Dutch Agreement

For some months the United States and the Entente Allies have been conducting negotiations with the Dutch Government with the object of concluding a general commercial agreement.

A very clear statement of the character of these negotiations was made on March 12, to the Dutch Parliament by his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Holland. As appears from the statement the discussion proceeded upon the basis of two fundamental propositions, namely, that the United States and the Allies should facilitate the importation into Holland of foodstuffs and other commodities required to maintain her economic life, and that Holland should restore her merchant marine to a normal condition of activity.

It was the task of the negotiators to develop a specific application of these propositions which would be acceptable to the governments concerned.

Early in January, 1918, the negotiators came to an understanding which was embodied in a tentative agreement, which was submitted to the governments concerned in order that, if acceptable it might be ratified, or, if unacceptable, that a counter-proposal might be made.

The negotiations becoming prolonged, the Dutch delegates proposed, in order that their ships might sooner be put into remunerative service, that Dutch tonnage lying idle in American waters should, with certain exceptions, be immediately chartered to the United States for periods not exceeding ninety days. This proposal was accepted by the United States government, and on January 25, 1918, the Dutch Minister at Washington handed to the Secretary of State of the United States a note expressing the terms of the temporary chartering agreement and his government's acceptance thereof. This agreement provided, among other things, that 150,000 tons of Dutch shipping should at the discretion of the United States be employed partly in the service of Belgian Relief and partly for Switzerland on safe conduct to Cette, France, and that for each ship sent to Holland in the service of Belgian Relief a corresponding vessel should leave Holland for the United States. Two Dutch ships in the United States ports with cargoes of foodstuffs were to proceed to Holland, similar tonnage being sent in exchange from Holland to the United States for charter as in the case of other Dutch ships lying in the United States ports.

The agreement was on its face explicitly temporary in character and, being designed to meet an immediate situation, prompt performance was of the essence. The Dutch government at once disclosed, however, that it was unwilling or unable to carry out this chartering agreement which it had itself proposed. The first desire of the United States was to secure at once shipping, as contemplated by the agreement, to transport to Switzerland foodstuffs much needed by that State. One difficulty after another was, however, raised to postpone the chartering of Dutch ships for Swiss relief, and, although the reason was never formally expressed, it was generally known that the Dutch shipowners feared lest their ships should be destroyed by German submarines, even though on an errand of mercy, and though not traversing any of the so-called "danger zones" proclaimed by the German government. That this fear was not wholly unjustified has unhappily been shown by the recent act of the German government in sinking the Spanish ship "Sardinero" without outside the "danger zone", when carrying a cargo of grain for Switzerland, and after the submarine commander had ascertained this fact by an inspection of the ship's papers.

In respect of Belgian Relief, the Dutch government expressed its present inability to comply with the agreement on the ground that the German government had given Holland to understand that it would forcibly prevent the departure from Holland of the corresponding ships, which under the agreement were to leave coincidently for the United States. The Dutch government even felt itself unable to secure the two cargoes of foodstuffs, which under the agreement it was permitted to secure, since here again the German government intervened and threatened to destroy the equivalent Dutch tonnage which under the agreement was to leave Holland for the United States.

Nearly two months have elapsed since the making of the temporary chartering agreement, and the proposed general agreement has lain even longer without reply on the part of Holland. Meanwhile, German threats have grown more violent, that no with a view to preventing any permanent agreement should be adopted, or if adopted shall, like the and of forcing Holland to violate any temporary chartering agreement , be violated.

On March 7, through Great Britain, a final proposal, expiring on the 18th, was submitted to Holland. A reply has been received which, while in itself unacceptable, might under other conditions have served as a basis for further negotiations. But the events to which I have alluded had served to demonstrate conclusively that we have been attempting to negotiate where the essential basis for an agreement, namely, the meeting of free wills, is absent. Even were an agreement concluded, there is lacking that power of independent action which alone can assure performance. I say this not in criticism of the Dutch government. I profoundly sympathize with the difficulty of her position under the menace of a military power which has in every way demonstrated in neighboring Belgium its disdain of neutral rights. But, since coercion does in fact exist, no alternative is left to us but to accomplish, through the exercise of our indisputable rights as a sovereign, that which is so reasonable that under in other circumstances, we could be confident of accomplishing it by agreement. Steps are accordingly being taken to put into our service Dutch shipping lying within our territorial jurisdiction. This action on our part and the similar action which is being taken by governments associated with us leaves to Holland ample tonnage for her domestic and colonial needs. We have informed the Dutch government that her colonial trade will be facilitated and that she may at once send ships from Holland to secure the bread cereals which her people require. These ships will be freely bunkered and will be immune from detention on our part. The liner "New Amsterdam" which came within our jurisdiction under an agreement for her return, will, of course, be permitted at once to return to Holland. Not only so, but she will be authorized to carry back with her the two cargoes of foodstuffs which Holland would have secured under the temporary chartering agreement had not Germany prevented. Ample compensation will be paid to the Dutch owners of the ships which will be put into our service, and suitable provision will be made to meet the possibility of ships being lost through enemy action.

It is our earnest desire to safeguard to the fullest extent the interests of Holland and of her nationals. By exercising in this crisis our admitted right to control all property within our territory, we do no wrong to Holland. The manner in which we proposed to exercise this right and our proposals made to Holland concurrently therewith, cannot, I believe, fail to evidence to Holland the sincerity of our friendship toward her.