John J. Pershing to Henry P. McCain

COPY.

CABLEGRAM
Received at the War Department
Washington, D. C.,
January 16, 1918.

Cable Company
No. (9 CO)
From H A E F To The Adjutant-General, Washington.

Number 487, January 13th.
Confidential, for the Chief of Staff.

Reference my 441, held conference in Paris on tenth instant with General Robertson on the subject of providing additional men for British Divisions. He presents request from British Government that American Battalions be sent over for service with British Divisions. This memorandum is practically the same as that submitted to General Bliss. General Robertson says in substance, "That he regards situation as becoming very serious on the Western Front and that Germans will undoubtedly exert every effort to win before our troops are able to play an important part in the war. Also that British will be unable to furnish many men even for draft, and that it will be necessary to reduce British Divisions from 12 to 9 battalions each. He says further that even if the German attacks can be held, as is hoped, the British Divisions will become so exhausted in the process as to be fit for little employment afterwards. And expresses the hope that serious consideration may be given to their request for help. He suggests that to bring over a given number of men completely equipped as divisions will be much greater task than to bring same number of men as battalions and to transport....Then proposes that in order to secure these infantry reenforcements British Government is prepared to take risks as to their own supplies and provide sea transportation to these....

Without in any way interfering with present plans and arrangements for bringing our American troops. He proposes that we furnish for this purpose 150 battalions to be distributed 3 battalions to each British division so that they can retain their present strength of 12 battalions to each division. He thinks the question of whether these battalions would be brought to France or Great Britain for training could be settled later. But of course our battalions could be trained under our own officers. Later on, after serving with British divisions, if we so desired, they could be recalled for service with our own divisions and that everything would be done to meet our wishes in this and all other respects. Although he believes it would not serve any useful purpose to put these units into British divisions for less than four or five months. He expressed himself as fully appreciating American sentiment regarding service under our own flag but it was a question of that on the one hand or of Germany possibly establishing herself in a winning position on the other. The necessity of temporarily breaking up some of our divisions to meet this request was also discussed.

Paragraph 2. This whole question seems to me to be one of necessity, and we must consider the probability of strong German attacks in early spring and summer. While it would not be advisable in any way to alter our own program for bringing our divisions yet the offer of the British to provide sea transportation for such extra men as we may be able to furnish for temporary service in their army would not interfere with that. In meeting this emergency by reenforcing the British, our ultimate object of building up our own forces as planned, in order to provide a strong cohesive American Army to strike a decisive blow as early as possible, should be strictly adhered to. The moral effect upon our people at home of keeping our men in our own army under our own officers is of paRAM Ount importance. And in conceding that the emergency requires this temporary supply of men for the British, it ought to be distinctly understood that these men are to be available for return to their own divisional units as soon as transports, horses, and artillery can be brought over or otherwise provided. At that time such disposition can be made of American divisions as may be determined.

Paragraph 3. Have had a full and frank discussion of this question with the French as far as any such plans relates to them. And have stated that in my opinion, generally speaking it would be a dangerous experiment on account of difference in language to put our regiments into French divisions for active work. They apparently hold the same view. Mr. Clemenceau gave his entire approval of the plan of such aiding the British as above set forth. General Petain also gave it his approval.

Paragraph 4. I would therefore recommend (1) that this request of the British Government be given serious consideration from the point of view of our National attitude regarding service in another army; (2) that it be regarded as a temporary measure to meet a probable emergency; (3) that as soon as possible the remaining troops of divisions thus temporarily broken up be brought over and the division reorganized; (4) that division, brigade and regimental commanders and their staffs be sent over with their Infantry for training with corresponding British units; (5) that the Infantry be taken from those divisions that would not otherwise be transported until after June.

Paragraph 5. The above program must be considered as entirely apart from any plans we now have in operation, including all shipments of troops now going through England and the proposed shipments through Southampton on our own ships. All of these must be held as separate projects not to be confused with General Robertson's proposition, that is only such troops as the British themselves transport in additional tonnage should be available for the service with British divisions as proposed by General Robertson. In other words those troops brought through Brest or Southampton in our own ships would come under the plans for training proposed in my 441 or be sent here to our own training areas. I consider this as very important and would not approve or accept the British proposition except as a measure for providing additional men for them that can not be provided in any other way.

Paragraph 6. In this connection it should be insisted upon that the British Government continue to provide for their army as many men from England as possible, and it would be pertinent for our government to inquire just what the British Government proposes to do to keep up its own forces. When we make this concession, the tendency is certainly going to be to relax and let the burden fall on us to the detriment of our own preparations for decisive action later.
Pershing.