League of Nations
Title
League of Nations
Creator
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932
Identifier
WWP15553
Date
1918 December 25
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
CONFIDENTIAL.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF- : - : - : - : - :
-SUBJECT: QUESTION 10 AND RECOMMENDATIONS.- : - : - : - :
-Copies to: -
Mr. Lansing (2)
Colonel House (2)
General Bliss (2)
Mr. White (2)
Navy Dept. (2)
Files (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF
Question 10 and Recommendations-
: - : - : -: - : - : - : -
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Naval forces required by the League of Nations to attain the ends of the League should be provided at the time from the fleets of the nations loyal to the League.There should under no circumstances be a separate International Navy under the control of the League.
Any Naval force engaged in executing the decisions of the League should contain a unit of a single nationality as powerful as the navy of the nation against which action is to be taken.
WS Benson
Admiral, US Navy.
APPENDIX
It is the consensus of opinion of statesmen who are concerned with the practical solution of the problems involved in the establishment of the League of Nations that there must exist some means of using military power to enforce the will of the league in the settlement of differences that may arise between states.
There are two general plans for providing Naval power at the service of the League of Nations.
1. An International Navy.
2. A naval force organized by international agreement for each occasion as it arises.
1. An International Navy.The following are some of the requirements for an International Navy.
(a) It must be twice as great as the Navy of any single power.
COMMENT
To be able to act promptly without fear or favor against even the strongest naval Power a safe margin of force is essential. Considering the weakness inherent in a mixed force composed of elements from many navies, and the further unavoidable weakness arising from the fact that that element of the International Navy which is drawn from the Power against which action is to be taken cannot be depended upon to be loyal to the League, no League navy which is less than twice as strong as the strongest navy can be considered effective. Any League navy less strong than this is not in a position to exercise its force impartially against the Powers of the world, but is only in a position to act against weaker powers.
(b) An International Navy must be independent of any control or influence except the control or influence exerted by the League as a whole.
COMMENT
The constant tendency in international operations is toward the emphasis of national interests. This is being emphasized now, especially in the Adriatic. We must expect similar emphasis in other instances. To prevent as far as possible the emphasis of national interests in international operations, it is essential that the facilities of an international force be not dependent upon any single nation or upon any group of nations but that these facilities should exist independently of any control except that of the League of Nations. These facilities include:- sources of supples, equipment and munitions, fortified bases, dock-yards and repair facilities throughout the world. The International Navy, itself, in order to maintain its existence must be supported by a legislative body to authorize it, an executive power to direct its operations, and minor executive powers to administer its design, construction, supply and maintenance, as well as to direct its training and the recruiting of its personnel. There will be needed machinery for the assignment of commands and for the promotion of officers and men all of which will have to be administred impartially and in the sole interest of the League. Granted that these functions are thus attended to, there still remains the element of personality, the loyalty of the individual to the land of his birth which no treaty, and we believe, no oath can overcome, so that no matter how many precautions are taken, those in command of the International Navy will unavoidably direct its operations in part toward the attainment of national ends favorable to the country of their origin.
It has been suggested that the present interned German vessels might form the nucleus of an International Navy. Asiede from the political questions involved, there are certain practical questions which make this undesirable. An International Navy must be preeminently a navy capable of world-wide ocean movement. Its ships must have a long radius of action. These are not the characteristics of the German ships, either of the large ships or of the small ones. They were built for a special purpose and with special refernce to the geographical position of Germany. They are not suitable for service far afield.
One of the funadamental princpiples of efficiency in military operations is homogeneity of the forces and especially the standardization of materiel. These vessels in their construction, armament, and equipment, are the product of a single nation. They are adapted for use with the guns, dock-yards, and materiel of that nation. If they base elsewhere than in German ports, they will lose much of their efficiency. They are all outclasses by vessels of the same date of Great Britain and of the United States. In a few years they will be obsolete. They are at present not sufficiently numerous to be useful against any power of importance or against any power which would not yield to a collective diplomatic pressure such as the League would be able to bring to bear. We believe it unwise to use these vessels as the nucleus of the International Navy, since by so doing we would be placing our faith in a shadow of power, rather than in power itself.
There are psychological considerations which bear upon the advisability of the formation of an International Navy. If such a Navy were formed it would inevitably be composed of vessels of several nationalities. If these vessels were associated closely in an organization, as they would have to be if they were trained to any degree of efficiency, there would be a ceaseless friction of nationalities, incidental to racial termperaments. This friction itself would be dangerous as it would tend to create incidents between the nations which might otherwise maintain the most amicable of relations.
The mere existence of a permanently organized International Navy would be a constant invitation to find something for it to do. There would be a danger that it would be used in a domineering manner throughout the world.
If a great task were set the International Navy to perform, we believe, that it would not be accomplished unless that task were of such a nature as to bind the various national elements of the Navy together into a loyal adhesion to the cause. A sine qua non of military service is loyalty both to individuals and to causes.
