Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson

Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson

Baker, Newton Diehl, 1871-1937

WWP22397

1918 June 5

Newton D. Baker writes to Woodrow Wilson about transport of infantry and machine gune units to Europe.

Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1786-1957

My dear Mr. President
Mr. Jussrand called on General March yesterday afternoon and told him he had an appointment to see you today at two o'clock, at which time he is going to present a request of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, and Mr. Orlando for the June shipment of troops to Europe. I do not know what this joint request from the three Prime Ministers contemplates, but in all likelihood it will urge for the month of June further preferential shipments of infantry and machine gun units. I understand the British and ourselves estimate the June transportation capacity at 300,000 men. Our program for shipment in June is based on that number and comprises 120,000 infantry and machine gun personnel as such, 20,000 infantry replacements, making in all 140,000 infantry and machine gun personnel; the remainder, as now planned, is 160,000, and comprises Engineers, Artillery, Medical units, Signal Corps (including Air Service), and Service of the Rear troops, the latter being of great, if not indispensable, importance, as we are already landing at the French ports from our cargo ships, month by month, larger stocks of subsistence and other stores than we are able to evacuate away from the port, creating a congested situation which of course can not be indefinitely continued.

I have received today, from General Pershing, a cablegram of which I enclose a copy. From it you will observe that General Pershing feels that to a larger and larger degree the burden of this fighting is going to fall upon the American Army. Already, from all accounts we have, the American divisional units are giving the best sort of account of themselves, while there seems to be marked loss of cohesion among the British and French troops. For this reason, General Pershing is clear that the greatest military strength we can add to the Allied defensive line lies in complete American divisions operating under their own commanders and having the esprit de corps which comes from serving in their own units. General March concurs very strongly in General Pershing's view, and feels that probably some part of the apparent disorganization of the French and British forces proceeds from the fact that American troops have been brigaded with them, thus depriving the French and British soldiers of the sense of responsibility and esprit de corps which comes to them when they are members of an established French or British division, by making them divide responsibility with their American associates. General March also feels that American soldiers brigaded with either the French or British, serving under officers whose language or ways they do not understand, and fighting under another flag than that of their own country, lose a great element of moral strength. So that on the whole case General Pershing and General March are very urgent that the rapid formation of complete American divisions is of the highest importance.
From the beginning of this pressure for the shipment of American infantry and machine gun personnel, I have felt that we ought not be put in the position of failing to do what was suggested to us as essential to hold the German line, chiefly because I did not want the possibility of failure being attributed to us even if the course recommended by our Allies would not have prevented the failure. Nevertheless, the present situation is one in which the best thing to be done has to be determined on the facts as they are, and these seem to point quite clearly to the soundness of General Pershing's judgment, particularly when one takes into account the fine and steady service of our organized divisions as contrasted with the wavering and unsteady service of the British and French divisions which are composite in character by reason of the brigading of American troops with them.
The program for June as made up, involving the transportation of 140,000 infantry and machine gun personnel, ought in my judgment to satisfy the French and British, since it is a number in excess of any expectation they have at any time entertained; and the transportation of the other personnel deemed necessary by General Pershing and General March can not be prejudicial and must be helpful to the Allied cause if it in fact expedites the formation of complete American divisions with the advantages above pointed out.
Should Mr. Jusserand suggest the depletion of French and British divisions as reason for supplementing them with American personnel, the obvious military answer is that it would be better for them to consolidate two depleted divisions into one homogeneous division, all French or all British as the case might be, and to have an independent American division, with the advantage in each case of national sympathy, officers, and traditions all of the same kind with the men comprising the division.
I wish, too, it could be possible for you to urge upon Mr. Jusserand that suggestion contained in General Pershing's cablegram to the effect that Great Britain and France in this crisis ought to use the maximum manpower available to them. I do not know how fully they are doing this, but in no case ought any uncertainty to be left in the minds of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau that the United States desires its military effort to be supplementary to their maximum, rather than any replacement of any of their available strength. I am sending these observations so that you may at least have them in mind in your conference with Mr. Jusserand. 

Respectfully yours,
Newton D. Baker


d

Letter

Wilson, Woodrow, 1856-1924