Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson

Title

Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson

Creator

Baker, Newton Diehl, 1871-1937

Identifier

WWP21430

Date

1917 May 27

Source

Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1786-1957

Language

English

Text

My dear Mr. President

I return herewith the letter of Mr. Moore which was sent to you by Colonel House, and with it a memorandum drawn for my information by General Bliss, in which very warm concurrence is expressed with Mr. Moore's views. I confess, however, a belief that it is not going to be possible for us to act on the theory advocated by Mr. Moore, and to some extent at least approved by General Bliss, for the reason that our own country will not be willing to continue here a long drawn out process of training with the ultimate intention of doing fighting on a large scale at some later time.
I think it essential to keep the country onin the spirit which made it necessary for us to go into this war. That spirit, I think to be a compound of two motives; first, the determination express by you to make the world safe for democracy, and second, the desire to bring the war to the earliest possible conclusion.
For us to sit by and allow the French and British to be worn down by further attrition would start three kinds of criticism; first, it would be said that our part in the war was too slow, and that the red tape of the General Staff was prevailing over the impetuous wish of Americans to be of present assistance, and this would be based upon statements made by the English and French, and also by soldiers in our own Army, to the effect that a long drawn out period of training in this country is unnecessary. Second, it would be said that we were running the chance of the French or Russians breaking down, and thus immeasurably increasing the size of our own task later. Third, it would be said that the immediate and overwhelming aggregation of forces, including our own, is the way most speedily to terminate the war, and not to feed nations to the German machine in detail.
I confess my own mind inclines to sympathize in some part with the last view expressed. As it seems to me the paramount objective ought to be the early conclusion of the war, and even if our men are not prepared to the highest point, I think we can trust the discretion of our own officers to assign them to less important tasks in the fighting until their preparation is perfected, but their mere presence on the fighting front relieves better prepared men of the French and English armies for the more trying operations.
I have this morning been going over the question of building cantonments for the forces which we are proposing to train. Originally it was estimated that $77,000,000 would be needed for this purpose. A committee of officers aided by the most eminent and upright experts in construction, have this morning told me that in their judgment a minimum of $140,000,000 would be needed for that purpose. This, of course, is on the theory of building thirty-two separate cantonments, and having in training at one time in the United States 1,250,000 men. I think the task is impossible. I do not believe the supplies of lumber and building material are in existence to build thirty-two cities of this size between now and the first of September. I do not believe the carpenters and other workmen are in the country for any such building program, and I have therefore just directed the General Staff to restudy with these experts the whole problem, with a view to cutting the program in half, building sixteen cantonments rather than thirty-two, and proceeding on the theory that sixteen large divisional camps thus constructed will be successively occupied; being filled with new levies as those which have had three or four months training in them are sent either to England or France for the completion of their training.
As a matter of fact we are going to spend very large sums of money in France providing shelter and accommodations for our men there. One of the great difficulties in France has been the housing question. The attempt to use the ill ventilated and unsewered houses of the French Peasants as army quarters has undoubtedly greatly increased the prevalence of disease, and on every ground our American forces there ought to be adequately houses. It would seem, therefore, bad economy to duplicate these buildings, one set in France and another set here, and rather in the interest of both speed and economy to make our constructions in this country of such character as to insure the health of our troops in training, and of such a size as to enable us by successive use of them to send our troops in a continuous flow from this country to France and England where they could at the outset occupy existing camps used by the French and English for the training of their own reserves and ultimately coming into prepared housing during the period of their remaining as reserve battalions to supply the actual force at the front.
This memorandum calls for no decision from you, but I will ask the opportunity of bringing to your attention the result of the General Staff's study now in progress since the adoption of any determination with regard to cantonment building will require a determination of our general policy in the matter of dispatching troops overseas at the present and in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

Newton D. Baker
Secretary of War.




The President,
The White House.

Original Format

Letter

To

Wilson, Woodrow, 1856-1924

Files

http://resources.presidentwilson.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/WWI0319.pdf

Collection

Citation

Baker, Newton Diehl, 1871-1937, “Newton D. Baker to Woodrow Wilson,” 1917 May 27, WWP21430, World War I Letters, Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library & Museum, Staunton, Virginia.