William S. Graves to Peter C. Harris

Title

William S. Graves to Peter C. Harris

Creator

Graves, William Sidney, 1865-1940

Identifier

WWP22538

Date

1918 October 25

Source

Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1786-1957

Text

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCESS
IBERIA
CONFIDENTIAL.

From: The Commanding General.

To:The Adjutant General of the Army.

Subject: Intelligence Detachment.1. I find there is some difficulty in handling the Intelligence Detachment sent here for service in Siberia. The idea of most of these officers is that they should operate on the same general principles as are used in France. As my guide in determining what is desired in Siberia, I have taken the unsigned "aide memoir" of the Department of State, dated July 17th, which was handed to me by the Secretary of War in Kansas City. In this "aide memoir" one of the objects mentioned was "to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence".

This limiting phrase, "as may be acceptable to the Russians", of course hampers all activities. I think, however, it is a very wise limitation. These intelligence officers are energetic, competent and very ambitious to accomplish what they think is for the good of the United States, and their desire, I am sure, is to be hampered as little as possible by the limitations placed upon me. I have been trying to use them to aid the Russians who have been selected to supervise in Vladivostok censorship of mail and telegraph and for the examination of passports, but, with the greatest of caution and the most specific instructions, I find they take the lead and soon it appears to the onlooker that the Americans have taken over these activities.

I am going to send these officers out to various points in Siberia, with very specific and definite instructions, with the idea of getting all information possible on military, political and economic conditions, with a view to helping in any way we can in the regenration of Siberia. This information will be valuable in helping distribute American supplies sent here. The Russians cannot be depended upon to do things according to our ideas. This is particularly true now when all Russians are uncertain as to what political faction will be on top when a government is established in Russia.

As to the censorship of the press, mail and post office, it is impossible for it to be made effective. The Japanese want to handle their own boats and their own people, and so do other representatives of foreign governments, to a greater or less extent. If such control be established in Vladivostok alone, it becomes a farce, because any supervision here can be easily evaded by sending news from other parts of the country just a short distance from Vladivostok. To take complete charge would be most offensive to the Russians and would not be in accordance with War Department instructions.

2. The Japanese have practically filled all empty barracks east of Lake Baikal. I cabled recently that, in my judgment, they had 60,000 troops east of Lake Baikal, and I feel sure my estimate is not above what they actually have. I have just received word from Verhnudinsk that they have 8,000 Japanese there, and that we will be unable to get any quarters there. Under the guise of combined operation, and the need for troops at certain places, I have practically been sewed up to the railway line between Vladivostok and Habarovsk; and the Japanese have more troops at practically every station occupied by United States troops than I have. It is evidently their desire to keep American troops from being stationed alone at any station in Siberia, and they have already accomplished their desire by occupying all of the places.

I understood from the Secretary, when in Kansas City, that the Japanese were to send 10,000 or 12,000 troops to Siberia. I think they undoubtedly now have 40,000 in Siberia, and about 20,000 in the Seventh Division beween Chita and Pogranitchnaya on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Apparently, our Government keeps the Japanese well informed as to all orders given me, but I am kept in the dark as to any agreements between the Japanese government and the United States Government. I think, generally speaking, it would be well to give me such information, especially such as affects the strength of Allied troops in Siberia, and limits as to movements. The Japanese character is sufficiently well known in the War Department to make it unnecessary for me to state that it is impossible for me to find out their intentions or strength here. Two or three days ago a detachment of 600 Japanese landed at Possiet Bay, which action apparently very much excited the Russian people.3. Yesterday General Ivanoff-Rinoff, Minister of War for the new Russian government at Omsk, called upon me. He seemed to be a man of moderate convictions, for a Russian. He stated to me that he had just arrived from Omsk, and from all information that he could gather and from what he had seen on the railways he was convinced the Japanese were permanently establishing themselves in this part of Siberia. He said their flags were flying from all railway stations; Japanese sentinels were stationed at these railway stations; and that in some cases they had thrown the Russian troops out of Russian barracks. In reply, I informed him that public announcement had been made by the United States and Japan as to their objects here, and I felt sure there were no good grounds for his anxiety. He then replied that the Japanese were encouraging factions in this part of Siberia, and he could come to no conclusion other than that it was their desire to prevent the Russian people from getting together. He cited the case of Ataman Kalmikoff at Habarovsk. He said that he was being encouraged and, in his judgment, given money by the Japanese, and it is a well known fact that he is a murderer and a robber, and naturally the Russians could not understand why such a man was being encouraged by the Allies. I replied that I had no evidence as to these facts and, consequently, had absolutely nothing to say other than that the policy of the United States was not to interfere in the internal squabbles of Russia, and I believed it should be possible to make any man in Russia comply with their laws.

The President of the Zemstvo and the Mayor of the city, who were in office prior to the Bolsheviki regime, also came to me and made practically the same complaints. They all said that they must look to America to see that the announcement of the Allies as to their intentions when coming here was carried out.

As to the object of these Russians in coming to me with these stories, I cannot be absolutely sure. The Russian seems to thrive on controversy, and I have to be particularly guarded in my conversation with them, because of fear of exaggeration as to what I said, and also because I am always looking for an intent on the part of certain Russians to stir up trouble between the Allies. My relations with Japanese Headquarters have been very cordial, and they have always, apparently, desired to cooperate with me in matters within our respective authorities. I am beginning, however, to believe that the Japanese soldiers and junior officers are very high-handed in their dealings with the Russian people. Feeling is undoubtedly growing more bitter against them all the time, and the feeling toward the American soldiers is becoming better all the time. This probably has something to do with two or three unfortunate incidents which occurred recently.

(Signed) Wm. S. Graves
Wm. S. GRAVES,

Major General, Commanding.
W.S.G.--MLB

Original Format

Letter

To

Harris, P. C. (Peter Charles), 1865-1951

Files

http://resources.presidentwilson.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/WWI1276.pdf

Collection

Citation

Graves, William Sidney, 1865-1940, “William S. Graves to Peter C. Harris,” 1918 October 25, WWP22538, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.