League of Nations
Title
League of Nations
Creator
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932
Identifier
WWP15552
Date
1918 December 25
Source
Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia
Language
English
Text
CONFIDENTIAL.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
- : - : - : - : - : -
SUBJECT: - QUESTION IX AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
(What steps should be taken by the Peace Conference to inaugurate a plan for a League of Nations.)
- : - : - : - : - : -
Copies to: -
Mr. Lansing.
Colonel House.
General Bliss.
Mr. White.
Navy Department.
Files.
CONFIDENTIAL
QUESTION IX AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
- : - : - : - : - : -
What steps should be taken by the Peace Conference to inaugurate a plan for a League of Nations?
STEP ONE.
The adoption of the principle of an organized League of Nations through which justice in international relations may be maintained without recourse to war; or failing this, that the force of the League be exercised on the side of justice.
STEP TWO.
A universal treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation.
STEP THREE.
The formulation and codification of international law.
STEP FOUR.
An alliance of Powers to support the decisions of the tribunals of arbitration and the canons of codified international law.
WS Benson,
Admiral, US Navy.
A P P E N D I X.
Step One.
The adoption of the principle of an organized League of Nations through which justice in international relations may be maintained without recource to war; or failing this, that the force of the League be exercised on the side of justice.
Comment. The ideal foundation for a League of Nations would be a code of national ethics as high in its standards as the code of ethics observed by honorable individuals, from which would spring international confidence in the aims of individual nations. Such a foundation for League of Nations does not now exist, so we are compelled to take such measures as will tend toward a League based upon such a foundation.
The successful formation of a League of Nations under present world conditions will depend largely upon a recognition of the habits, customs and ideas of the past. Among these idesas the idea of the complete sovereignty of each nation is so firmly established that any suggestions to the contrary would meet with considerable resistance. No organization of nations into a League is possible without the surrenders of some part of the soverieeignty of eahch individual nation. We believe that the nations of the world can be induced to part with sufficient of their sovereignty throufgh a gradual process of passing from old ideas to new ones, the rapidity and extent of the process being dependent upon the confidence which is inspired by the new ideas and their effect. The adoption of the principle of a League of Nations as enunciated in Step One above, will tend to induce an attitude of tolerance toward the idea of organization for international ends.
If the measures which are taken at first to put the principle of a League of Nations into effect are not too wild far reaching, that confidence in the plan which we wseek should be stimulated from the start.
Step One is really an announcement of the end in view for a League of Nations. The next step would naturally be the primary means for accomplishing the end in view.
Step Two.
A universal treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation.
Comment.
The most direct way for nations to associate themselves together in the interests of international justice is through the medium of a general treaty of arbitration to which all Powers are signatory. The idea of a Treaty of Arbitration is not new. The public mind is accustomed to it, so that when we pass from a single Treaty of Arbitration between two Powers to a Treaty of Arbitration that includes the Powers of the world as signatories there is no sheocnk to old ideas since we are merely giving extension to a principle already recognized.
We do not presume to lay down here the specific provisions which a general Treaty of Arbitration should include, but we deem it important that the terms of the Treaty should distinguish between those international differences which are capable of judicial settlement and those other difficultieserences which are not capable of judicial settlement, since they may involve questions of national hornor, national sovereignty or national existence. Although certain questions may be non-justiciable, we deem it still necessary that machinery be provided which will make the necessity for a resort to a decision by force as remote as possible.
If the nations having non-justiciable differences are unable to come to an agreement, machinery should be provided by the League to permit it to announce its judgment on the questions as issue. No such announcement of judgment wshould be made until every other means for an amicable adjustment of differencesh has been exhausted.
One of the difficulties which international tribunals of arbitration will experience at present will be found in the very nature of which is called International Law, which is not a law of enactment but a concensus of opinion. There are many differences, not alone in interpretation but even in principle, and in the last analysis each nation acts upon its own conceptions. It is suggested that until such time as this condition is rectified it would be a wiser process for the decision of differences between States to require that each subject for arbitration be passed upon by an arbitration tribunal specially convened to consider that subject, with representation for each contestant. This procedure would permit the assembly of a tribunal specially qualified to pass upon the questions at issue so that no nation would have cause to be dissatisfied with the decisions of the tribunal through a belief that its interests suffered through the lack of special knowledge or experience of the members of the tribunal.