When we approach specific arrangements for an International Navy we are confronted with these facts which no arguments may change.
(1) The British Government and the British people believe with a faith that is unshakeable that their safety and the continued existence of their national life is dependent upon a superior naval force free to act when occasion demands, in the untrammeled interest of the British Empire. Believing this as they do, it is idle to expect them to surrender into other hands their chief security.
(2) Having in view “1”, it is certain that any international naval police force that may be organized under present conditions, must be dominated by British interests, and must be composed largely of British ships. If such a force is asked to act against Great Britain, its most powerful units would not so act, but would identify themselves with strictly British forces.
The above facts compel us to the conclusion that if we desire an International Navy now, we must accept one that is British in its aims and in its administration.
From the above considerations we are compelled to the conclusion that:- There should under no circumstances be a separate International Navy under the control of the League.
We consider that no combined fleet, however large made up of heterogeneous elements, gathered from far and near to support the League against a strong Naval Power, will ever be able to accomplish its mission unless it contains in the organization a single homogeneous navy, equal in strength to the Navy of the Power in opposition to the League. As we are basing our arrangements upon ability to control the unjust actions of any member of the League, there must be at least two powerful navies in the world, so that, should either one of them engage in operations contrary to international justice, the other may, with the assistance of subordinate navies, cause it to desist. We believe that no matter how altruistic may be the aims of any single power, possessing a navy that is practically the mistress of the seas, it is dangerous to lodge so complete a power in one nation, and that the existence of that power with no effective balancing force is not in the interests of peace and of continuing international justice.
In providing for international action by the Navies of the League, the simplest and most direct means are apt to be the most efficient. Every international problem requires a special solution. We cannot expect to organize the world in such a way as to provide at one time in the organization, a solution for all world questions. Each question has so many sides to it that even if the organization of the League be complete in details, the question will still have to be made the subject of special conferences and special arrangements. With these facts in view, we recommend that every case requiring the application of force by the League should be considered as a separate problem, requiring a separate solution to accord with conditions then existing. Questions of command, of the extent of actions to be taken, of the exact end in view, of the support of military and naval forces, of the division of expenses incident to the operations; all these can be taken up best at the time rather than by a general solution made in advance. Further, this plan acts as a deterrent to military action rather than as an encouragement, which we consider to be an advantage when viewed from the standpoint of the peace of the world.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF- : - : - : - : - :
-SUBJECT: QUESTION 10 AND RECOMMENDATIONS.- : - : - : - :
-Copies to: -
Mr. Lansing (2)
Colonel House (2)
General Bliss (2)
Mr. White (2)
Navy Dept. (2)
Files (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF
Question 10 and Recommendations-
: - : - : -: - : - : - : -
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Naval forces required by the League of Nations to attain the ends of the League should be provided at the time from the fleets of the nations loyal to the League.There should under no circumstances be a separate International Navy under the control of the League.
Any Naval force engaged in executing the decisions of the League should contain a unit of a single nationality as powerful as the navy of the nation against which action is to be taken.
WS Benson
Admiral, US Navy.
APPENDIX
It is the consensus of opinion of statesmen who are concerned with the practical solution of the problems involved in the establishment of the League of Nations that there must exist some means of using military power to enforce the will of the league in the settlement of differences that may arise between states.
There are two general plans for providing Naval power at the service of the League of Nations.
1. An International Navy.
2. A naval force organized by international agreement for each occasion as it arises.
1. An International Navy.The following are some of the requirements for an International Navy.
(a) It must be twice as great as the Navy of any single power.
COMMENT
To be able to act promptly without fear or favor against even the strongest naval Power a safe margin of force is essential. Considering the weakness inherent in a mixed force composed of elements from many navies, and the further unavoidable weakness arising from the fact that that element of the International Navy which is drawn from the Power against which action is to be taken cannot be depended upon to be loyal to the League, no League navy which is less than twice as strong as the strongest navy can be considered effective. Any League navy less strong than this is not in a position to exercise its force impartially against the Powers of the world, but is only in a position to act against weaker powers.
(b) An International Navy must be independent of any control or influence except the control or influence exerted by the League as a whole.
COMMENT
The constant tendency in international operations is toward the emphasis of national interests. This is being emphasized now, especially in the Adriatic. We must expect similar emphasis in other instances. To prevent as far as possible the emphasis of national interests in international operations, it is essential that the facilities of an international force be not dependent upon any single nation or upon any group of nations but that these facilities should exist independently of any control except that of the League of Nations. These facilities include:- sources of supples, equipment and munitions, fortified bases, dock-yards and repair facilities throughout the world. The International Navy, itself, in order to maintain its existence must be supported by a legislative body to authorize it, an executive power to direct its operations, and minor executive powers to administer its design, construction, supply and maintenance, as well as to direct its training and the recruiting of its personnel. There will be needed machinery for the assignment of commands and for the promotion of officers and men all of which will have to be administred impartially and in the sole interest of the League. Granted that these functions are thus attended to, there still remains the element of personality, the loyalty of the individual to the land of his birth which no treaty, and we believe, no oath can overcome, so that no matter how many precautions are taken, those in command of the International Navy will unavoidably direct its operations in part toward the attainment of national ends favorable to the country of their origin.
