Cary T. Grayson Diary

Title

Cary T. Grayson Diary

Creator

Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938

Identifier

WWP17209

Date

1919 June 27

Source

Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, Virginia

Language

English

Text

The President arose early and he and the Council approved the final details of the ceremony to be gone through with on afternoon at Versailles. It was decided that there would be no effort to make the scenes incident to the signing ceremonious. Instead of court dress it was agreed that all of the delegates would wear the ordinary black afternoon costume.

The President proceeded to the Crillon, where at 2:15 o’clock he met the assembled newspaper correspondents. Probably never before had the President shown to such advantage as he did at this conference. Gathered there were more than fifty representatives of the American newspapers and of the various magazines. Many of these men were avowedly hostile to the President. Some of them were hostile because of political reasons; others were hostile because of socialistic tencdencies. However, at no time did a single man succeed in putting a question to the President that in any way embarrassed him. The President at the outset explained very carefully to the men that he would be very glad to be perfectly frank with them, but that they must understand that what he said to them was said to them entirely for their guidance and must not be attributed either to him or to that mythical “high authority” which many of them had utilized as a medium for the dissemination of erroneous information.

The President was asked how he felt regarding the accomplishment of the task which he came to Europe to assume. He replied: “I am very well satisfied; I think a good job has been done.” Asked whether he considered the treaty followed his original fourteen points, the President said that he thought it did so in every way. In fact, he said that he was surprised that he had been able to keep the treaty as closely to the lines laid down in advance as he had done. The President paid a generous tribute to the work of the men with whom he had been associated. There was not a single note of criticism in his reference to the other members of the Council of Five. He openly praised both Clemenceau and Lloyd George for the manner in which they had cooperated, and he pointed out that in an exchange of views such as had taken place in this connection, it was natural that men would want to know all sides of all questions before they finally reached a decision.

When the President was asked to sum up what he believed had been accomplished in connection with the treaty, he said: “The Treaty is severe on Germany, but why should it not be? Germany caused the war. Germany ran amuck and tried to rule the world. Germany must accept the consequences of her own acts. We make individuals responsible for their own acts. In capital cases we make individuals responsible for their own acts even to the extent of giving up their lives because of such acts. We have not attempted to exact Germany’s life. We have only compelled her to make such reparation as she is capable of making. But it is not alone Germany in this case. We have done something that no one would have believed possible only a year ago. We have liberated peoples who never hoped for liberation. We have re-created ancient Poland - a dream that was only a dream even to the Poles themselves. We have liberated the peoples who were oppressed parts of the Austria-Hungary Empire. They are given back their original sovereignty. We have made possible the restoration of liberty to the world itself.”

The President was asked whether he cared to say anything about the settlement in connection with the Shantung Peninsula. He replied that he would be very glad to tell the correspondents all of the actual facts. He made it plain, however, once more that this information was entirely for their guidance and must not be attritbuted to him. The President then said that when the question of Shantung came before the Council, the Japanese delegates produced the secret treaties which were entered into during the war between Japan on the one side and Great Britain and France on the other side, whereby these two nations assured Japan that she would be given as her reward for her participation in the war all of the rights enjoyed by the Germans under their original understandings with China. He said that after this had been agreed upon the Japanese sent to Peking a representative who took up the matter with the Chinese Government. This Japanese representative told the Chinese that while they had abandoned, upon the protest of the United States, what was known as the “24 points”, yet Japan intended to carry through a good portion of these demands in connection with her understanding with England and France. The President said that when he learned this he found that it was necessary to exert the utmost influence to secure for China the rights which she deserved, and also to protect China from the imposition under a new guise of these so-called points, which had been the medium of a sharp protest by America to Japan. As a result of this, the Shantung agreement was reached, whereby Japan agreed to restore to China all her territorial rights in the Shantung Peninsula, with the exception of the ownership of the railroad itself and with the establishment of certain commercial stations. Japan agreed that these commercial stations should not at any place infringe upon the Kiao Chau fortifications. He said that as a result of the agreement China had received far more than she possibly could have received in other circumstances, and, in addition, was in a position later on to appeal to the League of Nations to restore to her the railroad rights which Japan was to retain under the present rarrangement. The President was asked why it was when this arrangement was approved he took such a positive stand in connection with the Dalmatian question. The President said that there was absolutely no comparison between the two problems. The so-called Treaty of London, he said, was an unholy alliance. France and Great Britain both recognized this fact. However, Italy had insisted that it would stand squarely upon the London Pact, and the United States was therefore compelled to declare that it could not participate in any settlement under it.