The Treaty of Arbitration should contain a clause binding the signatory Powers to accept the decision of all tribunals of arbitration.
We suggest a possible danger in having an international court of arbitration with a permanent membership sitting constantly. The mere existence of the court might be provoceative of a tendency to bring questions before it, whereas if no such court were in existence to stimulate the machinery for its assembly and subsequent procedure, there would be sufficient difficulty in the assembly of the court to discourage the presentation of questions for its decidsion which might otherwise be settled through diplomatic channels. On the other hand there might be great hesitation in submitting a nation’s case to such a court, in the formation of which it had no hand esxcept in the most general way.
Step Three.
The Codification of Internationala Law.
Comment. One of the principal difficulties experienced in the relations of States is the uncertainty as to the actual status of international law. This is particularly true during war when neutrals are at a loss to know extactly what kind of international law will be imposed upom them by the belligerents. The commeercncerce of the world desires above all, certainty. Certainty can never be had when the belligerent is left free to make and interpret international law to meet his changing requirementxs. It is useless to talk of international law as something definite, binding and understood unless it is -
(a)Written;
(b)Precise and definite;
(c)Comprehensive;
(d)Accepted;
(e)Defended.
At present, any Power may bolster up its illegal acts by a vague reference to the law of nations. This should be impossible when the law of nations is written.We have but to cite a few of the sources of present international law to see how impossilble it is to get, from these sources, uniformity in the interpretation of the rules governing international relations. Treaties, conventions, unwrritten international law derived from text writers, no two of whom are in agreement, proclamations of Governments, Decisions of Prize Courts, municipal legislation, diplomatic pronouncements, all have etheir part in the formation of international law as the terms is used at present. Authority for diametrically popposed decisions based on international law may be found on almost any subject at issue.
Much difficulty has been experienced in past attempts to make conventional law, and much of the force of conventions has been lost through the non-concurrence or the reservations of one or more Powers and also through those usual provisions of conventions which say that the convention shall not be operative unless all of the Powers concerned are signatories to the convention. In other cases, the insertion of qualifying words in thre convention has served to reduce its provisions to impotence.
Some machinery must be devised by which conventions will be made binding on all and will be ratified in the briefest possible time. It may be necessary eventually to compel the acceptance by the lesser Powers of wsuch international law aws they may agree to among themselves.
Since one of the objects of the Peace Conference is to provide for the peace of the futtuure,, it should be constantly bornee in mind by any and all Congresses dealing with the codification of international law that they should give special emphaseis to the peace-time relations of States, as peace, not war, is the normal state and as the prompt and just settlement of questions that may arise during peace will best prevent a recurrence of wars.
Step Four.
An alliance of Powers to support the decisions of the tribunals of arbitration and the canons of codified international law.
Comment.
Treaties of Arbitration and written international law must have a definite sanction or they will fail in the attainment of the objects for which they are created. They cannot rest on the uncertain grounds of general assent or supposed general assent as is now the case. A world alliance to support the results of arbitration and to sunpport written international law is the primary step in the organization of the law. Granting that such nan alliance is formed and that the ordinary processes of arbitration or conciliation have failed, the alliance would probably make its power felt in the adjustment of international differences by -
(1)A collective note to the Powers at variance;
(2)Collective economic pressure on the Power or Powers at fault;
(3)Absolute non-intercourse;
(4)In case of the failure of both the collective note and the economic pressure, the employment of the naval and military forces of the Powers of the League to compel submission.
The collective note would set forth the judgment of the Alliance concerning the points at issue, and by its expression of judgment would bring all the moral force of the League into play in the interests of a peaceful settlement. The means by which the military and naval forces of the Alliance would be brought into action against offending Powers will be treated in a separate paper.
US NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.
- : - : - : - : - : -
SUBJECT: - QUESTION IX AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
(What steps should be taken by the Peace Conference to inaugurate a plan for a League of Nations.)
- : - : - : - : - : -
Copies to: -
Mr. Lansing.
Colonel House.
General Bliss.
Mr. White.
Navy Department.
Files.
CONFIDENTIAL
QUESTION IX AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
- : - : - : - : - : -
What steps should be taken by the Peace Conference to inaugurate a plan for a League of Nations?
STEP ONE.
The adoption of the principle of an organized League of Nations through which justice in international relations may be maintained without recourse to war; or failing this, that the force of the League be exercised on the side of justice.
STEP TWO.
A universal treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation.
STEP THREE.
The formulation and codification of international law.
STEP FOUR.
An alliance of Powers to support the decisions of the tribunals of arbitration and the canons of codified international law.
WS Benson,
Admiral, US Navy.
A P P E N D I X.
Step One.
The adoption of the principle of an organized League of Nations through which justice in international relations may be maintained without recource to war; or failing this, that the force of the League be exercised on the side of justice.
Comment. The ideal foundation for a League of Nations would be a code of national ethics as high in its standards as the code of ethics observed by honorable individuals, from which would spring international confidence in the aims of individual nations. Such a foundation for League of Nations does not now exist, so we are compelled to take such measures as will tend toward a League based upon such a foundation.
The successful formation of a League of Nations under present world conditions will depend largely upon a recognition of the habits, customs and ideas of the past. Among these idesas the idea of the complete sovereignty of each nation is so firmly established that any suggestions to the contrary would meet with considerable resistance. No organization of nations into a League is possible without the surrenders of some part of the soverieeignty of eahch individual nation. We believe that the nations of the world can be induced to part with sufficient of their sovereignty throufgh a gradual process of passing from old ideas to new ones, the rapidity and extent of the process being dependent upon the confidence which is inspired by the new ideas and their effect. The adoption of the principle of a League of Nations as enunciated in Step One above, will tend to induce an attitude of tolerance toward the idea of organization for international ends.
If the measures which are taken at first to put the principle of a League of Nations into effect are not too wild far reaching, that confidence in the plan which we wseek should be stimulated from the start.
Step One is really an announcement of the end in view for a League of Nations. The next step would naturally be the primary means for accomplishing the end in view.
Step Two.
A universal treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation.
Comment.
The most direct way for nations to associate themselves together in the interests of international justice is through the medium of a general treaty of arbitration to which all Powers are signatory. The idea of a Treaty of Arbitration is not new. The public mind is accustomed to it, so that when we pass from a single Treaty of Arbitration between two Powers to a Treaty of Arbitration that includes the Powers of the world as signatories there is no sheocnk to old ideas since we are merely giving extension to a principle already recognized.
We do not presume to lay down here the specific provisions which a general Treaty of Arbitration should include, but we deem it important that the terms of the Treaty should distinguish between those international differences which are capable of judicial settlement and those other difficultieserences which are not capable of judicial settlement, since they may involve questions of national hornor, national sovereignty or national existence. Although certain questions may be non-justiciable, we deem it still necessary that machinery be provided which will make the necessity for a resort to a decision by force as remote as possible.
If the nations having non-justiciable differences are unable to come to an agreement, machinery should be provided by the League to permit it to announce its judgment on the questions as issue. No such announcement of judgment wshould be made until every other means for an amicable adjustment of differencesh has been exhausted.
One of the difficulties which international tribunals of arbitration will experience at present will be found in the very nature of which is called International Law, which is not a law of enactment but a concensus of opinion. There are many differences, not alone in interpretation but even in principle, and in the last analysis each nation acts upon its own conceptions. It is suggested that until such time as this condition is rectified it would be a wiser process for the decision of differences between States to require that each subject for arbitration be passed upon by an arbitration tribunal specially convened to consider that subject, with representation for each contestant. This procedure would permit the assembly of a tribunal specially qualified to pass upon the questions at issue so that no nation would have cause to be dissatisfied with the decisions of the tribunal through a belief that its interests suffered through the lack of special knowledge or experience of the members of the tribunal.