It has been suggested that the present interned German vessels might form the nucleus of an International Navy. Asiede from the political questions involved, there are certain practical questions which make this undesirable. An International Navy must be preeminently a navy capable of world-wide ocean movement. Its ships must have a long radius of action. These are not the characteristics of the German ships, either of the large ships or of the small ones. They were built for a special purpose and with special refernce to the geographical position of Germany. They are not suitable for service far afield.
One of the funadamental princpiples of efficiency in military operations is homogeneity of the forces and especially the standardization of materiel. These vessels in their construction, armament, and equipment, are the product of a single nation. They are adapted for use with the guns, dock-yards, and materiel of that nation. If they base elsewhere than in German ports, they will lose much of their efficiency. They are all outclasses by vessels of the same date of Great Britain and of the United States. In a few years they will be obsolete. They are at present not sufficiently numerous to be useful against any power of importance or against any power which would not yield to a collective diplomatic pressure such as the League would be able to bring to bear. We believe it unwise to use these vessels as the nucleus of the International Navy, since by so doing we would be placing our faith in a shadow of power, rather than in power itself.
There are psychological considerations which bear upon the advisability of the formation of an International Navy. If such a Navy were formed it would inevitably be composed of vessels of several nationalities. If these vessels were associated closely in an organization, as they would have to be if they were trained to any degree of efficiency, there would be a ceaseless friction of nationalities, incidental to racial termperaments. This friction itself would be dangerous as it would tend to create incidents between the nations which might otherwise maintain the most amicable of relations.
The mere existence of a permanently organized International Navy would be a constant invitation to find something for it to do. There would be a danger that it would be used in a domineering manner throughout the world.
If a great task were set the International Navy to perform, we believe, that it would not be accomplished unless that task were of such a nature as to bind the various national elements of the Navy together into a loyal adhesion to the cause. A sine qua non of military service is loyalty both to individuals and to causes.
When we approach specific arrangements for an International Navy we are confronted with these facts which no arguments may change.
(1) The British Government and the British people believe with a faith that is unshakeable that their safety and the continued existence of their national life is dependent upon a superior naval force free to act when occasion demands, in the untrammeled interest of the British Empire. Believing this as they do, it is idle to expect them to surrender into other hands their chief security.
(2) Having in view “1”, it is certain that any international naval police force that may be organized under present conditions, must be dominated by British interests, and must be composed largely of British ships. If such a force is asked to act against Great Britain, its most powerful units would not so act, but would identify themselves with strictly British forces.
The above facts compel us to the conclusion that if we desire an International Navy now, we must accept one that is British in its aims and in its administration.
From the above considerations we are compelled to the conclusion that:- There should under no circumstances be a separate International Navy under the control of the League.
We consider that no combined fleet, however large made up of heterogeneous elements, gathered from far and near to support the League against a strong Naval Power, will ever be able to accomplish its mission unless it contains in the organization a single homogeneous navy, equal in strength to the Navy of the Power in opposition to the League. As we are basing our arrangements upon ability to control the unjust actions of any member of the League, there must be at least two powerful navies in the world, so that, should either one of them engage in operations contrary to international justice, the other may, with the assistance of subordinate navies, cause it to desist. We believe that no matter how altruistic may be the aims of any single power, possessing a navy that is practically the mistress of the seas, it is dangerous to lodge so complete a power in one nation, and that the existence of that power with no effective balancing force is not in the interests of peace and of continuing international justice.
In providing for international action by the Navies of the League, the simplest and most direct means are apt to be the most efficient. Every international problem requires a special solution. We cannot expect to organize the world in such a way as to provide at one time in the organization, a solution for all world questions. Each question has so many sides to it that even if the organization of the League be complete in details, the question will still have to be made the subject of special conferences and special arrangements. With these facts in view, we recommend that every case requiring the application of force by the League should be considered as a separate problem, requiring a separate solution to accord with conditions then existing. Questions of command, of the extent of actions to be taken, of the exact end in view, of the support of military and naval forces, of the division of expenses incident to the operations; all these can be taken up best at the time rather than by a general solution made in advance. Further, this plan acts as a deterrent to military action rather than as an encouragement, which we consider to be an advantage when viewed from the standpoint of the peace of the world.
Files
Collection
Citation
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932, “League of Nations,” 1918 December 25, WWP15553, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.