The President was asked why it was that there had been no decision reached in connection with the Hungarian problem. He said that was due to the fact that Hungary at the present time was like a basin of quick-silver - there was no government that could be pinned down for a single moment. Bela Kan was in power only in Budapest. The rest of Hungary was in a state of chaos, and until a stable government should evolve itself there was nothing that the Allies could do to settle the questions there.

The President was asked what had been done in connection with the suggestion that America be given mandatories in Turkey. He said that that was a matter which Congress itself must decide. So far as he personally was concerned he did not favor accepting any mandatory except possibly one for Armenia and another for Constantinople. In the case of Armenia there were sentimental reasons that would affect a decision. In the case of Constantinople he said the United States was the only nation which could administer it unselfishly. Any European nation must naturally have a selfish interest, while the United States would have none, and he likened the proposition of America carrying this mandatory to its position in connection with the Panama Canal, as it would keep open the Dardanelles at all times and leave a free sea route to the Black Sea.

The session with the correspondents was most illuminating, and the President made it very clear to them that so far as the United States was concerned, it had not sacrificed a single principle during the weary months of negotiation.

Lloyd George and Clemenceau are very anxious that the President come back to Europe later on. The President said: “This is practically out of the question. Lincoln one time told the story of a little girl who had some blocks with letters on them. She was learning her A B C’s with the use of these blocks, and one night before going to bed she was playing with them. When she got into bed she started to say her prayers, but she was so sleepy all she could say was: “Oh, Lord, I am too sleepty to say my prayers; here are the blocks and the letters - you spell it out.” The President continued: “I have worked over here and laid down all the principles, the rules and regulations that I could think of. Someone else now will have to take the blocks and spell it out.”

Today I lunched with Lord Derby. Lloyd George, Balfour, Sir Ian Malcolm were also present at the luncheon. I had asked Lord Derby whether I could call and say good-bye to him. He replied by saying that he wanted me to lunch with him; that he would ask Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, who were good friends of mine, to come if they could find the time; if they were not engaged, he felt sure they would come. Lord Derby referred to Lloyd George in his conversation as “L.G.”, and to Balfour as “Arthur”. He refers to me as “Admiral Grayson” but always addresses me as “Grayson”. The question of having Lord Derby accept the vacant Ambassadorship at Washington came up at the luncheon table. Lloyd George and Balfour joined with me in urging him to accept the vacant post. They told Lord Derby that he was my selection, and that they not only endorsed it but that they agreed with me, and that they were anxious to see that I had my way in this matter. Lord Derby said that he regretted very much that his business interests were such that he could not afford to be absent, or to be as far away from them as would be necessary were he to go to Washington. Lloyd George slyly suggested to me that possibly it might not be so much a matter of business interest as it was his deep interest in racing and his love for his thoroughbred stables. I then told Lord Derby that if this was the only obstacle we could very easily remedy it. I told him about the wonderful racing in the United States, of our good tracks there, of the attractions such as the Latonia Derby, the Kentucky Derby, the Preakness and other big fixed stakes; that if this was not sufficient we would construct a race-trqack especially for his benefit. When I concluded with my persuasive speech, Lord Derby turned and said to the others: “I see now why it is that President Wilson considers Grayson such a good doctor.” To my proposal he then said: “It cannot be done, but I will tell you what I will do. I will agree to offer you every inducement to come to England as my guest and spend the month of July with me.” This would bring me to England for the two famous meetings - the meeting at Epsonm and that at Ascot.

This afternoon I called on the King of Montenegro at the Ritz Hotel. The call was made at the King’s request. He said to me that he was very glad to meet me; that he had been in poor health; that he had heard I was a famous doctor, and when he had heard that I had taken such good care of the President he wanted to offer the highest honor at his command. He said that the people of Montenegro looked upon the President as the big man of the world and that they wanted to show their appreciation to me for the good health that I had given him. They were, therefore, presenting me with a decoration. He expressed regret that he had not been able to “show” me this honor earlier.

The President dined quietly at home with the family tonight and retired early, realizing that he had a very serious ordeal before him tomorrow.

Original Format

Diary

Files

http://resources.presidentwilson.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PCST19190627.pdf

Citation

Grayson, Cary T. (Cary Travers), 1878-1938, “Cary T. Grayson Diary,” 1919 June 27, WWP17209, Cary T. Grayson Papers, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.