The Treaty of Arbitration should contain a clause binding the signatory Powers to accept the decision of all tribunals of arbitration.
We suggest a possible danger in having an international court of arbitration with a permanent membership sitting constantly. The mere existence of the court might be provoceative of a tendency to bring questions before it, whereas if no such court were in existence to stimulate the machinery for its assembly and subsequent procedure, there would be sufficient difficulty in the assembly of the court to discourage the presentation of questions for its decidsion which might otherwise be settled through diplomatic channels. On the other hand there might be great hesitation in submitting a nation’s case to such a court, in the formation of which it had no hand esxcept in the most general way.
Step Three.
The Codification of Internationala Law.
Comment. One of the principal difficulties experienced in the relations of States is the uncertainty as to the actual status of international law. This is particularly true during war when neutrals are at a loss to know extactly what kind of international law will be imposed upom them by the belligerents. The commeercncerce of the world desires above all, certainty. Certainty can never be had when the belligerent is left free to make and interpret international law to meet his changing requirementxs. It is useless to talk of international law as something definite, binding and understood unless it is -
(a)Written;
(b)Precise and definite;
(c)Comprehensive;
(d)Accepted;
(e)Defended.
At present, any Power may bolster up its illegal acts by a vague reference to the law of nations. This should be impossible when the law of nations is written.We have but to cite a few of the sources of present international law to see how impossilble it is to get, from these sources, uniformity in the interpretation of the rules governing international relations. Treaties, conventions, unwrritten international law derived from text writers, no two of whom are in agreement, proclamations of Governments, Decisions of Prize Courts, municipal legislation, diplomatic pronouncements, all have etheir part in the formation of international law as the terms is used at present. Authority for diametrically popposed decisions based on international law may be found on almost any subject at issue.
Much difficulty has been experienced in past attempts to make conventional law, and much of the force of conventions has been lost through the non-concurrence or the reservations of one or more Powers and also through those usual provisions of conventions which say that the convention shall not be operative unless all of the Powers concerned are signatories to the convention. In other cases, the insertion of qualifying words in thre convention has served to reduce its provisions to impotence.
Some machinery must be devised by which conventions will be made binding on all and will be ratified in the briefest possible time. It may be necessary eventually to compel the acceptance by the lesser Powers of wsuch international law aws they may agree to among themselves.
Since one of the objects of the Peace Conference is to provide for the peace of the futtuure,, it should be constantly bornee in mind by any and all Congresses dealing with the codification of international law that they should give special emphaseis to the peace-time relations of States, as peace, not war, is the normal state and as the prompt and just settlement of questions that may arise during peace will best prevent a recurrence of wars.
Step Four.
An alliance of Powers to support the decisions of the tribunals of arbitration and the canons of codified international law.
Comment.
Treaties of Arbitration and written international law must have a definite sanction or they will fail in the attainment of the objects for which they are created. They cannot rest on the uncertain grounds of general assent or supposed general assent as is now the case. A world alliance to support the results of arbitration and to sunpport written international law is the primary step in the organization of the law. Granting that such nan alliance is formed and that the ordinary processes of arbitration or conciliation have failed, the alliance would probably make its power felt in the adjustment of international differences by -
(1)A collective note to the Powers at variance;
(2)Collective economic pressure on the Power or Powers at fault;
(3)Absolute non-intercourse;
(4)In case of the failure of both the collective note and the economic pressure, the employment of the naval and military forces of the Powers of the League to compel submission.
The collective note would set forth the judgment of the Alliance concerning the points at issue, and by its expression of judgment would bring all the moral force of the League into play in the interests of a peaceful settlement. The means by which the military and naval forces of the Alliance would be brought into action against offending Powers will be treated in a separate paper.
Files
Collection
Citation
Benson, William Shepherd, 1855-1932, “League of Nations,” 1918 December 25, WWP15552, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.