a narrow gate in the barrier and thus be under the closest possible supervision by allied vessels of war. Such supervision was an undoubted infringement of neutral rights, but at the time it was to the interest of most neutrals that the barrier be maintained to assist in hampering submarines in their operations. If submarine warfare were abolished, the need for deep mine fields, either within or without territorial waters, would disappear. Barrier mines are subject to the same causes of deterioration as trap mines.
As complete barriers to prevent the passage of all vessels whether on the surface or submerged.
There is no question but that such barriers are legitimate when laid wholly within belligerent territorial waters and notified to neutrals; but when the barriers extend into the open sea they are a menace alike to friend and enemy. The difficulties of navigation in darkness and thick weather, the uncertainties of currents, wind and weather, are such that neutral vessels can assure their own safety solely by considering the sea closed in the vicinity of mine barriers. It is plainly an infringement of neutral rights to the free navigation of the High Seas to establish such barriers.
The belligerent may argue the paramount usefulness of such barriers. The North Sea barrier, the Dover Straits barrier, are examples of the usefulness of mine barriers.
Nations whose ports lie close to enemy naval ports may have a special need for the use of mine barriers, as naval actions may develop with such great rapidity, that the defending nation will need arrangements for holding or delaying action a sufficient time in a given sector to permit the arrival of mobile forces. This need of the belligerent, however, is not sufficient warrant for blocking the High Seas with mines against all comers. The primary principle, that the High Seas belong equally to all nations as a safe and peaceful highway for ships, should govern and prevent the pre-emption of the high seas or any portion of them for semi-permanent military use of belligerents.
(d) As Local Tactical Barriers to destroy vessels that may come in contact with them.
Mines used in this manner belong to the floating type. They may be used in fleet actions or in actions against single vessels. As action in a given locality is always of brief duration the mines may be so constructed as to be innocuous in a brief period of time. If submarines continue to be authorised weapons, tactical mine barriers enclosing submerged submaries may develop into the most efficient form of attack against submerged submarines.
The use of mines as above (that become innocuous in a short time) is no serious threat to neutrals and does not impair, except very temporarily, the freedom of navigation of the High Seas.
(e) As Protective Barriers to keep hostile vessels at a distance from the coast.
As examination of our own coastline, and the position of the cities on the coast, indicates that we have no special need for minefields far off shore in order to prevent bombardments. Bombardments from the sea in themselves have no great military value. Experience in the present war has shown that mines were not laid by belligerents in their own territorial waters to any great extent, except as traps for submaries. Balancing the advantages and disadvantages, and remembering the superior rights of neutrals in the High Seas, we conclude that submarine mines should not be laid as barriers outside territorial waters of belligerents.
The above considerations have led us to propose the recommendations already indicated.
To
Lansing, Robert, 1864-1928
Files
Collection
Citation
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932, “Naval Mines,” 1919 January 28, WWP15640, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.